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   Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to go towards proving that the generalist 
ambitions championed in Medical Ethics discourse are both misguided and 
dangerous to that discourse’s meaningfulness. It will be claimed that the 
generalist undertones which underscore the discourse are motivated by the 
looming threat of irrationalist accounts of moral reasoning. I first make 
attempts to show that generalism itself does not avoid this threat. I then aim to 
show that irrationalism, in turn, is predicated upon a particular and highly 
contestable conception of empirical epistemological ideas which are, post-
analysis, simply unsustainable.  
I use the work of recent particularist contributors to philosophical debates 
regarding meaning to show - via a reading of Wittgenstein’s later work - which 
this empiricist epistemology fails.  I then defend this reading of Wittgenstein 
against others, by trying to show that there is enough in the accounts of 
theorists such as McDowell to suggest that it can rescue meaning in ethical 
utterances.  
Our discussion will take us through various areas of thought in claiming that a 
particularist account really does give the best explanation of moral reasoning. 
Epistemological, motivational, phenomenological and ontological concerns will 
all be assessed and contrasted with competing generalist claims. I also 
critically assess various particularist theorists’ claims, making the case for a 
specific form of non-reductive ethics. This is cashed out by providing a 
commentary on the very recent debate regarding thick concepts.  
As the particularist position I advocate is largely found by way of adjudication 
between the pre-existing positions, I cannot make much claim of originality 
here. But by way of applying a thoroughly worked out particularist account to 
Medical Ethics - one which explains what motivates generalist accounts - I 
aim to elucidate in an important way how the generalist underscoring is not 
just incorrect, but also damaging to ethical debates in this domain; as well as 
providing a more thorough account of how we actually can improve Medical 
Ethics via first-order ethical reasoning. These last points give the thesis its 
unique interest.  
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Epistemological and Moral Reasoning in Medical Ethics 
 
Introduction: 
This thesis aims at critiquing the academic domain of Medical Ethics, which I 
will define as the attempt to use methods which find their foundations in philosophy 
to help us tackle and supposedly solve ethical and practical problems that arise 
within the practice of medicine. The overarching thesis will contend that the way that 
the discourse there is implemented carries all the hallmarks of serious confusions in 
philosophy about how we can reason about ethical problems. Indeed, the majority of 
the thesis will be unapologetically focussed on deep philosophical assumptions 
which ground the sort of theory which makes itself available to be easily ‘applied’ to a 
practice.  
It might make sense to give a small history, to elucidate the reasons for my choosing 
to not keep this thesis restricted to the more academically driven philosophical 
domain. Having graduated from my undergraduate, I decided to take up a course 
which could make the skills I had learned in philosophy more applicable to a job 
market. To this end I undertook an MA in Medical Ethics and Law. What I found 
being taught there, mostly to an audience of soon to be or already qualified medical 
practitioners became the motivation for this thesis. The ideas that were championed 
were precisely those that could be easily marshalled into systematic accounts and 
then applied to awaiting social systems, doing so at the cost of what I can only 
describe as vital first order moral goods. Everything I had come to love about ethics - 
studies of virtue, respect, integrity and meaning – were minimalised in a surprising 
way; firstly, in the name of practicality; but also in the name of a very narrowly 
conceived notion of rationality and objectivity. There seemed to be an unwavering 
belief that anything outside strictly statable, universally comprehensible and easily 
actionable principles and processes failed to really hit its target. 
This thesis aims to undermine that picture, and thus has an eye on two separate 
opponents: not just the generalist but also the irrationalist. I want to show that it is a 
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certain conception of how we come to know the things we all feel very certain saying 
we do know, that when thinking philosophically, casts what I will term as ‘the 
unfavourable comparison’ upon ethical discourse. Furthermore, this conception does 
so in such a way that those who wish to defend morality are willing to create a 
caricature of it in order to keep its realist pretensions alive. The intuition that there 
must be something we can still say - in the face of an empiricist theory of mind and 
epistemology which almost rules the roost by fiat, given the epistemological success 
story of scientific practices – is admirable. Once we have bent and altered morality to 
fit around this epistemological conception of knowledge acquisition, however, if we 
no longer recognise the reasons that remain as being distinctively ours, then it 
seems evident we are doing a vast disservice to the whole ethical enterprise. It is 
surely incumbent upon us to make sure that both medical personnel and their 
patients understand the best reasons that are really there to be discussed are ones 
they already know intimately; not ones prescribed by experts guided by a very 
specific conception brought on by highly contestable philosophical worries.  
As the targets of this thesis are wide ranging then, the thesis will necessarily be wide 
ranging as well. I will start by critiquing various versions of generalist theories, whose 
content, form, or both still have influence in the domain of practical ethics. I will show 
how each has limited either that form, or content, or both in order to comply with the 
overarching worries that are ever present in a field whose epistemological success is 
forever compared and contrasted to that of the scientific and empirical enterprise.  
The first section of the thesis will attack the idea of overtly theoretical and generalist 
reasoning. By showing that no generalist theory works in a way that is intuitively 
acceptable, as well as diagnosing various methodological flaws in the attempt to 
ground such theories - either by way of overt rationalism or naturalism - I aim to steer 
us towards the jagged rocks of irrationalism. 
Once we are face to face with this worry, and certain that we have nowhere inside 
reductive or definitional theoretical constructions left to hide, I will aim to show the 
flawed assumptions that are apparent in comparisons of morality with the scientistic 
and empirical claims. This will require a review of reasoning itself. Epistemological, 
methodological and psychological factors of what it is to arrive at a good reason in 
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every field will hopefully start to show that the unfavourable comparison is also an 
unwarranted one.  
My main line of attack will match that which is attributed mostly to John McDowell; 
but also that which has been taken up by various Neo-Aristotelian theorists. It aims 
at exploiting deep insights held within the unsystematic account of the later 
Wittgenstein in order to show once and for all that the empiricist theory of mind - the 
best explanation I believe we have as to why philosophically minded moralists so 
readily reject first order ethical concepts as valid points of discussion – rests upon a 
fallacy. That excursion will again put pressure on our ideas of objectivity, but from 
this position the comparison is not with another domain of thought. Empirical claims 
will be fumbling for a ground as much as moral ones are. Rather, from here it will be 
an intuitive ideal of objectivity which will be threatening the very idea of meaning and 
normativity in all forms of reasoning. Again, this follows the sorts of issues that 
McDowell was dealing with in the late 1970s and early 1980s. If we can salvage 
reasoning from this position without giving too much up, as I believe we can, we will 
emerge with empirical claims and moral claims both properly situated and 
understandable. Their distinctive qualities will still be recognisable, but neither one 
will need to be understood as holding primacy over the other. It is crucial to note that 
much of this attack on generalism and non-cognitivism must be attributed to 
McDowell.  
The originality of the thesis finds its ground after these lengthy excursions into 
McDowell’s work; excursions which at most act so as to bring together ideas which 
can be found in various articles into a clearer image. The originality of the thesis lies 
in both assessing the ways in which McDowell’s own account might be bettered - 
here taking ideas from such theorists as Garfield (2001), Wiggins (2000, 2006), 
Thomas (2006) and Crary (2009) - to see which parts of each rendering we might 
keep and which we might lose to help give us a better grasp of the scope of the 
Wittgensteinian inspiration McDowell uses to defend ethics. 
Section 6 includes what I claim is a crucial distinction between the McDowellian non-
reductive particularism we develop and another particularist theory – namely that of 
Jonathan Dancy (2001). This comparison is inspired by an analysis of some tricky 
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issues regarding thick concepts which have garnered much recent attention and aim 
to undermine the non-reductive picture I am aiming to build.    
It is only once all this is done that we will turn to the domain of Medical Ethics and 
Clinical Practice, to contemplate how the sorts of moral reasons we have earned the 
right to can help to remedy the issues which are prevalent in that academic domain, 
and to see if the sorts of generalist tendencies we hoped to resist at the outset can 
indeed be resisted. We will also look to see if the non-reductive particularist picture 
that we have built can have anything meaningful to contribute to the sorts of 
problems that arise in medicine. I will state now that my aim in this thesis is to 
discuss the moral, metaphysical and epistemological assumptions that underscore 
applied moral discourse. As such I will be aiming to stay out of the fray of any 
specific conflicts that might occur within that discourse.  
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Section 1: Practical and Theoretical Reasoning 
 
Some Preliminary Comments: 
Moral reasoning, if there really is such a thing, is about producing practical 
outcomes which are in some way the ‘right’ outcomes. When one is faced with a 
position in which one needs to work out ‘what one ought to do’ one is faced with a 
practical problem. Not all practical problems are, at first blush, anything like moral 
problems. When we decide what we should have for breakfast, which holiday 
destination would be suitable for our family, or whether to take out health insurance, 
we are faced with a practical problem. Whilst planning a family holiday I will be 
plausibly constrained by various factors: the time I can take off work, the expense, 
making sure the destination suits all the persons, that it has appropriate facilities for 
children or the elderly and so on. While such decision making is evaluative, the 
values involved are not immediately evident as being akin to moral values. Deciding 
whether grandma would value seeing the museums of Florence more than the 
natural beauty of the Gorge du Verdon and whether this preference should be seen 
as holding any importance to my final decision of where to go, is not the same as, 
say, deciding whether I value her autonomy enough to not extensively persuade her 
to try one more bout of chemotherapy, despite her previous protests that she would 
prefer not to go through the ordeal.  
What we have for breakfast in the morning seems an even more obviously non-
moral decision than choosing the holiday. Still, what I ‘ought to do’ seems to have 
some moral sense to it. If I wish my daughter to have her favourite breakfast of 
bacon sandwiches as a treat and there’s only enough bacon for one, or if I should 
have a low cholesterol breakfast on my doctor’s say-so, I may still here have an 
evaluative choice to make that, at least prima facie, moves beyond merely attending 
to my more selfish desires, non-controversially.  
Practical choices, by hinging on which of several possible things one ought to 
choose are characteristically normative; and norms reflect values. Deciding to keep 
to a low cholesterol breakfast because it makes my spouse happy to see me 
following my doctor’s orders – even though I’d much prefer the ‘full English’ - shows 
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that I value my spouse’s happiness over my own immediate preference in this 
matter. Framed as such, the decision seems a somewhat moral one: underlying the 
choice of greasy meat or cornflakes is a decision between values, such as my own 
life expectancy, the happiness of my wife, my evaluation of long term health versus 
immediate pleasure. As nearly all practical decisions which are not a choice between 
two alternatives which might best be categorised as a value-equal preference 
(‘cornflakes or branflakes?’) have the potential to be decisions which exhibit values I 
hold about what kind of life to live, I will not yet make any major distinction between 
practical choices and moral choices. Non value-equal choices all exhibit some sense 
of evaluation of ‘what matters the most to me’ which will take the form of reasons in 
favour of my decisions, and the content and outcomes of these decisions seem apt 
for obviously moral assessments. If I choose the bacon over the cornflakes I might 
be open to criticism for weakness of will in not heeding my doctor, callousness 
towards my spouse, or greediness in denying my daughter. Not all theorists see the 
distinction this way, but drawing any borders around what constitutes a moral 
decision at this stage would beg the question against those who allow that nearly all 
practical decisions exhibit values that speak to moral evaluation, or those who 
believe none do.  
Even for those who do take a reduced view, most would accept that moral decisions 
are all practical decisions, (even if that equation cannot be reversed). They are 
normative. They exhibit values; or at least our evaluations. The output of moral 
reasoning is practical; that is, it leads to actions. In contrast to this type of reasoning 
stands another type: theoretical reasoning. As stated in the introduction, above, 
when one takes part in moral philosophy one always has an eye upon objectivity. We 
want to say that we are in some way getting things right, that the end result (the 
action of booking the holiday to Florence as opposed to the south of France) is 
something we did because it really was the ‘better’ option. This implies that we can 
give reasons for our action which show its superiority to other options on the basis of 
the decision making process we went through. We justify our actions with reasons. If 
these reasons are to mean anything then they are set against a standard, the 
purpose of which is to show that the decision was a better one. The postulation of a 
standard aims at ‘grounding’ the decision as something that was not just an arbitrary 
choice; rather it shows how this choice is of greater value than another option. But 
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what standard we might invoke when asked by an interlocutor who disagrees is 
never instantly apparent in the practical case. It is not, in the face of disagreement, 
something we can simply point to in order to settle the issue once and for all. The 
very fact that the interlocutor disagrees implies her own standard is different than our 
own. Her standard says that alternative factors should have been given greater value 
when the decision was being made (“why just focus on Grandma’s wants – the kids 
would be much happier in France!”) 
At first glance, most pieces of theoretical reasoning have none of the problems that 
are associated with practical reasoning in this regard. Rather than the output of such 
reasoning being an action, or a motivating belief that justifies an action, it is instead 
just a belief – something which, if the result of good reasoning, reflects the way that 
the world actually is. And unlike practical reasoning, where one can only attempt to 
ground one’s claims via invoking a standard which is itself open to critical 
assessment, most examples of theoretical reasoning have an obvious ground: the 
world as it is anyway. The output is thus an ‘is’ claim. The distinction between the 
two types of reasoning thus brings out the logical distinction famously made by 
Hume: the ‘is/ought’ distinction. ‘Is’ claims are logically distinct from ‘ought’ claims in 
various ways. What ‘is’ the case seems non-controversial in its essence. A good 
piece of theoretical reasoning ends with a belief that reflects the real world, the world 
as it is absent of our own biases, values and preferences and exists in its own right 
as a set of causes and effects. A belief can be tested and shown to be a belief that is 
in some very real sense ‘right or wrong’. Crucial to such claims are modes of 
verification, and in the natural sciences we have a method of investigation that gives 
us insight into how accurate our ‘is’ claims are. A belief is a simple proposition that 
thus can be established as being true or false, or at least a close approximation 
dependent upon the modes of verification or falsification available, against a 
standard that is not in any sense observer dependent; what keeps making a belief 
true or false is the picture of the natural world against which it is cast. Moreover, the 
features of the natural world are subject to constant forces in the form of constant 
causal physical laws which help us to predict effects from causes, or work out what 
caused a certain phenomenon. These laws are the very stuff of more complex 
examples of theoretical reasoning. These combined features all contribute to us 
feeling that when we reason to a conclusion of the ‘is’ form, assuming we have the 
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right sort of evidence at hand, then the output is a belief that can be called 
knowledge. 
The contrast just drawn between theoretical and practical reasoning leaves the latter 
in a bad light in epistemic terms. The features which distinguish the two are 
unfavourable in such a way as to suggest that even to address the mental processes 
involved in practical reasoning as though they constitute an actual form of reasoning 
is no more than a charitable misnomer. It will be the purpose of this section to 
alleviate practical reasoning from the burden of this contrast in two ways. Firstly I will 
press the idea that the evidence in theoretical reasoning is non-controversial. 
Secondly, I will attack the idea that the deductive form that leads to a theoretical 
conclusion in which such evidence is utilised is a necessary element for the output of 
a piece of reasoning to be  described as knowledge. 
The suggested threat to practical reason rests on a contrast of the content and form 
that constitutes a piece of such reasoning to that exhibited in theoretical reasoning. 
By showing that theoretical reasoning has similar problems to the ones which give us 
pause when considering its practical cousin, we will be left with two options: take up 
a sceptical position on reasoning as a whole, or accept that the prima facie 
advantages of theoretical reasoning discussed above are not necessary markers for 
attributing knowledge to the output of a piece of reasoning.  I will opt for the latter 
option, with further arguments for this position coming later in the thesis. The final 
part of this section will show how lessening the distinction between the two sorts of 
reasoning is crucial to getting on in the world. While what ‘is the case’ and what one 
‘ought to do’ will remain logically distinct, I will address the idea that reasoning 
always has a purpose, and that in using reasons in the characteristic way that we do 
involves a mesh of both practical judgement and theoretical judgement. This will 
involve canvassing various options offered by moral theories for addressing the 
distinctively practical content of moral issues. As we will see there, the epistemic 
form of theoretical reasoning still has a serious draw which in turn shapes the 
content of most moral theories.  
 
1.1 On the content of evidence: 
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As stated above, practical reasoning seems to be at a deficit to theoretical 
reasoning in an epistemic sense. The intuition that guides this thought is that the 
various features available to theoretical belief claims which are not recognisable in 
ought claims (that the natural world grounds their rightness or wrongness; that they 
are straight forwardly factive; that they have an accepted form of verification…) act 
as markers for the correct application of the concept of ‘knowledge’ by a competent 
user.  As has already been mentioned, if we wish for our moral claims to be taken 
seriously - as well as the majority of practical claims, given their conspicuously 
evaluative nature - then there must be a way to show that the discourse, if it is to be 
a meaningful one, is in some sense ‘truth-oriented’. For us to make an assertion that 
the conclusion of a piece of reasoning is true we need an epistemic ‘hook’; 
something which shows why we believe that this claim, and not other claims which 
oppose it, is truthful (and by a matter of inference that the opposing claims are false).  
Given the above analysis of the differences between the two forms of reasoning, 
however, if we accept that the features that theoretical reasoning has which practical 
reasoning lacks constitute necessary markers for a piece of reasoning to lead to a 
conclusion that can be claimed to be truthful then the idea that practical reasoning 
can lead to knowledge seems under serious threat. Is the moral discourse a bogus 
one then; one which is given an unjustified air of objectivity by the complex language 
we have developed around moral and evaluative concepts which underwrites our 
moves within it? (Gibbard, 2003)  
It should first be noted that there is a form of practical reasoning that is acceptable 
even to those who believe that the natural world, as science reveals it to us, contains 
everything that ‘is’ the case and therefore the totality of true propositions. When one 
makes an ‘ought’ claim, one is expressing a statement that says not how the world 
is, but how it ‘ought’ to be. We form an intention to act so as to fulfil this conception. 
If I would prefer Florence to Marseille, or think I ought to have a word with Grandma 
about her attitude to various cancer treatments, then it is rational that I set about to 
act so as to bring the world into line with my end (whatever that may be) by 
assessing the various means to achieving it. The various accounts which can accept 
this form of instrumental (ends-means) reasoning, whilst still denying the truthfulness 
or universality of the ‘ought’ which is its output, are labelled ‘non-cognitivist’ theories. 
We might say that such theorists would claim that finding the means to what we think 
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we ‘ought to do’ is rational, but that the proposition ‘I ought to do…’ is not apt to be 
called truthful or a piece of knowledge, for it is hedged in terms of a relative form of 
rationality.  
If I believe that Grandma should try chemotherapy then I ought to think of the best 
means by which to persuade her to try chemotherapy. But the ‘ought’ is not 
universal. It reflects only my own intentions, values, desires and ends. And these 
values themselves have no place inside the conception of the natural world as 
science reveals it to us. The desires which drive me are non-cognitive; a projection 
of my own ideals which, as they remain devoid of an epistemic hook to anything that 
exists in the natural world, cannot be the output of a truth-oriented piece of reasoning 
and thus can be declared to be neither right nor wrong; they just are. 
What can be assessed, once my ends are known, is the effectiveness of the means 
which I choose to achieve my end. If one’s end is to get to Florence as quickly as 
possible, one acts irrationally if one chooses the boat instead of the available 
aeroplane as the best available means. In this diminished sense, even by the non-
cognitivist’s lights, practical reasoning is still possible and its output is rational. 
Reason speaks only to the relations between the physical causes in the world, 
though, and never to values which drive the practical reasoning; its end or aim. 
Whether one should have a particular aim is not a matter of reasoning; how one 
achieves one’s aim once it is non-cognitively given is. Once again this highlights the 
idea that theoretical reasoning has a distinct advantage over practical reasoning. 
The underlying idea is that the norms that are in place for the acceptance of certain 
aims or goals as being better than others cannot be grounded by anything but our 
contingent social practices or mental constitution; how we were raised to value X 
over Y, or how we are psychologically constituted so as to value X over Y. But social 
practices and the makeup of our mental states seems an arbitrary and purely relative 
matter. The presence of norms in our decision making thus threatens the notions of 
knowledge, rationality and truth in any end-norm. Those things are present, however, 
in finding the means to that end. 
But the naturalistic conception of theoretical reasoning also has a normative slant, 
just deeper down. If we can show that this is indeed the case then the contrast 
between theoretical and practical reasoning used to cast aspersions upon the latter 
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form of reasoning will be shown to be an unfair contrast. Let us take a simple case of 
a theoretical assertion: ‘My mother is wearing a green dress today’. At first blush this 
statement seems to be one which could be seen as a proposition for which the 
evidence is so apparent that it can be seen as immediately rationally compelling and 
apt for being a belief that one can assert in the appropriate sense – the sense that 
we just ‘know’ it is true. But if this is the case, how can this be reasoning at all? 
Surely one just looks and on the immediate sensory evidence one knows. As any 
epistemology undergraduate can tell us though, sensory data is not so kind as to 
leave no room for doubt.  
P1: If I can trust my senses then my direct sensory experience reveals facts about 
the world 
P2: My direct sensory experience indicates my mother to be wearing a green dress 
P3: I can trust my senses 
∴Therefore my mother is wearing a green dress 
 
Premise three is always contestable. While the argument is valid, the contestability 
of the third premise means it comes up short of being sound and as such its 
conclusion need not be seen as rationally compelling. A fault in my eyesight, the 
unexpected arrival of my mother’s long lost twin, bad lighting, a matching top-and-
skirt combination which only appears to be a dress from afar; all of these options 
could explain how the third premise denies a deductive transition from sensory 
experience to a factual conclusion. One has to make a judgement that in this case 
one can truly trust the sensory data that is presented to them. Waking up in bed after 
seeing my mother in a green dress with no memories in between could indicate I 
have awoken from a dream with this content or perhaps that I fainted and was put to 
bed after seeing my mother in a green dress. As either option explains the 
circumstances, neither compels rational assent as to its truth. Again a judgement is 
called for.  
Now take a scientific claim: 
P1: Washing cotton garments in excess of 50 degrees Celsius will shrink the 
garment 
P2: This garment is made of cotton   
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P3: I have washed it in excess of 50 degrees Celsius 
∴The garment will be shrunk 
 
Premise one states a scientific theory which predicts the effect of heated water of a 
certain temperature on cotton. While this proposition is the end of a scientific theory, 
there is a logical gap which stops it from being one that compels rational acceptance. 
One can doubt that the methods of the studies which have produced the theory are 
conclusive; or that the paradigm in which the theory is based is correct (“it’s an 
outcome of God’s anger at our using cotton for such frivolous garments and washing 
them at such expense of natural resources that explains it being ruined”). While 
these options seem unreasonable, they are not illogical. As such their 
reasonableness seems to hang not on certain truths but heavily engrained norms. 
These simple examples show that there is a normative bent to theoretical reasoning 
also, and it occurs due to the fact that the evidence that we use when reasoning that 
it’s better to believe one thing over the next never logically entails the assertion. 
Those who argue that the naturalistic conception of the world as science reveals it to 
us contains all the ‘is’ propositions there can ever be, all the truths, have already 
begged the question against those who disagree with this statement. When we 
decide that a certain feature or certain features act as evidence for our forming a 
belief, we are not just assessing that the belief follows from the evidence, but that 
these features constitute the right sort of evidence for forming this belief. Thus it is 
appropriate to say: ‘one ought to believe that cotton garments shrink when washed in 
excess of 50 degrees Celsius’ or ‘one ought to believe my mother is wearing  green 
dress today’. In making such a claim one is also evaluating the evidence on which 
the belief claim is made as being apt for supporting the claim. But this only 
elucidates just how normative even empirical belief claims can be. And if theoretical 
reasoning fails to be non-normative then the fact that practical reasoning contains 
norms more conspicuously does not pose such a threat to it as we first might have 
thought. It is not just the natural world that grounds such claims, but the notion that 
the natural world ought to ground these types of claims; that the way we investigate 
this feature of the natural world ought to ground this specific claim; and that the way 
the natural world impinges upon my senses ought to allow me to make this specific 
claim (though at other times I may be less certain in my assertion of said claim).  
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That we are forced, even in the theoretical model of reasoning, to make a judgement 
call regarding the evidence we are using, should likewise lessen the pull of the non-
cognitivist assessment of what is happening when we reason practically. That the 
natural world does not act as a ground for our particular ends may not be such an 
issue. After all, neither is it a sufficient ground for our belief that our sensory data, or 
a scientific theory, provide ample data for making a theoretical assertion, or coming 
to believe that assertion. We will come back to non-cognitivist theories in later 
sections. (4 in particular) For now let’s be content in seeing the distinction between 
the content of theoretical and practical claims as a lessened threat to those of us 
who believe that practical, and therefore moral claims, might be apt for knowledge. 
 
1.2 The form of reasoning: 
While it is clear then that our first worry for practical reasoning can be assuaged by 
showing there are more parallels between practical and theoretical reasoning than 
might have first been apparent - given that there is no simple justification in 
expounding either beliefs or intentions on the grounds of simple access to the natural 
world - there are still credible differences between them which might cause further 
worries. While there is room to doubt the soundness of syllogisms of the theoretical 
type, they still seem to be conducive to producing valid conclusions; something not 
readily available in the practical realm at first blush. The normativity present in a 
case of theoretical reasoning causes trouble for their content, but not their form. 
Whether or not we agree that the evidence is the correct evidence for the first 
premise, once we have put it into place in the syllogism then the rest follows as a 
matter of necessity. Deductive reasoning here seems perfectly valid as a means to 
arriving at a conclusion. But practical reasoning does not start with a belief; rather it 
starts with a desire, intention or end. This takes up the first premise. The minor 
premise then states something factual, which suggests a means of achieving this 
end, a belief, which by our analysis in 1.1 would be required to be the conclusion of a 
piece of theoretical reasoning or something that hits us in a flash  (which indicates a 
normative aspect of how the agent sees the world). This form of argument aims to 
suggest that this is the right means to achieving that end, leading to a practical 
conclusion as to how one ought to proceed.  
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This shows how normativity appears as a double dose of doubt in practical 
reasoning. Not only does the second premise, the factual premise, suffer from the 
normativity described above which leads to possibly unsound arguments, the 
conclusion itself (by virtue of relating to the end or desire in the major premise) 
describes something patently normative; an ought statement, which appears to 
render it unsuitable for being a valid (and therefore necessary) conclusion. A piece of 
deductive logic used in theoretical reasoning can be criticised for being unsound 
when the ‘if → then’ relationship which makes up the major premise is open for 
criticism; but this has no bar to the validity of the argument. The ‘if → then’ still 
retains its necessity in the conclusion of the reasoning, relative to the reasoning, 
regardless of whether the first premise holds:  
P1: X → Y 
P2: X 
 ∴ Y (necessarily Y given the acceptance of P1) 
 
Whereas in practical reasoning the fact that X → Y serves as the minor premise 
renders the practical conclusion as not being a matter of necessity at all.  
P1: I desire Y/ Y is my end 
P2: X → Y 
∴ I ought to X so as to achieve Y  
 
The introduction of a desire/end strips the ‘→’ of the logical necessity it exhibited 
when it applied to the conclusion of the piece of theoretical reasoning. For the 
premises together do not necessitate that the conclusion holds. Say that ‘X → Y’ 
represents, ‘if I make this mince into burger patties and fry them then I can have 
burgers’. Theoretically this is true. But in the practical syllogism the desire Y (to have 
burgers) can be obtained by ordering them in, by having someone else make them 
for me, or I might disregard my desire to have burgers (perhaps due to my growing 
gut). There is nothing necessary here in the conclusion of the practical case (I ought 
to X to achieve Y) as there is in the theoretical case (if X then Y). In this regard, while 
the reasoning seems an accurate representation of a thought process we might go 
through, it is not deductively valid.  
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This is essentially Anscombe’s (1989) complaint against von Wright’s (1983) attempt 
to create valid practical inferences by making the means necessary. Anscombe 
complains, quite rightly, that necessity goes hand in hand with validity and, as shown 
above, we lose our claim to validity by adding an intention into the process of 
deduction. Rather, whether theoretical or practical, the aim of the reasoning stands 
outside of the reasoning itself. Take the following two statements: 
‘Flying from Manchester to Florence is the only way to arrive in Florence by 
tomorrow’ 
‘Being in Florence tomorrow is the only way to see this year’s Florentine New Year 
celebrations’ 
∴ As I am in Manchester I need to book a flight if I am to see the Florentine New 
Year’s celebrations 
 
This piece of valid deduction can be used for various aims. In the practical sense it 
can guide us in which transport to take, and in the theoretical sense it can be used to 
predict the transport someone might take whom we know wishes to go to Florence 
only because of the Florentine New Year celebrations.  According to Anscombe, 
whether one is conducting a piece of practical or theoretical reasoning, one is 
starting from a position in which one has an end – to predict an effect, to explain a 
cause, to intend to achieve that end, or to intend to achieve its opposite. The former 
two are theoretical versions of reasoning and will thus end in beliefs which have what 
have come to be called a ‘world to mind fit’. 
The latter two are practical versions of reasoning and thus end in intentions which 
have a ‘mind to world fit’. Crucially, however, in both cases, the reason for which one 
wishes to utilise a deductive chain such as that above stands logically distinct from 
the chain itself. The chain will be the evidence that is utilised to make the assertion, 
be it practical or theoretical; and the decision to utilise the chain in either case will be 
a judgement call that this chain gives us reason to suppose the assertion is true. 
Given the normativity that is present in both of these cases that were canvassed in 
1.1 we already have strong grounds for assuming that there is nothing that beliefs 
have which intentions do not (or vice versa) which precludes the latter from being 
seen, out of court, as somehow lesser than the former. 
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Without an analysis which shows how normativity is also present in our most obvious 
theoretical attempts at reasoning towards knowledge there is a temptation to believe, 
however, that beliefs are more readily open to being simple cases of knowledge, 
underpinned as they are by something that exists in a seemingly observer 
independent manner. We have already shown that even assertions which end in 
beliefs that are guided by our most obvious means of access to observer dependent 
data - namely our senses and our paradigms of scientific verification via the 
postulation and testing of theories - make use of normative criteria about the 
evidence used being the ‘best evidence’ for making these epistemic claims, and that 
these norms cannot themselves be grounded by the natural world alone. From this, it 
seems to follow that deduction, being relevant to reasoning only once one has made 
a series of normative judgements, cannot tell the whole tale of reasoning towards 
knowledge. We need more focus upon the normative nature of discernment about 
what constitutes evidence which leads us into the deductive process if we are to 
better understand either type of reasoning. I will conclude here that despite the 
seemingly vast differences between practical and theoretical reasoning with which 
we began, both types of reasoning have very similar issues. Both show normativity in 
the content of the claims and neither can fall back upon a form in which knowledge is 
a simple case of attaining the right sort of evidence and applying deduction as a way 
of attaining outputs which are rationally compelling as indisputable cases of 
knowledge; any piece of deduction stands logically distinct from the purpose it is 
being used for. What remains true of the differences between them is that theoretical 
reasoning leads to beliefs about the way the world is, while practical reasoning ends 
in an attempt to align the world with how one wishes it to be, by forming intentions to 
act. This relates to issues of psychology between intention and belief formation, the 
former requiring some level of motivational content. We will discuss motivational 
issues in later sections. (3.5, 4.2.2 and 6.3 in particular) 
  
That the two types of reasoning turn out to be as interlinked as they are should, 
perhaps, be of little surprise. When one embarks upon a piece of theoretical 
reasoning one does so for a purpose; more often than not for it to be utilised as the 
minor premise in a piece of practical reasoning as that is usually construed in 
syllogistic form. We can always be seen as aiming at knowledge for a reason, and 
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that reason is more often than not a practical aim. Although even if this is not so, we 
can assume that ‘finding out what is the case’ has some normative value; even if one 
does so simply for the sake of furthering one’s knowledge in an area that may be of 
no more practical purport than just ‘knowing more’, one exhibits a normative 
evaluation that such knowledge is of interest, that they value knowing it. Likewise, 
the very idea that practical reasoning is of philosophical interest is in some very real 
sense theoretical. It is under the guise of wondering about the objectivity of values 
that we come to wonder about whether this practical decision is the right decision, or 
whether any practical decision has any claim to being referred to as the right 
decision, and if so, how. Answering either way to either case constitutes one 
adopting a theoretical stance on the matter.  
It will be the aim of the coming sections to entertain theories which have attempted 
to show that moral claims, a species of practical claim, really can be shown to be 
either right or wrong in their prescriptions. I will utilise theories which are 
commonplace in normative medical ethics text books which attempt to make the 
‘ought’ which acts as the conclusion for a piece of practical reasoning binding, not 
just to those with a given end, relative to a particular agent, but binding upon all 
agents. Despite the fact that we have shown norms are present in both cases, the 
touchstone or grounds that the real world gives to theoretical belief claims are 
always thought to be assessable as right or wrong; if not now, then at some future 
time when our ability to agree upon and gather evidence is so compelling as to 
require one to make a huge leap to be able to deny it. Who is making the claim is 
irrelevant to the correctness of that claim; whereas who is making the practical claim 
seems to be absolutely crucial to the practical claim; the conclusion requires 
reference to the intentions of an individual agent.  
As we will see, this universal ought is hard to pin down. Given the above analysis of 
the logical gap between evidence and assertion we already have strong reason to 
believe that this will indeed be the case. Attempting to fill that gap with a theory 
seems futile given that accepting the theory will count as making a judgement that it 
is theory X and not theory Y which should be followed when making practical 
decisions. The desire to formalise and universalise our judgements in this manner 
seems to be an attempt to align our reasoning towards prescriptions with the now 
discredited and distorted version of our reasoning towards descriptions; one which, 
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given the normative bent of theoretical reasoning, seems to be a pre-philosophical 
illusion. But the sheer abundance of available differing moral positions towards any 
subject matter seems to require something like the postulation of a standard by 
which we measure them, while at the same time the postulation of a standard seems 
to be just as ‘intuitive’ as the postulation that any particular judgement is right or 
wrong. As Loughlin (2002: 56) puts it, this is a ‘methodological flaw’ with the whole 
debate: either our ‘intuitions are sound’ and a theory is not needed, or our intuitions 
are unsound and we have thereby called into question the only ground we might 
have for judging any postulated theory.  
However, going over this well-worn terrain will give us insights into several positions 
and more importantly the assumptions which underpin them. After seeing why each 
fails to attain rational assent we will turn to the intuitions which seem the crux of the 
matter in both the theoretical and practical cases of reasoning to see if we can 
rescue the idea of having knowledge in either area.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
Section 2: Generalist Accounts 
 
This section and the next will address three separate attempts at giving moral 
knowledge the kind of ground we wish it to have if we are to keep the sense of 
‘ought’ that seems implicit in our moral assessments. In purely practical reasoning 
we have a sense that there is seemingly some relativity as to how one ought to 
rationally proceed. If one desires to get to the destination quickly one will fly. If one 
prefers the anticipation of the journey and the idea of seeing the changing landscape 
leading up to their destination one might take a ferry or drive. Once the end is 
decided upon, instrumental reasoning can easily provide something closer to an 
objective account of realising that end with the appropriate means, but the end itself 
seems something relevant only to the person deciding.  
In the language of moral assessments, however, no such relativity seems to pertain 
in the way we make our judgements. As MacIntyre (1981: 11-35) points out in his 
assessment of emotivism, the emotivist idea that when I make the claim ‘A is morally 
wrong’, what I really mean by this is actually ‘I do not like A, and nor should you’ or 
‘boo to A’, seems utterly misguided. When people make moral statements what they 
profess to mean is that by some universal standard A is definitely wrong. There is no 
relativity implicit here. The problem occurs in the fact that no standard has (or by way 
of the analysis in 1.1 & 1.2, could) elicit universal acceptance. MacIntyre believes 
that this puts us in an awkward position by way of which emotivism may well be the 
best theory to describe our current moral position, though not as a ‘theory of 
meaning’ but as a ‘theory of use’. While we mean to evoke a standard by which our 
moral prescriptions are measured, all we are really doing is appealing to our own 
emotional responses to certain states of affairs; responses which have no ground in 
reason or reasoning.  
From this assessment it follows that moral claims are also relative in regards to our 
individual psychological tendency to find some states of affairs or actions to be 
conducive to feelings of approbation and others to feelings of disapprobation (though 
it is likely that MacIntyre would dislike the use of such Humean expressions in an 
analysis of his own work). It is these psychological concerns that guided the theorists 
who created, modified and defended the theories we will now canvass. If our moral 
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claims are to have any authority, there must be some ground upon which they sit; an 
‘epistemic hook’ which warrants our saying some claims are right and others not so. 
Without this, the threat of non-cognitivist theories looks problematic. 
As well as the need for an epistemic hook, the realist will need to find a way to 
overcome the Humean driven idea of direction of fit, which so nicely fits into both fact 
value and the belief attitude distinctions. These points relate to psychology. Given 
that these suggestions for grounding morality are theoretical, I will also need to make 
methodological points about each theory.   
Three theoretical attempts to ground morality will now follow. The first, which will 
make up the bulk of this section, will be deontological. I will focus mostly on Kant but 
closely related theorists will also be looked at.  The second of the three theories 
(starting at 3.1) will be Utilitarianism. Looking at this type of theory will allow for 
analysis regarding the form of arguments and commensurability. The third type of 
theory (starting at 3.4.2) to attempt to ground moral claims will differ in two ways. 
Firstly, it is not as action guiding or principle based as the first two, and secondly it 
attempts to ground claims via a naturalism that often underscores virtue accounts, 
rather than the rationalism that underscores the principled accounts. In the 
epistemological and methodological arguments against these three positions we will 
have time to assess other theorists in passing as well.   
 
2.1 Deontological Principles and Autonomy Based Accounts: 
The first attempt at grounded moral reasons that I will analyse are 
Deontological principles. There are various ways in which theorists have pictured 
these as coming to guide us in our decision making processes. The most famous 
defender of such a position was Kant, however, and it is he more than most others 
who truly attempted to give these principles a rational hold on us that could not be 
simply argued away by complaining that the principle being evoked was simply not 
shared by a disagreeing party. Since his attempts there have been various other 
forms, some of which are highly constructivist Korsgaard (1996) and some of which 
are aligned more strongly with a virtue account (O’Neill, 1996). I will have time to 
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mention the constructivist position in passing and directly look at a challenge set by 
O’Neill towards the final sections of this thesis (see 7.4) 
Kant attempts to duck the charges that we laid out above, regarding practical 
reasoning necessarily embodying the normative features of deciding whether the 
evidence we take to be good evidence for a practical decision is the right sort of 
evidence, by postulating, as Dancy puts it, ‘a bifurcated conception of practical 
rationality’ (Dancy, p. 68 ,2004). For Kant, in most cases of practical rationality, one 
simply follows the given instrumental model of using reason to find a means to one’s 
ends. Crucially, however, in the moral case this is not good enough. When one has a 
moral decision to make, one must test their intention against the Categorical 
Imperative which is given by ‘pure practical rationality’. Before we explore what the 
Categorical Imperative states, let us first see why Kant determines pure practical 
rationality as necessary for making the right moral choice, and thus sees the 
bifurcation of practical rationality into two distinct realms - the moral and the practical 
- as being necessary to understanding the distinct claims that the merely ‘practical 
ought’ and ‘moral ought’ make. 
For Kant, his theory is a third way to securing the idea that moral judgements are 
categorically right or wrong. He believed that it was needed because all the others 
failed to capture the importance of practical reasoning to moral theory (1948: 441-
444). The two types of theory he mainly argued against both fall into scepticism by 
his strictly rationalist lights. He denies that a sort of intuitive naive realism such as 
that proffered by Leibniz can give us categorical ‘oughts’ and thus properly ground 
morality. If there are simply a set of facts like empirical facts which exist anyway and 
are recognised by us then they have no more authority over us than a sign that 
reads, keep off the grass (Dancy, 2004). Knowing that this is a law does not compel 
action, for this we would need another element, namely a desire to follow the law. 
For Kant the only way that moral reasons can have moral authority over us is if those 
reasons are self-legislated and vindicated by reason (in the form of pure practical 
reason) as being our laws to follow. For this, no such desire is needed. For Kant, a 
law to keep off the grass is only rationally compelling and categorical if it is a self-
legislated law. In the same breath, he disregards Hume and Smith’s ‘Sentimentalism’ 
on the grounds that they openly deny the idea of reason generating laws or critiquing 
anything other than finding means to ends. Those ends are already set by one’s 
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anthropological make-up, learning the practices of a society, enculturation into moral 
practices and norms, psychological constitution and various other things that might 
be seen as establishing in us a second and acquired nature. Such concerns - our 
wants, likes, values, passions and so forth - are, for Kant, only contingent matters 
and thus cannot be the ground for a definitive moral reason. As we will see then, the 
Kantian notion of certainty about moral claims will necessitate us accepting a very 
different conception of rationality than that which we normally utilise in practical 
judgements.   
Having abandoned quite openly all the substantial data human beings do have when 
making moral decisions as being contingent - including the ends that we happen to 
have - Kant claims that the only way of coming to know our decision is right is if it is 
one that is suggested to us by pure practical reason. It is practical, in that it suggests 
an ‘ought’, but also pure, in that it suggests it is arrived at prior to any particular 
knowledge we may have about our own situation. This a priorism (Kant, 1948) that 
Kant adheres to vehemently, is a crucial and distinctive claim of his account which 
sets it apart. Any theory which lacks it has the issue of proving just how one is 
stating a properly universal principle and not merely their contingent biases. If one is 
to adopt a principle that is truly rational, one must will it freely and not be constrained 
by exterior alien forces, as Kant conceives those to be. If these exterior forces act as 
a cause for our choice we have not, according to Kant, chosen freely. An otherwise 
quite reasonable desire or end, such as that to not see family members harmed, 
would be contingent for Kant in this regard. One might will this end in the ordinary 
sense, but the cause for this willing would be set upon contingent and conditional 
criteria. To truly will something universally that is not contingent (Wille) means that 
thing be freely chosen and thus truly proposed by rationality itself, prior to any of our 
particular inclinations or concerns (Kant, 1948: 398). Thus, the principle one wills 
must be self-legislated upon grounds that pure practical reason (and not an everyday 
notion of reason) can endorse for itself as being a law that makes no reference to the 
agent’s contingent circumstances, but to the act the agent is intending to commit.  
From these assumptions Kant creates the first formulation of the categorical 
imperative: 
29 
 
Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it 
should become a universal law. (402) (my emphasis) 
Without any substantive content to supply his principle, a principle which will act as a 
test for whether an intended action is morally right or wrong, Kant’s formula has only 
the added highlighted features to work from. Beset by the ideas that: no other way 
could truly mean we are acting rationally, by way of his own definition and 
commitment to his idealism; that morality requires pure rationality to have any 
authority; and that this authority must be expressed in laws that are relevant to all 
rational agents, this is what he is left with. ‘... [either] that or think of a simpler or 
better formulation!’ as Wiggins decisively puts it. (Wiggins, 2006: 92)  
The first thing to note, however, is that Kant’s first formulation seems to intuitively fail 
to secure whether an action is right or wrong. It would seem that absolutely anything 
can be willed into being a universal law on the basis of the Categorical Imperative as 
it stands here. If we are a strong man, or a nihilistic man, we might have no qualms 
about willing into existence the law ‘let all disagreements, no matter how minor, be 
resolved by a duel to the death’. Or, if we are a selfish man, willing, ‘let everyone 
have freedom to their own possessions, except when I (and only I) demand use of 
them’ (for other examples see MacIntyre, 1981: 46). There seems to be no rational 
bar to these sorts of flagrant misuses of the Categorical Imperative being used with 
impunity. One might note that the fact we see these as ‘flagrant misuses’ shows how 
dependent upon our ongoing moral intuitions an analysis of any postulated moral 
theory must be. Is it not odd that Kant claims to disown all such inclinations? Kant’s 
setting of the moral law is specifically meant to not invoke laws imposed from 
outside, but to instead allow us to create our own laws, as this is what makes us 
what we are as rational, autonomous and moral beings. But this feature also seems 
to allow for us to will the most intuitively immoral things if we wish. Indeed, it seems 
to allow us to will anything; and a rule which allows for everything cannot hope to 
guide action. Kant attempts to avoid this charge by invoking the idea that we cannot 
truly rationally will just anything without contradictions. If he can show this to be the 
case then Kant may well have given us food for thought.  
Kant gives us four examples (1948: 422-424) from which to work from. Kant’s 
examples are: of a man considering suicide; of one considering whether to borrow 
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money despite doubting that he could pay back the debt; of one considering whether 
to neglect his natural talents; and of one who believes that, while he should not 
negatively affect another man’s standing, there should be no sense of duty to aid his 
welfare were he to ask for it. Kant’s problem here is to show that these examples 
cannot be rationally willed and to do so without helping himself to any teleological, 
anthropological, or in any other way contingent notions about human moral life or 
nature. To do so would be to subvert the a priori framework which he has so 
vehemently claimed is the only framework which can truly justify moral claims.  
Sadly, for Kant, his examples all make use of either teleological or anthropological 
notions. In the suicide case he refers us to the contradiction of willing a ‘system of 
nature whose law would be to destroy life by the very feeling whose special office is 
to impel the improvement of life’. This teleological characterisation of natural 
elements having end goals, such as to ‘impel the improvement of life’ obviously 
undermines the strict a priori account he had so far adhered to.  Likewise, the other 
three examples have similar issues. The idea that borrowing without being able to 
pay back would undermine the entirety of the financial system seems a truth unlikely 
to be proven a priori. The example regarding the man neglecting his talents, again, 
requires a teleological notion to not become a logical contradiction. ‘For as a rational 
being he necessarily wills that all his faculties should be developed...and serve him 
for all sorts of purposes’. This additional teleological notion of what the rational ends 
of man might be is again unsuitable to the a priori framework. Finally, the man who 
refuses to be benevolent to the other in need is derided by Kant for a contradiction of 
the will. One cannot, Kant believes, will that it become a universal law that people do 
not help others in need, as ‘instances arise in which he would need the love and 
sympathy of others’ (Kant, 1948). Again, Kant’s insistence on a completely pure a 
priorism works against him. While we can reasonably say from an a posteriori 
position - one that might happily take advantage of all the local knowledge we have 
about human needs and human lives - that the majority of persons do indeed rely 
upon the benevolence of others, such a point is still a contingent fact about human 
nature and not a truth discoverable a priori, one which could be applied to all 
possible rational beings, as Kant needs it to be for his Categorical Imperative to 
work. Indeed, hermits who eschew contact with others from a personal preference 
for solitude are testament to this.  
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But Kant later does supply those testing their intentions by way of the Categorical 
Imperative with some serious substantive content by way of his second formulation. 
For Kant, ‘rational nature exists as an end in itself’ (ibid: 420). This is not to say that 
we must always act so as to become more rational, but that we can never rationally 
act in such a way that harms our rational nature. Likewise each rational agent sees 
his rational nature in this way: he necessarily acts (if he is acting rationally at all) in 
such a way that sees his rational nature as an end in itself. He might forgo safety or 
dignity or health for other ends he sees as worthy, but he cannot ever rationally will 
that he becomes merely a means to the end of another will. What we have reverence 
for in ourselves and other persons is not a kinship by way of being members of the 
same species, but of sharing this unique feature of rationality, of being able to 
legislate laws freely by way of our Wille, that rises above the animal reasoning of just 
being pressed by one’s contingent desires into wanting certain things and reasoning 
about the means to get them. It is in light of this feature that has ‘absolute worth’ and 
is ‘an end in itself’ that we must likewise never treat other rational beings as means 
to our own ends. He calls this feature that we must respect ‘humanity’, or the 
capacity to rationally will laws for oneself on the basis of pure practical reason. 
However, by way of empirical evidence we know that rational beings do indeed act 
so as to constrain and manipulate the wills of others by lying, cheating, stealing, 
killing and so on. They choose to act not from formulations of the Categorical 
Imperative, which acts as a means to understanding what the moral law demands of 
us prior to our personal circumstances, but from hypothetical imperatives which state 
conditional pieces of reasoning such as, ‘to achieve Y do X’, where the end (Y) 
indicates only reasoning which fully takes into account the particular conditions and 
personal concerns, ends, wishes and desires of the agent doing the reasoning. Kant 
does not see this as a worry similar to that with which he charges intuitive realists 
such as Leibniz (ibid: 443); the worry that one requires an extra desire to be moral, a 
desire to follow the moral law, alongside knowing the moral law. When we test an 
intended action by way of the Categorical Imperative, we are not just finding out what 
the moral law says we must do, as though we had just discovered a list of 
commandments that were in no way ours. Instead, we are ourselves making our own 
laws; and to fail to live by one’s own laws is to give up one’s freedom as an 
autonomous agent. One needs not a desire to be good to accord their actions to the 
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moral law; rather, not doing so shows that one has abandoned the prescriptions of 
their own Wille and is thus acting irrationally.  
 
2.1.1: Critiquing Kant: 
What becomes apparent in this summation is the notion that we started with: the 
notion of a bifurcation of practical rationality. In making this first step, Kant makes 
various claims which seem to lead to his conclusions in ways that will appear 
question begging to those who disagree with him. In the first sense, the bifurcation of 
practical reason leaves us with two sets of methodologies which apply to two distinct 
sets of imperatives. In normal practical rationality we create laws for ourselves by 
willing the means to our antecedently willed ends, which give us hypothetical 
imperatives to act. In pure practical rationality we Wille in a way which acts only in 
cahoots with the conception of law as determined by pure practical reason. Having 
rejected any ends as worthy for us to pursue as distinctively moral agents, given that 
any such ends would themselves be contingent upon anthropological experience, 
Kant gives up on the ability of claiming this or that ends as being worthy direct ends 
for moral behaviour. All we are left with is the notion of the moral law with which to 
judge individual actions. This strategy alone, forced upon Kant by his rejection of 
purportedly contingent beliefs of what is good, forces him to reject the evaluation of 
moral ends as being worthy or not and find a separate means of assessing 
behaviour. To do so he has to abandon our normal understanding of practical 
reasoning (‘what ends should I have and what means are suitable to obtaining such 
ends?’) and focus instead upon the idea of the moral law, which is only 
understandable outside of the normal scope of practical reasoning, which he takes to 
be a distinct methodology of finding an imperative by which we can ascertain the 
moral law a priori.  
This in turn gives Kant both a license and a need to adopt the strategy of separating 
the ‘intelligible’ and the ‘sensible’ selves. The sensible-self is subject to all the 
desires regarding the contingencies of the world we live in. But the intelligible-self 
steps outside of these determined causes, and, by means of rationality, can adopt 
laws which condemn or condone these desires as irrational or rationally necessary. 
Reason suggests something to us, say, the desire to feed our family by means of 
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stealing, and pure practical reason either ratifies this thing that we will as being 
something it is moral or immoral to do by assessing it in terms of the categorical 
imperative. It is only in this sense of the two selves, and of the two realms which 
each self-inhabits, that the Kantian notion - that freedom and morality are really one 
and the same thing (defined as supplying the laws of reason to oneself on the 
grounds of reason and nothing else) - is not viciously circular. Otherwise we can be 
free only if we are moral, but we are moral only if we are free; each vindicates the 
other. Given the two realms, however, self-legislating is to be moral in the intelligible 
world, to see others with the same rational will as equal, while it also insures our 
freedom from the sensible world. In this way the very notion of willing is also 
bifurcated. I might sensibly ‘will’ my family not starve, but I cannot intelligibly ‘Wille’ it 
without contradiction if that would guide me to steal to feed them. 
Those who intuitively feel that the types of laws which the Categorical Imperative 
produces are too stringent may well come to question the bifurcation all the way 
down. Is it not the ever-so-early assumptions in Kantian morality that lead to us 
separating the two types of practical reasoning; begging the question somewhat 
against others who do not believe that the judgements they come to when making a 
moral decision need be laid out in such in such law-like terms which focus never on 
ends but only on actions? Can it really be the case that we can be perfectly moral 
without an understanding of what kinds of ends are suitable for us as moral beings?  
The only way to see this as being so is if one agrees from the outset, with Kant, that 
there is no room for rational action if we start from an agglomeration of 
anthropological data - such as feelings and wants about our particular circumstances 
(as contingent as they might be upon those circumstances) - and practical reason, 
described as a faculty which discerns how to either take the means to realising these 
wants, or to disregard them as unworthy of us or too complicated to achieve and so 
on. For Kant, from the very outset, to accept this framework is to accept something 
which will deny the claim of the moral ought as being objective. It will be subjective 
all the way down as our ends will not be provided by pure practical reasoning but 
what he conceives of as ‘alien’ (Kant, 1948: 404). But these are only alien to us if we 
are already inclined to accept his separation of two realms: one in which freedom is 
possible (the intelligible) and one in which it simply isn’t (the sensible) and to assign 
our ‘real’ selves to the former. If we accept this notion - that our practices, 
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inclinations, experience of what constitutes good, bad, permissible and 
impermissible behaviour constitutes an alien force - then perhaps we will want to 
bifurcate practical rationality so as to supply moral judgements with a sense of will 
(Wille) quite distinct from that used in other practical judgements. As Wiggins points 
out however, there is something destructively creative in the way that Kant defines 
“Wille as the causality of living beings in so far as they are rational” (2006: 126). The 
italicised words beg the question against those who believe that rationality requires 
no such thing as a faculty which supplies laws from a standpoint metaphysically 
distinct from the seemingly natural standpoint in which we practice morality as part of 
our specific form of life. It seems to beg the question against other theories to rule 
out of court that from this more ‘normalised’ stand point, one which does not 
separate realms of being and existence, we have no reason to disavow the actions 
of an immoral man and our actions cannot be rational. Either we accept the 
bifurcation or we must reject the a priori structure that Kant attempts to instil. As I 
have argued, the former possibility is mired with problems, the most evident being 
accepting what I can only see as a philosophical metaphysical fiction.   
Most of this analysis is at the metaphysical level, but at the normative level alone, as 
mentioned, the principles that Kant’s theory produces cause problems. The most 
famous of these is the idea of clashing principles. Judgement still has a great deal of 
work to do when we come across two such principles. This is of course an infamous 
problem for those who wish to retain the sanctity of a principled morality, even if they 
are not Kantians at the metaphysical level. There is an obvious pull towards being 
able to have moral norms that hold universally. On a purely epistemological level it 
makes the intelligibility of the domain instantly understandable. There are actions 
that we are just expected to never or always take part in. These actions are then laid 
down in principles which act as an arsenal for the moral man. As we approach a 
situation, we test the features of the situation to see which fit and when a principle 
fits it simply must be heeded as having universal authority over us.  
As we saw with the Kantian analysis however, how we discover such principles is of 
key concern. Kant believed pure practical reasoning could uncover an imperative 
that would act as an universalisation test for any candidate maxim for action. Once it 
had passed the test the candidate became a working universal principle. Part of the 
normative issue for Kantian philosophy is how distinct some of its ideas are from 
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everyday morality as we seem to practice it. Other concerns than that of a sense of 
duty to law seem to pervade our moral reasoning. Yes, we have a duty to never act 
in certain ways (just think of the most heinous crime a man might commit and add 
‘one must never...’ as a prefix to it for clarification of this point), but we also seem to 
have further duties. The notion raised by Constant (Korsgaard, 1986: 325-349) of an 
axe murderer asking for the location of his intended victim while you shelter him in 
your home from danger brings this to the fore.  
 
2.2.: Ross: Perception and Principles: 
Kant’s rigor for the moral law, as he decreed it, blocks his ready acceptance 
of ideas based on everyday moral notions such as beneficence, care, consequence 
and the rest. This objection was raised by W.D. Ross and was the cornerstone of his 
positive account. In such a situation, claims Ross, what we have is a clash of 
principles. In coming to choose which principle to act upon a man shows his moral 
worth. There is no unresolved clash of universal and necessary principles in Ross’s 
account because each of his principles (he names seven but admits this account 
need not be complete) is prima facie. By this he means that they are not absolute 
duties, as these cannot be discovered by us through a priorism or any other means. 
For Ross, his principles are best described as responsibilities which have certain 
features which should impel us to action when they fit the particular situation an 
agent is in when deciding what to do. I prefer the term pro tanto, following (Kagan, 
1989: 17)  
Pro tanto principles, then, act as normal principles except on occasions where one or 
more principles are in play and state different possible actions for the agent. In this 
case, one must take precedence over the other. Ross’s view has the advantage of 
thus making our appeal to principles more in line with our intuitions; something he 
thought was a positive aspect of his theory (Ross, 1930). There is not, by these 
lights, one single source of morality, such as the moral law as Kant sees it, but 
multiple ones, often with varying and distinct concerns regarding the right and the 
good. In the case of the axe murderer at our door then, Ross would be able to simply 
answer that two norms apply, the norm to be honest and the norm to preserve life. In 
this case the former is ousted by the latter; but on what grounds? Well, Ross 
36 
 
believed there was no real ground for these principles except the sort of ‘...moral 
reflection of many generations, which has developed an extremely delicate power of 
appreciation of moral distinctions.’ (Ross, 1930: 41) This sort of knowledge of 
choosing between general concerns can only be, in Ross’s eyes, a sort of 
‘perception’ which we develop by being actively involved in the moral practices we 
are necessarily involved in. Given the complexity of this sort of knowledge that Ross 
expounds as so central to morality in comparison to that which fits the broad 
concerns of principles and concerns he did state - such as fidelity, non-maleficence, 
reparation (Ross, 1930: 21-25) and so forth which are simple enough to write down 
and recognise as and when they occur - it seems that most of the work in Ross’s 
account is being done by the intuitive part of his theory. Principles, in Ross’s case, 
seem to be doing very little work, except picking out major concerns that the moral 
man who can choose between the principles in the correct manner, might already 
have. Richardson points out (Richardson, p. 42: 1994) that practical (and therefore, 
moral) dilemmas ‘may arise from a single principle’, such as that of promising. In 
deciding in either case, what one ought to do ‘all things told’, it is more likely to be 
the intuitive knowledge and not knowledge of principles doing all the work.  
This being the case, we have something of an issue regarding deontological 
principles which have no basis in a Kantian sort of a priorism - which I have argued 
is too fantastical in its transcendentalism to seriously proffer as a valid account of 
how we should decide what to do. In the non-a priori case, we select a principle for 
ourselves which, if it is to guide our actions in any meaningful sense, must hold on 
each occasion in which it is relevant: For all circumstances, C, do action A. But it is 
clear that the world being as it is, and that the principles themselves are set by our 
own judgements, that there will be cases where the same ground which suggested 
setting or accepting a given principle, namely our judgements, will wish to override 
this same principle as it seems to not suggest the right sort of action. ‘When my 
students are disrupting the lesson plan by talking loudly in class it is best to first give 
them a withering look to make them remember they are disrespecting my place as 
teacher’. But now imagine the discussion is academically useful even though I, as 
the teacher, did not start it. Perhaps here I will let them talk and disregard my 
principle. Those attuned to the idea of the consistency that principles afford us would 
claim that, if this judgement is not to be a subjective matter, what we must be 
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appealing to here is another principle, perhaps, ‘do not interrupt my students when 
they are making academic headway’, which has superseded the first of my teaching-
based principles. I have, a la Ross, used my intuitive judgment to pick the one over 
the other. Ross’s theory, we have already decided though, does not itself seem to 
explain our moral and practical reasoning in a principled manner, as it simply imports 
the faculty of intuition into the mix. There will be further commentary on intuitive 
judgements later. In the above example a further way of explaining what is 
happening in deontological terms is by way of expanding the principle.  
By the ‘expansionist’ method, a term I take from Dancy (2004: 11), rather than 
intuiting that I should choose one of my principles over the next, what moral 
principles come down to is actually specifying the true content of each principle in 
more detail. According to expansionists, the educational non-moral case, which is 
represented as having two conflicting principles under Ross’s analysis, really has but 
one principle: ‘Do not allow students to interrupt my lesson plan unless they are 
actively advancing their academic knowledge by doing so’.  The benefit of this 
analysis over Ross’s, that those such as Scanlon who employ it enjoy (ibid), is that 
the Intuitionism inherent in Ross’s account is removed. One is never picking between 
clashing principles in such cases, but rather giving an instance of a single principle 
which is specified according to the needs of the interlocutor with whom they are 
conversing. The problem is the myriad of variables which can affect any situation 
seem nearly infinite. Perhaps we would still agree with the more fully specified 
principle unless we feel that the students took over in a highly disrespectful way, 
which would add a further specification. These concerns go on almost infinitely given 
the complex nature of relations between the tutor, the student, and the material, 
incorporating all the expectations, power relations and other factors relevant to the 
learning situation. A fully specified principle according to Scanlon’s account would 
thus be a nearly infinite thing with equally infinite ‘unless’ clauses which took one’s 
decision on how to judge the situation between behaviour that was or was not to be 
tolerated. The idea that such a principle could underwrite action seems plainly false. 
One could not carry around this principle for use in deliberation itself, as one could 
not surely have, in front of one’s mind, a principle with infinite clauses, or set of 
principles with some pertaining to differing contexts, against which one measured 
behaviour.  
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Such a way of discerning what is right and wrong seems to fall back on the same 
sort of intuitionism that is there in Ross’s account, just less obviously so. Rather than 
choosing between principles, one is deciding whether an ‘unless clause’ is valid in 
deciding what one’s overall judgement of the situation will be. When one thus makes 
that call it cannot be the principle itself that is used as a ground for deciding; instead 
it is one’s decision which shows how one would go around specifying the principle if 
one’s interlocutor were to ask. As there is no way to expound the principle prior to 
the deliberating process it seems it plays no such role in underpinning the 
deliberation and thus has no epistemological authority over us. It is more a process 
of self-discovery; discovering at which point the ‘unless clauses’ seem to run out for 
us, or of at which point a new variable does not override the last.  
As we cannot link every possible variable to every other in such a way as to pre-
deliberatively know which combinations will result in which sort of action (or reaction) 
from us, it seems that each ‘unless clause’ has the same sort of judgement in it as 
does Ross’s principles, of which there may be an infinite amount once we see the 
same principle can lead to being forced to judge between two accounts of it and 
given the various cases in which such individual instances can clash seem infinite in 
and of themselves. If we imagine the way in which two promises might force a 
Rossian into an intuitive call, the deciding of which one to honour may appear to 
contain the same sort of judgement inherent to it as the ‘unless clauses’ in keeping a 
promise where another promise is involved as a reason not to uphold the first, in 
Scanlon’s account. Rather than choosing between two principles intuitively, 
Scanlon’s account would have us believe that there was only one principle which 
needed further specification. It might run: ‘one must always keep one’s promise, 
unless another promise is involved, which should then be honoured unless the first 
has greater necessity, in which case it should be honoured...(and so on, to an 
indefinite length based on the possible variables)’. One might well say that the sort of 
concerns expressed in the ‘unless clauses’ are what a Rossian might be bothered 
with in making his ‘intuitive’ call, except that Ross sees them as not apt for being a 
part of the principle itself. In this I would agree with Ross, as it seems crucial for a 
principle based account that the principles involved count towards deliberation, not 
obtained post-deliberation.  The parallel issue in Ross’s account is that although the 
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principle makes some import to the deliberative process, when one needs to choose 
between them they are simply not relevant to deliberation.  
It seems, then, from the three attempts to ground moral thinking upon non-
consequentialist principles, that such principles do not afford us the universal ought 
we are looking for if we are to attain the objectivity implicit in the language of our 
moral assessments that MacIntyre alluded to. The principles we have either match 
the phenomenology of our thinking more clearly, as Ross’s do, whilst failing to 
provide anything close to a universal ought that is based upon the reasoned part of 
the account, or they do manage to attain a universal ought, as in Kant’s case, but 
only by supplying a rendering of practical reasoning that is distinct from our usual 
phenomenology and thus remains suspect. Still, what we have here is our first 
hallmark of the orthodox account of moral theory: it is principled and must be 
principled in order to achieve objectivity (principles should be universal), epistemic 
validity (principles must have an evident ground) and rational (principles allow for 
discursiveness).  What eludes each of these accounts is just what the ground of 
such principles is to be if they are to fit each of these criteria. Kantian a priorism 
came closest to giving a satisfying answer to such a question but failed to convince 
us. Whilst Ross’s account seems to have a more sensible account of the seeming 
flexibility of principles, it seems we require intuition more than we would like without 
further analysis on this issue. I will come back to intuition later in the thesis. 
Such an analysis leaves us in a tricky position regarding our search for universal 
principles to underpin moral claims. Any principle also seems to come with possible 
exceptions built into it, unless we take the Kantian route of a priorism, which rejects 
out of hand any such exceptions at the cost of a sensible account of practical 
reasoning for arriving at such principles. Such accounts have, as it were, a 
framework that would allow for a fully objective moral account based on principles, 
one which will remain empty until we can find exactly what those principles might be. 
But this always seems a matter for dispute on the normative level without any 
possibility for resolution in a way that commands rational acceptance. As such, 
choosing any theory over the next seems to be as intuitive a matter as deciding 
between competing actions in an individual scenario.  
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In the domain of medical ethics this is a serious issue; what we are left with is the 
ability to find principles which we all agree upon but in so doing we are not 
actualising the purpose of those principles, which is to guide action. Principles which 
are proposed thus could guide the action of people who disagree if only we could 
find suitable grounds for them which would compel acceptance, or they would 
already be accepted but would do no work in guiding action for this very reason and 
are thus impotently tautological.  As deontological principles are duty based, and 
rights are derivable from duties, this analysis puts the entire framework of moral 
rights into the above quandary. There is a sense in which we like to think that having 
a right to something protects us. But if someone disagrees that they have a duty to 
uphold that right and we have no recourse to explaining just why it is our right in 
some universal sense, it seems the addition of this linguistic nuance does nothing at 
all to protect us. Rather, as principles seem to be more intuitive than this in their 
application, you have a right to be told the truth by your doctor only if your doctor 
does not think that his duty to protect your welfare is more important than this, and 
that in this case the truth may well be harmful, irrelevant of how much you might 
disagree. If you wish to disagree by arguing that his ordering of principles is incorrect 
then the appeal to principles simply breaks down; we are left once again looking for 
a serviceable hook.  
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Section 3: Commensurability 
 
3.1:  Utilitarian and Maximisation accounts: 
The previous section covered deontological principles, noting that the best 
grounds for such principles were heavily rationalist. Those accounts, such as Ross’s, 
which did not appeal to a priori accounts of practical rational thought seemed to rely 
upon the idea of the principles in principled accounts being suis generis. This, in 
turn, relied heavily on the postulation of an intuitive perception in order to choose 
between clashing principles and even in discerning what the right principles might be 
to carry around with us and when they were appropriate for use. Both these attempts 
to ground principles failed in various ways to provide what we were looking for: an 
epistemic hook upon which to hang our moral judgements to provide them with a 
level of clarity and certainty which would align them with descriptive judgements.  
We have already seen that descriptive judgements themselves rely upon some level 
of normativity (1.1 & 1.2); however, the distinction remains valid to a certain degree 
in various ways. As mentioned previously, one of these is a matter of the difference 
in psychology between the formation of belief and intention. Secondly, the norms 
upon which we choose to apply descriptive knowledge seem to have smaller 
variation and are more widely held than those regarding evaluative knowledge. It 
takes philosophical analysis to see that the epistemology of the descriptive is 
normative in a way that is not necessary for the epistemology of evaluations. The 
former has a hook, which is the natural world itself, as revealed to us by science and 
our sense data. “When I see a bird that walks like a duck and swims like a duck and 
quacks like a duck, I call that bird a duck”, said James Whitcomb Riley. Gettier 
(1963: 121-123) examples and evil demons aside, we have solid reason to follow 
this advice on the descriptive side more than we do if we transformed it into an 
evaluative moral version, such as: When I see an act that appears in every way to be 
morally repugnant I call that act morally repugnant. In the latter case everything 
comes down to the way in which normativity is so apparent to appear instantly and 
readily open for critique. And what, we may ask, are the defining features of moral 
repugnancy for you?  
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This small diversion is meant to draw us back to the idea that if there is moral 
knowledge then there must be some set of moral facts to which they relate, some 
content which would make a case of recognising the features in an everyday setting 
as an instance of knowledge, in the same way a beak, webbed feet, a waddling walk, 
feather patterns, size, the tendency to quack and the abilities to swim and fly all act 
as features for us to correctly apply the term duck to a duck. One way such 
knowledge could exist would be if there were natural features of the world, easily 
recognisable, to which terms such as good, bad, right and wrong related. Then 
seeing how such natural features were affected by certain acts could determine just 
how good, bad, right and wrong those acts were. What would be needed is a solid 
argument that such a descriptive feature or features truly did ground these evaluative 
terms. Such an attempt would give moral knowledge a hook into the natural world. 
This section and the next will evaluate two ways in which theorists have attempted to 
give us such a hook for our moral judgements. This section will consider Utilitarian 
theories which identify right actions as those which maximise happiness. This 
analysis has the benefit of giving us an insight also into a popular idea regarding the 
way we make practical judgements in terms of an ends/means reasoning as well as 
the important notion of commensurability. While not all Utilitarian theories incorporate 
a naturalistic element, some will.  
As with all moral theories, those which employ the notion of maximisation of a single 
good start with the notion of just how we should go about deliberating in what we 
ought to do. In most cases we seem to follow basic axioms for deciding, be it 
avoiding harm, promoting autonomy, being kind, generous or charitable and so on. 
As we have seen, however, in regards to having such Rossian principles at the 
ready, such axioms are likely to clash, be it between respecting varying principles in 
one case, or one and the same principle in two separate cases where both can’t be 
respected; as in the case of two promises to two people, one of which one will be 
forced to break if either is to be carried out. Whereas Ross was happy enough here 
to leave the case up to a sort of intuitive perception, many see this as an 
unsatisfactory answer to the issue.  
There is always the sense that when one decides to respect one principle over 
another, or one case of the same principle over the next, if one is to be deciding 
rationally then there must be a reason for this decision that goes beyond a simple 
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appeal to perception. When one decides that promise X matters more than promise 
Y, if the decision is not to be a completely arbitrary decision, then case X must 
exhibit features which are absent in Y which the deciding party must view as being of 
greater value than those present in Y. These features will then act as a reason, 
which can be formulated as a principle, for deciding between such cases. Indeed, 
one may say that in promising one could form principles for deciding between 
promises; principles such as ‘always keep the promise in which the beneficiary of the 
promise has greater need’, or, ‘always keep the promise in which the beneficiary will 
have greater expectations of the promise being kept’. Now, it seems, however, that 
even these two principles may well come into conflict. In the same vein of thought, 
one would look to further principles that are more general still to work out how one 
adjudicates between such principles. What we end up with is a set of common sense 
principles much like Ross’s, but each being adjudicated by more and more general 
principles on pain of arbitrariness. As any two principles may well clash even these 
more general principles will require further principles which adjudicate between them 
until eventually we arrive at some first principle which adjudicates between all 
principles if morality is to be a fully rational process. Here is J.S. Mill, as quoted by 
Crisp (2014): 
…there must be some standard by which to determine the goodness or 
badness…of ends or objects of desire. And... there can be but one: for if there 
were several ultimate principles of conduct the same conduct might be approved 
by one of those principles and condemned by another…  
Such a picture of practical reasoning thus uses the fear of arbitrariness to paint a 
picture of commensurability. There must be, if decisions between actions on 
evaluative grounds are not to be arbitrary and therefore non-rational, a single 
principle of moral reasoning which allows for us to decide between the lesser 
principles when they clash. In this sense, all moral choices must be commensurable 
by way of the first principle of morality. The looming threat which motivates this 
thought is that in turning this picture over we are left with a picture of moral 
reasoning that is based in no more than personal judgement that could so easily be 
reduced to preferences and biases. Without some final end which governs and 
adjudicates between other ends it seems we have no rational warrant for choosing 
between clashing principles or concerns of a lower level. If we wish to claim the 
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moral sphere is intelligible, we must accept commensurability as a fact of that 
sphere. And if we are to accept commensurability as a fact we must also recognise 
that it brings in tow a system by which ends are judged on the basis of a first 
principle, with all justification coming from one first principle or end. Such a position 
is central for Utilitarian theorists such as J.S. Mill and Sidgwick (1981). We will come 
back to the idea of commensurability and the picture of systematisation that it seems 
to demand from us.  
 
3.1.1 Value Monism: Happiness as the Ultimate End 
To start with, however, we will consider a more basic proposal of Utilitarian thought 
which is distinct from that mentioned above where principles of common sense run 
up to a self-evident first principle or end which controls them when they clash. The 
simpler picture is the idea of a moral value monism, where there is only one single 
value that should be applied to all cases of moral thought. It is not that it overrides or 
controls the use of other principles. Rather, if we are practising ethics properly, it is 
the only principle, the only value that needs promoting. I will make three main attacks 
on this idea to show that the Utilitarian principle, structured in this way, fails as being 
fit to adjudicate each and every disagreement. Firstly, I will consider the revisionary 
arguments made for imposing a single end as final as happiness, at the expense of 
all other concerns, claiming that it is problematic. Secondly I will argue that this idea 
fails to capture the phenomenology of our moral thinking and the concepts utilised 
there. Thirdly I will elucidate why such a theory has a distinct epistemological 
disadvantage.  
The Utilitarian, taken as a value monist, seems to have an advantage over 
deontologists in the simple sense that a single principle has no issues regarding 
competing principles. Each and every moral conundrum ends with just one thought: 
‘which of these possible actions will maximise happiness?’ Once we have done 
some evaluative equations, the matter would be simply settled on that score. But 
what reasons do we have for believing that the maximisation of happiness, not just 
our own, but other’s happiness as well, is the ultimate end for man? Mill’s arguments 
for this position are well known and we will critique them here.  
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The first step in this tactic is to convince that we do, as a matter of fact, all value our 
own happiness over everything else and when we act for our own interests we act in 
the way which is most likely to secure our own future happiness. That is our end. Mill 
(2001: 35) puts his ‘proof’ this way: 
 
The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible is that people 
actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it: and 
so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner...the sole evidence it is 
possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people actually do desire it. 
If the end which the Utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory and 
in practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince any person 
that it was so  
Mill makes various mistakes in this passage that have been widely discussed. The 
analogy in the most straightforward interpretation regarding proofs for experience 
should fail to convince us. That we do see or hear things in no way proves those 
things are there. People do and see things all the time that aren’t there and we might 
say, ‘you ought not to be seeing/hearing these things’ to such unfortunate persons. 
Likewise, to claim that something, in this case happiness, is desirable merely 
because it is desired acts as no proof. In some cases of course we might say that 
one’s own happiness ‘ought not to be the thing one desires’. This of course is the 
naturalistic fallacy of Moore (1922: 11-20) at work: that people do always desire their 
own happiness is no proof that they should. What is under scrutiny here is whether 
what we desire is worthy of that desire. Mill in no way allows for us to get a grasp on 
whether this is the case with happiness. Of course it seems impossible for Mill to 
prove that which is desirable other than claiming it is desired, and surely without 
starting from an a priori position similar to Kant we could never start to believe that 
something that is desired by no one ought to be desired. But it is Mill’s preoccupation 
with proof that stops him from considering our ability to use everyday reasons to 
argue that what we desire in each instance should be desired by others too. That 
would not be enough for Mill, whose commitment to this level of objectivity obscures 
his willingness to concede to this sort of an analysis for moral reasons.  
Mill (2001: 35-360) goes on to say: 
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No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that 
each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. 
This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits 
of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each 
person’s happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, 
therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons. Happiness has made out its 
title as one of the ends of conduct and consequently one of the criteria of 
morality  
The latter part of the argument is also fallacious, this time the ‘compositional fallacy’. 
Believing he has established that to each of us our own happiness is our ultimate 
end - the only end we desire for its own sake - Mill then makes the claim that, as 
happiness is such a good for each us, then general happiness must constitute the 
general good. This is an inferential transition from the first claim ‘as my happiness is 
a good for me, all acts that maximise that happiness are a good thing for me’ to the 
latter claim ‘as each person desires their own happiness equally, any act which 
maximises the general happiness is a good for all persons’.  The inference is bogus, 
however, and it can be easily questioned as to why there is any reason to think, from 
Mill’s position, that a person who cares for their own happiness should care at all for 
the happiness of others. Claiming that there is this thing, ‘a general happiness’ - that 
constitutes the general good and must be made up of the ‘happiness of everybody’ - 
is thus equally fallacious. Something is not necessarily true of a whole, here the 
general good, simply because it is true of its parts; just because atoms are invisible 
to the naked eye, and you are composed entirely of atoms, it does not follow that you 
are therefore invisible to the naked eye. The inferential transition should fail to 
convince us that there is such a thing as the general happiness that each of us 
should desire, regardless of whether we believe with Mill that our individual 
happiness is something we do indeed desire and ought always to be seen as 
desirable. 
Even if we attempt to augment Mill’s argument, as many have tried to do, it struggles 
to find solid ground. We might augment it by lessening the appeal to the inferential 
transference between an individual’s happiness and the general happiness, for 
instance, by claiming that if each person desires happiness and we have no reason 
to see her to be mistaken, and each person sees their own happiness as a good – 
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then we can claim that happiness is an intrinsic good. From here the maximisation of 
the good does indeed seem to be a duty for us, assuming we go along with the 
Utilitarian idea that we define the good first and then the right as the maximisation of 
that good. All that matters is happiness as: 
…human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a 
part of human happiness or a means of happiness [as such] happiness is the 
sole end of human conduct and the promotion of it is the test by which to 
judge human conduct…(Mill, J.S.: 39) 
Even if we see happiness as an intrinsic good we need not see promoting that good 
as leading always to the right action. We might also see items such as comfort, 
justice, wealth, health or a multitude of other things as being things that we desire, 
and believe that there is no good reason for us to think we are mistaken in so 
desiring them. Why can’t we just think of the above as being things we desire in their 
own right and not as a means to happiness? To make the leap from ‘I desire X and X 
is a part of Y’ to ‘therefore I value X as a part of Y’, is a fallacy again on the part of 
Mill. To attempt to subsume the way we value acts of justice under an idea of 
happiness seems to cheapen our understanding of justice in such a way as to make 
it unrecognisable. The separation of the good and the right in the manner the 
Utilitarian creed promotes is forever questionable in the way that Moore judged it to 
be. It is the Utilitarian’s job to make us believe that when we are claiming an act to 
be moral or just we are merely saying that it is the act that produces the most 
happiness. But this reference to the happiness of the aggregate of persons seems to 
undermine our conception of other moral concepts on many occasions, as we will 
see. 
Acts, such as promising, mostly only need to appeal to the people involved within the 
act itself. To bring into account the entire aggregate of persons and their happiness 
thus diminishes the bond that should be forged between the person who makes the 
promise and the person who is the recipient of that promise. Of course it is highly 
possible that one uses a disaster clause to explain away not keeping a promise – 
that to keep it would have caused such great harm that it would have been unjust on 
those who would have felt those harms, and that harm outweighs the injustice of 
breaking the promise. But this reasoning, while appealing to consequences, 
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pleasure, harm and an aggregate of persons is not necessarily Utilitarian or 
consequentialist reasoning. Other, non-consequentialist, theories can appeal to 
consequences as well; indeed, any sane person will appeal to consequences as a 
reason for acting in certain ways at certain times. One is only a utilitarian if 
consequences are the only thing one sees as worthy of appealing to in such 
instances, if one believes that the aggregate pleasure or pain caused by an action is 
the only matter worth considering. And the impersonality that such a move causes 
makes a mockery of human bonds and intricate moral relations such as those 
created by promise making.  
This is why Williams (1973: 116-117) argues that Utilitarianism strips away the 
integrity that seems such an essential characteristic of moral agents. If I break a 
promise as a Utilitarian, based on good Utilitarian reasons, to feel guilt at doing so 
would seem irrational. I should train myself not to have such feelings, for to do so 
would only add to the overall store of unhappiness at my breaking of a promise. After 
all, I stand in no more a special relation to someone I have made a promise to than I 
do to every other person who makes up the total sum of happiness, and every 
member of that aggregate should have chosen as I have chosen. If I cannot train 
myself not to feel this unreasonable guilt, however, the guilt itself must still be taken 
into account in the calculation of the unhappiness breaking the promise will cause. 
For there is no judgement on what it is that causes happiness or unhappiness or 
whether those things are worthy causes of those mental states, only that those 
mental states do exist.  
Under examples such as this we also see how separate Utilitarianism is from any 
pre-theoretical conceptions of justice, and how subsuming complex moral ideas like 
justice with the Utilitarian principle appears impossible. Take the example of a 
community, terrorised by a murderer, who’s imprisonment and execution would 
result in such joy and relief that even mistakenly accusing an innocent man and 
executing him would have to be seen as bringing more overall happiness than not 
doing so, despite how much the loss of that man’s future happiness and the fear of 
his impending death and his frustration at being innocent in this situation would count 
against the act. This example is very telling as it strikes a chord with all of us about 
how we value justice and how we define just acts. Assuming the real culprit stopped 
that very day for whatever reason, the innocent man, if he were a Utilitarian himself, 
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would be forced to admit his death was for the best and therefore not an unjust act at 
all. 
Now suppose that sometime after his execution word gets out that the community 
has indeed arrested and executed the wrong man and as such the killer is still at 
large. The execution, that until this point of revelation was a just act according to the 
Utilitarian society, in the wake of this new fear and panic and remorse of the death of 
the innocent man, may now be seen suddenly as unjust. The privation of happiness 
being greater than it was originally in the second wake of fear, caused by remorse 
for the dead innocent man, the incompetency of the police department and the idea 
that oneself may also face charges for crimes they never committed. What is crucial 
here is that it is not that the act was always unjust on its own terms and the 
community have only now realised, but that a just act became unjust at the point of 
realisation and only because of that realisation. One cannot help but look at this 
example and wonder just how, even if we do take the idea of happiness to be a 
general good, that it is the maximisation of that good which is the sole and singular 
indicator of an act being morally right.    
Now, I started by saying that the Utilitarian picture has the potential to be seen in a 
naturalist light. Happiness can be easily reduced to pleasure, conceived as an 
objective fact of certain various chemicals (such as dopamine and serotonin) being 
released in the brain, perhaps being created in various amounts by our actions as an 
indicator of how good the action is. However, Mill seemed to think of happiness as 
more normative than this simple naturalist position, promoting as he did the ‘plurality 
of goods’. If Utilitarians do not take the naturalist interpretation then they have an 
extra problem, as now their theory would be reliant upon an idea of types of 
happiness being promoted which are evaluated as the ‘right sorts’ of happiness. The 
anti-Utilitarian literature is flooded with hypothetical examples of people wiling away 
their lives in bliss in opium dens, or flooding the water supply with drugs which would 
make everyone ecstatic but also leave them living in an ignorant haze. If such 
critiques are deniable on the basis that base pleasures are not as worthy as the 
happiness that comes from, say, strong familial relations or the completion of a piece 
of rational thinking, then there must be some defence for just where this sense of 
worthiness comes from. And now the Utilitarian principle can have no greater say 
over which is better, as both are undeniably types of happiness. Such an argument 
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for ‘worthy’ happiness being promoted over ‘unworthy’ happiness would require 
something like an a priori analysis of happiness that would land Utilitarians of the 
value-monist ilk back onto a rationalist grounding. Otherwise wouldn’t what counts as 
worthy happiness itself need to be delineated? And how one would analyse this 
would have no further court of appeal in commensurate terms.  Wouldn’t such an 
analysis of happiness bring us back to a place where the usual everyday concerns of 
morality - such as justice, honour, aptitude, success and so forth - be needed to 
explicate it and control it? If this is so, then the idea that the warrant for such 
concepts lies, all things told, in how much each is conducive to happiness, and that 
each only has merit to the level in which it promotes happiness, seems completely 
misguided. A desire to maximise happiness cannot be the ground for our promotion 
of what is worthy if a sense of what is worthwhile is a prerequisite for an appropriate 
sense of happiness to utilise in the controlling principle.  
The final point to be made in relation to a purely value monist attempt at 
Utilitarianism is the epistemological one. When I decide what to do in a case, and I 
appeal only to the notion of the maximisation of happiness, at what point am I to stop 
my calculations and actually act? Act A may produce a great deal of happiness here 
and now but have the potential for great tragedy in the distant future, while Act B 
may produce little happiness here and now but have no such concerns. At what point 
am I at fault? At what point does blame for an action, one that was in some small 
way a catalyst for various actions of others that may rightly be called the 
consequence of that action to some degree, stop being portioned to me? How would 
one judge the American and British coup d’état against Mosaddegh in Iran, which 
allowed for the suffrage of women and the modernisation of a nation, when the 
sharpness of this contrast from a more orthodox Islamic lifestyles and the manner in 
which foreign secular and Christian nations had a hand in it was also a likely catalyst 
for the Islamic Revolution of 1979 which has left women in a position with greater 
restrictions than ever before and the country in political turmoil both domestically and 
internationally? How does one measure the happiness of such a situation and the 
blame or praise to be portioned to those who made the decision, when one can only 
judge on the basis of happiness?  
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3.2 Moving Away From Value Monism 
We have seen then that the value monist notion of commensurability falls flat in 
various ways, be they methodological, conceptual or epistemological. Given that this 
is the case, the more sensible form of commensurability which ends in a single 
principle must pay homage to the way in which other values play their part in moral 
thought. This is true of the Sidgwickian (1981) approach to Utilitarianism, which 
makes great use of the principles of ‘common sense’ and their place in our thinking. 
These values act as our starting points. One cannot simply tell someone who is 
going through a moral education that they must in all cases promote happiness. 
Here, we get to the idea of happiness as the ultimate end via a system which works 
up from common sense principles such as those promoted by Ross. To theorists 
such as Sidgwick, what is the downfall of an account such as that posited by Ross is 
the previously mentioned appeal to intuition or perception to decide between 
clashing common sense principles. For people who take this route to an ultimate 
commensuration principle, when common sense principles clash, if we are to decide 
between them, there must be another principle which outlines what the appropriate 
concerns are for deciding between them. These concerns will be more general, 
picking out features which persist in cases where principles come into conflict, so as 
to help us see what is actually at stake in terms of value. These more general 
principles, if they are to do their job correctly, must help us prioritise between more 
concrete cases, allowing for a rational way to decide between disputes. So, while at 
the level of common sense, one needs principles such as ‘keep your promises’, 
when conflict occurs one must search for a principle which would rightly adjudicate 
which of the promises is of greater concern. This would provide a rationalist system 
for deciding the practical conflict and giving us a greater insight into what is valuable 
in each case. I am indebted to Richardson’s (1994: 122-144) account of Sidgwick in 
this part of the section. 
Cases can seem easily settled on this score. If there are two promises, equal in all 
ways, except one served a greater sense of justice in keeping it, or was made to 
someone closer to us than the other promise, then we would choose that which 
better served justice or benefitted our closer friend or family member. However, if 
between the two promises we decided that one seemed more pressing due to the 
fact that in so keeping it justice was served, where as in the other one a familial tie 
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was respected, and that it was one of these concerns which was valuable to each 
case, but not the other, we would then need some further principle, of yet greater 
scope, to decide between the concepts of justice and familial bonds. 
     Ultimate End-Norm 
Justice      Familial Tie 
       Keep Promise 1         Keep Promise 2         Keep promise 3        
Keep promise 4        
One could easily see a case where an administrator at a hospital was left with the 
choice of tampering trials to let a sick family member in, when their reason for taking 
that office was to oversee that no such tampering occurred, as on principle, each 
applicant had just as pressing need for the treatment. In this case, promises to both 
office, ‘to remain objective and unbiased’, and to a loved one, ‘to do everything in my 
power to help them live’, violently clash. If such a case is not to be left up to intuition, 
some other principle seems to be needed to adjudicate between these concerns. 
Furthermore, it must have the ability to decide between them. But here, the two 
further principles which govern the ends that made the promises both seem 
worthwhile likewise clash. Were the administrator not averse to tampering and an 
acquaintance and a family member both needed the tampering then the more 
general principle ‘respect family bonds’ would decide between the promises, 
assuming in practical terms it was only possible to switch one person into the trial in 
a covert manner. Likewise, if it was an acquaintance only who asked for the 
tampering then the promise to act justly would likely stop our administrator from 
promising any tampering at all for the acquaintance. But in cases such as the first 
hypothetical in this scenario - where both promises require serious attention and 
neither promise can be separated by reference to the wider principles that guide why 
they were promised - yet some further and even wider scoped principle seems to be 
needed for us to appeal to in our decision between our ends of protecting family 
members and our ends of respecting justice in the role of trials administrator. Given 
that any two principles can potentially lead to conflict, given the multitude of plausible 
particularities in any case of practical reasoning, it seems we would require a way to 
rationally decide between even the highest two principles. This, in turn, would require 
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a principle that is the ultimate source of warrant; a single principle in terms of which 
all other ends are outlined, controlled and decided between.  
In this manner, the route which provides an ultimate end of happiness as governing 
action - not directly but via a means of controlling the way in which more common 
sense clashing principles can be portioned their due - has, prima facie, less of the 
problems of the value-monist interpretation. Unlike the first score brought against the 
value monist, here the lesser common sense principles are evaluatively sound in and 
of themselves. They are controlled by higher principles, but one need not only apply 
the value of maximising happiness. The importance of such things as promises and 
maintaining integrity are unproblematically appealed to, even if their warrant comes 
from a higher source than this. In this way, we do not have the issue of the 
revisionary notions of the value-monist. Ordinary principles and values have their 
place. The third issue, the epistemological one, also has nothing to cling to here. We 
know how to apply principles in an ordinary manner. One only searches for answers 
at a higher level in times of conflict, and when one does so this simply means looking 
for more powerful and general ends which can act as governing principles. The 
epistemological quandary of how to apply the maximisation of happiness principle is 
used not directly to the concrete particulars but instead to other various principles 
which govern further principles and so on.  
The second issue I had with the value monists, however, seems to remain; namely, 
that this idea of systematisation does not appear to be phenomenologically accurate. 
Here we seem to forgo how we come to think of moral ends as working in order to 
keep the strong sense of systematising morality into something that any rationalist 
will love: being able to deduce from an indisputable first principle down to lesser 
principles, with all authority flowing from this one point.  
Such a picture should already raise our philosophical hackles somewhat by way of 
the analysis of 1.1 and 1.2. There we decided that whatever ends we have seem to 
stand outside the deductive chain of reasoning; but here deduction seems to be 
doing all the work of moral reasoning. What lies implicit in such accounts is the same 
positivist ideal that rules, if they are to be rational, must be underpinned by yet more 
general rules, the outcome of which can only be a rule (in this case an ultimate end-
norm) which governs all other rules it presides over, much like a supreme judge or 
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arbiter. Much like Kant’s single rule for decision making then, this picture is strongly 
foundationalist. Such foundationalism is inspired by the thought that only deduction 
can lead to definitive ‘oughts’ with a primary principle, assumedly an 
unchallengeable one, as the source of the authority. But we have reason to find the 
very idea of definitive ‘oughts’ suspect. To know what we must do, whether that 
doing is to be understood in terms of belief formation or intentional actions, is 
dependent upon a normative construct that will always be challengeable and as such 
never logically compelling.  
Eschewing the rationalist assumption that such a fixed ground is necessary for 
knowledge, systems of ethics like that of Sidgwick’s appear to have a motivation that 
is the reverse of what we would expect in their formation. It is the idea of system that 
seems to motivate one to look for an unchallengeable authoritative commensuration 
principle, as opposed to the attempt to understand the phenomenology of moral 
thought which inspires the search for a system that utilises such a principle. Once we 
realise that there is little hope of deduction securing definitive conclusions or ‘oughts’ 
in practical reasoning, the appeal to it should be lessened. A bootleg imitation of the 
reasoning that one would ideally like to be available, if one is to accept the 
assumption that such a thing is required to secure epistemically sound moral and 
practical conclusions, is no substitute for the real thing. As that ideal is a logical 
impossibility, given the way that any end stands distinct from the reasoning chain 
itself, it seems that an exploration of other forms of reasoning is called for. The fear 
is that reasoning will not be discursive if we drop the idea that each principle we hold 
is explicable only in terms of another of greater generality. This would cast us back 
into Ross’s territory. Yet we have every reason to hold that just plumping for one 
choice over another without being able to explain why leaves us in a position that 
could be appropriately described as emotivist and therefore irrationalist on this basis. 
What we will need, then, is a way for discursiveness to remain as a key element of 
moral thought, without appeal to deduction to secure it.  
For now I wish to conclude that any system that utilises an ultimate-principle has the 
major issue of proving why it is that one value which should commensurate all other 
concerns when other ultimate-principles seem readily available; and how it is that we 
are to measure all other decisions against it. If the argument is something like the 
question that Sidgwick poses - ‘if we are not to systematise human activities by 
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taking Universal Happiness as their common end, on what principles are we to 
systematise them?’ (Freeman, 1994: 324) - We might ask why it is that such a 
systematic view of deliberation is even called for in the first place. Deductive logic 
cannot hold the sway we wish it to, as any end we choose will always stand outside 
of the deductive chain and seems to require a judgement on the part of the 
deliberator. If ‘perception’ is needed to decide between competing ultimate-principles 
then we seem to allow an irrationalist element into our reasoning. But perception and 
deductive reasoning need not be the only choices on the table. It is made to seem so 
by the appeal of a top-down rationalist system, where the only way of deciding 
between relevant concerns is by appeal to a more general principle. Following 
Richardson’s analysis, one might well point out here that generality and warrant 
simply need not be ‘run together’ (Richardson, 1994: 138) as though each layer of 
principles presided over those below like a ‘court system’ of increasingly greater 
authorities. As he eruditely points out, if this were the case then it would imply that 
the more general the principle the more true it would have to appear. This, however, 
seems to be false in our phenomenology of moral and practical reasoning, as:  
Among normative judgments that stand most firm are...particular ones...about 
the evil of the Holocaust...the admirable character of Mother Theresa’s work with 
poor and sick...about the injustice of Idi Armin’s rule...Conversely, it is so difficult 
to frame general principles...that we are constantly indicating our doubts about 
them by hedging them.. (ibid) 
 
3.3 Evaluation from Bottom to Top: 
I would add to this analysis that in coming to frame general principles and 
properly understand them, we have to use concrete examples to even broach the 
idea of the more abstract ones.  There must be something which is to be abstracted 
from for these general principles to have the force that they do. Take a 
commensuration value such as happiness. If happiness is truly to commensurate the 
increasingly more specific principles below then its content must in some way be 
available in a more specific form than the term ‘happiness’ allows for. An argument I 
levelled against the value monist, which a Utilitarian of the Sidgwickian ilk seemed, 
prima facie, to avoid, was the idea that happiness cannot begin to function as a 
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deciding factor without a specific manifestation of happiness being in place; and then 
there is no court of appeal left as to which specification is better. Maximising one sort 
of good to achieve the right action, be it autonomy, happiness, welfare, or whatever 
else, still runs into issues of incommensurability given that not all manifestations of 
happiness or autonomy or welfare are of equal footing. It is not that both choices 
lead to equal measures of the same value that is problematic, but that either choice 
could be seen as greater than the other on differing conceptions of what that value 
actually entails when being utilised in a concrete case.  
The happiness of basking in the sunshine and finishing a marathon, the autonomy of 
the right to privacy and the right to roam unhindered, or the welfarist notions of being 
told that one is dying so they can sort out their affairs immediately, or not being told 
so they do not have to face the stress of their immediate demise, are all examples of 
each type of ultimate-principle clashing with itself, where further appeals to the 
relevant ultimate-principle would be rendered useless for deliberation of what one 
ought to do. Maximisation seems to fail because any proposed ultimate-principle is 
more complex than the single principle it pertains to be in guiding everything. As 
such, clashes seem not just possible but completely inevitable. We posited that the 
Sidgwickian eludes this particular criticism due to the way the ultimate-principle or 
end norm can only be understood if it is seen as delimiting the principles of common 
sense which will be the first appeal in any piece of deliberation, with more general 
principles coming into play as and when clashes occur. However, when one pictures 
just what this means we start to see just how the system that Sidgwick envisages is 
anything but deductive, with reasoning being seen as a trickle-down of warrant from 
a vague ultimate principle to various more specific principles.  
If we are to take seriously the epistemology of this system, we have to see that 
coming to learn how an ultimate-principle such as happiness can delimit the lower 
principles would involve, first, taking note of the various differences in the more 
specific principles themselves. An otherwise poor parent from the first world, who 
receives an unexpected small fortune might well invoke the justification of greater 
happiness for either giving the money to Oxfam, to help the starving children of third 
world countries instead of to one’s own relatively needy offspring, or vice versa. For 
an ultimate-principle to have any deliberative power it must be able to make 
distinctions between the choices it presides over, and to make distinctions it requires 
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specific content which can be shown to be present (or present in greater quantity) in 
one choice over the other. But it seems that varying conceptions of happiness are 
possible without facetiousness being an excuse. The normativity of terms such as 
‘happiness’ or ‘welfare’ and so on, lead to a variety of conceptions which have no 
further, more general, court of warrant to appeal to in deciding between them. The 
source of these conceptions is in fact our way of understanding the lesser, more 
particular principles, that the top-down rationalist would have us believe are 
controlled by the ultimate-principle. When we decide between the relevant content of 
such ultimate-principles, what is relevant to that decision is still a judgement along 
the lines of ‘what is more important here’ – with this more complex phrase being 
glossed, later, as ‘happiness’ or ‘welfare’ as though that term was no longer 
equivocal. Unless we take happiness to mean an empirical measure of pleasure as 
reduced to various brain activities, we are always maximising a particular conception 
of the good that has potentially just as much scope for competing conceptions as we 
would do if we merely said that, as a principle, one should maximise ‘goodness’ 
itself.  
Thus, invoking a maximisation of ‘happiness’ or ‘welfare’ seems to be merely a place 
holder, one which requires us to look at the particularities of the situations we are in 
if we are to give it meaningful content. For in the example of the last paragraph, 
one’s child might complain legitimately about a lack of loyalty or sense of 
commitment to one’s own, of selfishness through self-aggrandising, or lack of 
immediate compassion, were they not to receive any money. The charity worker 
might complain of short-sightedness in other’s suffering, of a lack of empathy for 
those far away, of the disparity of the need felt by the third world children in 
comparison to those of the parent’s children. The child might say the satisfaction of 
expectation would lead to a happiness of knowledge that one’s parent truly valued 
them as they had believed and that a hard life was turned into one of pleasure and 
possibility. The charity worker might claim that the happiness gained by a well of 
fresh water in a small community would cause greater happiness than any luxury the 
would-be-benefactor’s child might use the money for. The point is that all these 
concerns are themselves legitimate concerns regarding who should receive the 
money. Questions of character and action both have power here. There can be no 
abstract, ultimate-principle or end which we appeal to in order to decide between 
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which concerns are most worthy or relevant. Of course we should do as much good 
as we can. But what that goodness amounts to can only be decided by considering 
in their own terms which ends are pertinent. Deciding to take happiness as an 
ultimate end in helping to decide between the two claims here would require 
deliberating about which happiness has greater claim, which is more worthy. 
Regardless of the specifics, it is hard to see how it is a commensurable notion of 
‘happiness’ here and not a general sense of what is good, hanging as it does on the 
various moral concepts of charity, compassion, happiness, welfare, selflessness, 
gratitude, loyalty to familial bonds (and many more not mentioned) that is doing the 
deliberative heavy lifting here. If one’s conceptions of what concepts make 
appropriate ends and the content that make those concepts meaningful in 
deliberation come from living within morality how can it be a simple top-down system 
based on deduction that explains the whole of ethical thought?  
It appears then, that incommensurability is a feature of ethical thought that merely 
has to be accepted. Even accepting a common ultimate-principle – by our analysis a 
phrase that merely short-hands an appeal when there is no further deliberative 
issues to consider-  in no way necessitates that the content that such a ultimate-
principle will have in guiding actions need be the same as someone else’s 
conception would have it. Once we allow that any linguistic proposal for an ultimate 
end norm is in need of filling out and specifying via some sort of reflection upon the 
concepts, those that the rationalist would like to say the ultimate end norm regulates, 
we have reason to keep open the idea that moral thinking cannot be a matter of 
mere maximisation of one singular value. Rather, we could only see what one really 
means by the phrase ‘maximising happiness is the benchmark of the moral man’ 
when we see them act upon such a principle and thus the content of what happiness 
actually amounts to, as they have it, is revealed.  
My contention here remains that a principle or end such as ‘maximise happiness/ 
welfare/ or any other proposed ultimate-principle’ is just a placeholder similar to 
‘maximise the good’ and each remains as abstract as ‘the good’ until one sees what 
concerns are ignored or cherished by the agent purporting to follow this principle. If 
one does not take seriously the lot of those who will be saddened by an act for 
selfish reasons - in the same way they might those who would be saddened for 
benevolent reasons given that ‘selfish people would be happier if they learned not to 
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be so selfish’- then we can start to see that there are more complex concepts at play 
than just the mere pleasure taken from an act, where pleasure is understood in the 
more quantifiable way that a naturalist utilitarian would have us take as a ultimate-
principle. 
Likewise, there is no deductive argument for choosing any one ultimate-principle 
over the next. The distinction between the sorts of content that we usually see 
happiness as imposing, which welfare doesn’t, when either is utilised as an ultimate 
end norm of action, is normative to its core. They both act as placeholders to be later 
specified. It’s not merely happiness, but the right sort of happiness that one wishes 
to promote. This is not to say that such specifications can’t happen in such a way 
that one gets incrementally better at seeing how each has its effect on some 
ultimate-principle and, from there, use a greater specified version of that ultimate-
principle to start to assess these concepts. It is merely to say that the process of 
specification necessary for an end norm to undergo to start to become useful in any 
proper sense of deduction to lower norms is itself not deductive. It is, instead, 
reflective; a matter of reflecting upon what matters the most. Whatever descriptive 
sortal one uses to denote the ultimate-principle one believes one is referring to, in 
order to utilise it effectively one must make sure its content is relevant to concrete 
cases in such a way as to allow for it to effectively have some traction upon those 
circumstances. Once this is said one could well substitute happiness for welfare or, 
as previously stated, ‘the good’ and claim that one should merely maximise that; with 
‘the good’ merely being a gloss for the various list of concerns that should matter 
most to us qua rational persons. In this sense the process necessarily needs to be 
bidirectional (Richardson, 1994: 141 and Rawls, 1971: 20). The content of any 
thought process moving down from the ultimate-principle to delineate less 
generalised concerns will be informed by an analysis of those concerns, in their own 
terms.  
 
3.4: Naturalism, System and Motivation 
A quick recap of the last two sections, and their main objects of discussion, 
starts to reveal certain characteristics that are shared by these normative theorists. 
They each have a desire for moral thinking to have a singular touchstone which can 
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be utilised to come to a conclusion about an acts moral status. The role such a 
touchstone plays, be it an ultimate end norm, intuition or a categorical imperative, 
has two major applications. The first is to give all moral statements a common 
ground by acting as the epistemological hook we discussed earlier in the thesis. This 
epistemological hook acts as a defence for one’s reasoning. The thought pattern 
goes: if moral reasoning is meant to be reasoning about a real subject then its 
content must be categorisable and recognisable as such. The seeming existence of 
competing claims in particular instances overlap in such a way as to make them 
untenable as being consistent explanations of the same phenomena. If any such 
phenomena are to have any reason for our attention then it must be shown that 
some such claims in some way explain what the essence of moral thinking is about, 
and actually touch upon a subject matter that is explicable through that essence. A 
dualism in thought here, that more than one hook exists, would lead to conflicts 
about what the subject matter under discussion actually amounts to.  
Clarification of this first point can be given by looking at how we deal with similar 
claims regarding other subject matters. If we wish to see if the test results of a 
particular scientific study were correct then we better clone that study as much as 
possible, sharing the same sorts of norms about which variables to highlight, which 
are redundant and so forth. We cannot back up the empirical claim the first study 
makes by way of rigorous scientific research by asking Mystic Meg. What guides this 
thought is normative intuition about knowledge – that knowledge requires a 
definable, consistent and statable standard which applies in all similar cases – which 
gives us reason to claim that all such events should be decided by appeal to this 
epistemological hook. Wielding more than one hook would leave us in a Sidgwickian 
position of having no further court of appeal to decide between them deductively, 
which explains the lament at the end of his ‘The Methods of Ethics’ (1981). This 
would require a judgement, which as far as the orthodox view goes, would leave us 
without a proper claim to knowledge; neither choice would be ratified by further 
definitive justifications as being the correct explanation. As such, either choice can 
have no explanation of why reasoning in that way is better than another way. 
This last part touches upon the second idea inherent within the draw to having a 
touchstone: that of a need for a system or method of understanding. In empirical 
matters the empirical world as shown to us by our senses seems to ground them. As 
61 
 
well as deciding between accounts so as to imbue us with an idea of how we come 
to know what the essence of a category of thought is, the touchstone also plays the 
role of showing how that essence instructs us in dealing with particular instances of 
that category. We have already shown how hard it is to find a way that deduction can 
play a central role inside moral reasoning 1.1 but the draw to such a feature is 
almost universal across normative theories. In both top down forms the idea of 
deducing from certain premises to conclusions is a prominent feature. When 
confronted with two choices, one utilises the touchstone to clear away doubts. In 
Kant’s moral theory deduction enters via the idea of contradictions. We cannot 
choose just anything as matching the Categorical Imperative as anything not worthy 
would contradict with other ideas that would pass the test. Working only with what 
we see as the essence of morality, we can always come to the correct answer as to 
what to do by appealing to the principles in place to designate the salient features of 
that situation and provide an answer; one that could be said to be correct, as long as 
the theory which promotes that distinct essence of the subject in such a way is 
likewise correct.   
The issue I have opened up in the previous sections was meant to show that it is not 
in the deduction itself, but in the way by which we arrive at a touchstone from which 
to deduce, which seem to cause moral theories (and by way of 1.1-2.2, also 
theoretical theories) to suffer in terms of making knowledge claims. The same 
certainty which we strive for in coming to a final conclusion from a normative theory 
is seemingly absent in coming to decide upon just that theory from all the available 
and possible theoretical positions there are. In light of this, it seems that any claim to 
knowledge from any particular theory loses its supposed punch, utilising, as any 
suggested theory must, a claim to certainty on the basis that the moral landscape, as 
it sits untouched by theory, gives us no definite clues as to what sort of organising 
and categorising theory might be best. Once this is understood, it becomes 
somewhat obvious how each theory available is a sort of restricted version of 
morality as we know it, pre-theoretically. Each promotes one certain type of claim 
that comes from a definitive type of intuition over all other types, and purposefully 
rejects the content of certain intuitions in favour of others for the sake of what we 
might see as the ‘form of reasoning’. In short: to keep the norm of system in regards 
to knowledge in place, we must, due to the conflicting set of intuitions involved in the 
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moral sphere, choose to group together certain intuitions which can be placed into a 
system over those that fall outside the system.  
When I say the ‘form’ of reasoning, I am referring to the idea that if one is to say ‘X is 
the right answer here’ with any confidence, there should be features which brings 
one to see X as the right answer; features that are available to all other situations 
which require that type of reasoning, which could then be applied to it. In other 
words, these norms regarding knowledge acquisition and what it requires seems to 
demand we find a consistent method or system of reasoning. This would be a 
reflection of the sort of analytical reasoning that arithmetic requires; that we utilise 
the same process for addition regardless of the numbers involved in the equation, or 
the situation which requires we perform such an equation. The numbers act as the 
content, the situation acts as the context, but that which guides the process of 
actually adding the numbers together is the form. Thus, the touchstone, by way of 
being the element which designates correct behaviour in light of a situation, also acts 
as the ‘rule maker’. It undercuts rivalling intuitions and competing claims by 
focussing only on a particular sort of claim, ones that can be systematised in such a 
way as to make a cohesive picture of morality.  
Once this is done, we have all we need so as to say that rules can be applied easily, 
with a system whose output could very easily be seen as knowledge by those who 
hold the form of reasoning as being so central to calling any output knowledge. But 
the sacrifice to any such system will always be the content of the competing claims 
that are ruled out of court as not really having any input to moral issues ‘properly 
understood’ by the creation of a cohesive touchstone in the first place. Thus 
Kantians rule out any notion of promoting goods recognised a posteriori and 
Utilitarians rule out our ability to understand rules that are not guided by the 
maximisation of a particular good such as happiness. Both manage to create 
systems which, in terms of form, are workable normative theories, but both do so at 
the dramatic cost of various instances where to agree with their output requires one 
to become deafened to one’s intuitions. And the literature is filled with such 
examples, be it dealing with an axe murderer asking for the whereabouts of a would 
be victim one is sheltering, or understanding how justice would function in a world 
where maximising happiness should always be the ends of a moral agent.    
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As far as morality and moral reasoning goes, it is this deafening oneself to intuition 
which seems a somewhat hypocritical and absurd suggestion at the normative level 
once one realises just how necessary intuition is in getting to that point. In a pre-
ethical world, there is nothing about killing which is inherently wrong, nor anything 
about looking after one’s own needs at the expense of looking after others. Rather, 
we seem to come to know these acts, or certain examples of these acts, as wrong by 
way of being inculcated into an already functioning moral world; a world where 
appeals to consequences in one situation and then appeals to character traits or to 
acts no one should ever do in the next, does not seem to elicit complaints about 
consistency. 
As pointed out at the end of 1.2 intuitions are a huge part in assembling any moral 
theory. What norms are taken as read to be good or bad to hold and which ones are 
left to see how a finished theory assigns them is up for debate, and in a pre-ethical 
domain none have anything but the beliefs of the person constructing the theory for 
backing. To find out what matters most in all cases, one requires, at the very least, 
some norm or norms to be seen as what matters most, in at least some cases, in 
order to start finding a pattern which is statable and can then be applied to new 
cases. Again, as much as we seem to need a theory to make sure we are not just 
working from bias or distorted intuition, we require intuition to start any theory which 
so designates some claims to be salient and others as not so salient or not salient at 
all. 
 
3.4.1 Norms of Form: 
What I now claim is that the one norm which is present in almost all orthodox 
theories, theories which end with a rule or rules which are meant to definitively guide 
behaviour, is not a ‘norm of content’ but  a ‘norm of form’ (or system, or method). 
Furthermore, I believe that it is clinging to norms of form as though they are 
somehow more sacrosanct, more definitive and more worthy of being untouched is 
both an arbitrary judgement and one which has caused the moral field serious harm 
in helping to comprehend the norms of content and how they are pervasive in our 
moral lives. When we have considered theories which use touchstones of morality - 
touchstones which categorise content norms in such a way as to include certain 
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content norms that fit a pattern at the expense of others, which often still weigh 
heavy on our intuitions - the reason for our acceptance that such norms must be 
mere intuitions (assumedly the product of individual of group bias ) is precisely the 
idea that content norms require to be fitted into a statable and cohesive system to be 
able to make judgements about the content of morality properly. But alongside the 
idea that certain intuitions get ushered away by being labelled as ‘mere intuitions’ by 
some theory, whereas others become the very essence of morality according to that 
same theory, we have also seen how the appeal to a strict system which attempts to 
omit the use of personal judgement and omit error seem to falter.  
The Kantian view on system is so strong that it is the form of practical reason and 
not the content of what that reason should promote that takes the central role in the 
Kantian account. In theories, such as Utilitarianism, which promote a 
commensuration system of deduction from ultimate-principles, we likewise see faults 
in the idea of systematically deliberating. There, the ultimate-principle meant nothing 
without being given content by the very elements of moral life that they were meant 
to regulate. This bidirectional process seems at first blush to rule out the idea that 
such a system could work without the use of proper practical reasoning filling in the 
content of the ultimate-principle first. As such the appeal to system failed here too - 
conditional upon how that ‘filling out’ might work - in creating a theory that included 
all the aspects of morality that seem to concern us.  
This analysis leaves us in a tricky position, of intuitively accepting the idea that 
morality can be fully systematised only at the cost of wilfully ignoring the call of the 
very same faculty, intuition, which suggested that there need be such a system. It 
will be the purpose of this section to show that the idea of a complete system is not a 
necessary one for us to aspire to, and at the same time consider the ways we do 
reason about moral issues and the way we can see this reasoning as really 
interacting with a proper content. In order to do this I will consider a different type of 
account which runs from a naturalist basis, and which eschews the idea of a statable 
system for morals. What it manages to do is to leave the idea of the system of 
reasoning behind without losing the idea that there is such a thing as a hook which 
could theoretically point us towards an unassailable reason for action in the moral 
instance. As we will see, such a call will be its downfall. In overcoming a need for a 
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definitive system however, it fails to take into account the important issue of moral 
motivation, of what it means for us to be motivated to do the right thing.  
My own account of moral reasoning will both disregard the idea that any reason is 
unassailable in the logical sense and take incommensurable premises as a stated 
fact; two ideas which I hope to show will no way discredit the idea that one action 
can be the right action to take when two such possible actions are in play. Likewise, 
though later in the thesis, the expanded theory should also hold onto a place for 
moral motivation and explain why and how we are motivated to act for the benefits of 
others. Furthermore, it will hold open a place, which has already been hinted at, for 
how we do come to deliberate about moral norms by looking at how we actually 
come to deliberate about norms in general. This exposition of proper deliberation, 
about what will then be determined to be an appropriate topic for reasoning, will 
complete the account. 
The idea that we need a system at all comes from the intuition that there need be 
definitive reasoning for our categorising some acts as right and others as wrong. 
Without a clear grasp of this, one could move from one case to the next, merely 
asserting one’s own intuitive bias upon the case at hand, and reasoning from there; 
concluding only relative to one’s own biases as to which acts fall into which category. 
In order to reason to a conclusion that has epistemic credibility, it is thought, there 
must be some pattern, equivalent to that of mathematics, which allows for certain 
features of a situation to be seen as more salient than others; with these features 
being seen as the essence of moral thought. Once we have identified an essence, 
by way of naturalism or rationalism, which can be said to prevalent in all such cases, 
we have a proper content for moral reasoning. Theories that seem to go against this 
idea of systematisation that we have so far seen are those like Ross’s, or indeed 
Moore’s, both of whom focus on perception as giving us access to intrinsic goods. 
The issue here seems to be a sort of explanation as to how this perception of what 
Moore calls non-natural properties differs from our merely sensing the presence of 
the natural world. We will come back to this. I believe that such an epistemological 
case can be made out in favour of such perceptions; not by postulating mysterious 
faculties, but by showing that the empirically driven conception of perception is not 
nearly as innocent as we believe it to be. In which case what is being set up is an 
illicit unfavourable comparison between the sorts of properties that Moore would call 
66 
 
natural and those he would call non-natural. Moore himself seemed to lose 
confidence in his own theory, essentially allowing a Harean (Hare, 1963: 55-75) 
conception of descriptivism and following the classic Humean empiricist conception 
of empirical facts and values that are projected on top of said facts. This in turn 
reduces evaluations to mere commendations for Hare, something any empiricist 
would be happy to agree with.   
 
3.4.2: Virtue Naturalism: Eschewing the Norms of System 
The theory whose shared feature will make up the bulk of the discussion in 
this section proposes an option that is quite distinct from other attempts at defining 
‘the good’. It does so by attacking the very idea that there is such a thing as a 
distinctly moral category which will spurn distinctively moral propositions; at least in 
the way that other theorists which we have so far canvassed have proposed. For 
Thomson (1997), ‘good’ does not stand for any property or definition yet to be 
uncovered. Instead, it functions in sentences by merely showing our approval of 
certain states of affair, whatever they may be. Not subjectively, however, like in 
Hare’s account. The way Thomson defies such commendations from reducing to a 
subjective affair, into something where ‘good’ can be meaningfully applied, is simply 
by extending a category of goodness we are all quite familiar with and which 
bypasses the usual complaints of the fact/value gap (and its cousins, the is/ought 
and belief/attitude distinctions). It does so, by precisely denying that ‘the good’ has 
an extra category of meaning, the specifically moral sort, and dissolving all uses of it 
from seemingly complex propositional issues into seemingly simple assessments of 
what features are good (in a non-moral sense) for certain types of things to have. 
The paper which I will analyse in this section belongs to Judith Jarvis Thomson in 
‘The Right and The Good’ (1997: 273-298). Her analysis shares features of various 
other naturalistic based virtue accounts (see (Hursthouse, 1999) in as much as they 
take a similar route in tying claims which include evaluative statements, such as 
‘good’, with factual statements. A good example of this idea and how it evades the 
fact value gap is given by MacIntyre. His own account seems to flirt with the 
naturalist position early on but in fact moves past it. His example in the paper serves 
as a decent starting point however: 
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From such factual premises as ‘this watch is grossly inaccurate and irregular in 
time keeping’ and this watch is too heavy to carry about comfortably’, the 
evaluative conclusion validly follows that ‘this is a bad watch (MacIntyre, 1981: 
57-58)  
There is an obvious draw here to the idea that if man can be made out as a 
functional concept in the same way that watch is made out, then if we were to know 
the function then we can know what sorts of principles to use, as they would be the 
ones which take us from how we are now to the state the proper function decrees; 
much like we know the steps to fix the watch, they are predicated upon how the 
watch should work. Rather than take it that there is such a fixed set of ends for moral 
agents, however, Thomson takes it that we use ‘good’ contextually in each instance 
it appears. Whereas naturalists who ground their use of evaluative terms on such an 
understanding - proposing that a good watch is one that fulfils a distinct essence 
(accurate and portable) of what it is to be a watch - Thomson would have it that a 
good watch is one that is contextually fit for the occasion. This means that while the 
natural teleologist’s would claim that a good watch is not made so by fulfilling a 
purpose outside of its more strictly understood use as a time piece, such as 
‘throwing at cats’, Thomson would say that the sentence ‘that’s a good watch’, is 
perfectly understandable as also meaning ‘this is a good for throwing at cats’. At 
least she would if the context allows that the listener understand it as such. If one is 
in a watch factory surrounded by angry cats and is asking to be passed things that 
are being put to use in the context of making sufficient missiles to scare the felines 
away then, ‘hand me that watch, that’s a good one’ is unlikely to be taken by the 
person handing out the watches as meaning ‘pass me that watch, as it is a perfect 
example of what we would in most contexts call a good watch’. The context allows 
that the watch’s (or indeed anything’s) ‘being good’ be only understood as 
meaningful in its immediate context.  
This is an important point for Thomson, as she wants to move past the idea that 
anything need have a specific nature which would allow it to be a ‘good’ anything, 
devoid of the context in which it is good. There is no such thing, she says, as just a 
good book, or just a good watch, or just a good person. Thomson’s moving past this 
position is inspired by her wishing to move away from understanding goodness as a 
property of any sort, much like ‘bigness’ is.  
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Following Geach, she claims that ‘X is a good K’ is attributive as opposed to 
predicative (Thomson, 1997: 277). Saying, ‘X is a good K’, is not to say of X that ‘X is 
good’, and ‘X is a K’. It is to heap praise upon X for being ‘good, plus adjunct’ - that is 
‘good at...’, ‘good for...’, ‘good with...’, ‘good to...’ and so on (ibid)(with ... leaving the 
adjunct open to describe whatever it is that we are claiming X is good at, with, for 
and so on). Without the ‘plus adjunct’ part, we are left with the idea that ‘some 
substantive need be understood’ and that substantive would leave the item under 
scrutiny as requiring that it have some essential purpose or function. Whereas the 
teleological naturalist thinks there is indeed such a thing as being ‘just a good K’, 
Thomson has seemingly shown that there is no such thing as ‘just a good K’. ‘For 
what K’, she asks, is ‘being good for the use of making cheesecakes...being a good 
K?’ (1997: 279) Her point here is that while one might utter the words, ‘that’s a good 
cheese’, the context would actually make it a perfectly legible statement and use of 
good, even though one could despise the cheese on every other level - it’s taste and 
texture perhaps - except when it was used to make cheesecakes and baked with 
various other ingredients. In which case the context of that statement would mean 
that ‘that’s a good cheese’ would be perfectly appropriate while in no way 
determining that ‘this cheese’ is in fact good all told (whatever that would mean) or 
good even in its more regular capacity of being just good to eat. 
 If we compare this to ‘big cheese’ then we can see the difference. For while 
bigness is an attributive adjective, some substantive is understood here that 
surpasses the context. That’s a big cheese is obviously attributive (that’s big for a 
cheese), and not predicative (that’s big and is a cheese). There is no need for 
contextual clarification, the statement is simply and plainly factive – it is either correct 
or not against a substantive standard for what constitutes a big cheese (or a big 
version of whatever object is under discussion). The question ‘big in what way?’ is 
not a valid question here unless the interlocutor misunderstands the comment. 
Whereas ‘that’s a good cheese’ cannot be plainly factive, as seen against some 
substantive that remains constant as a property amongst all good things of that type. 
Goodness is not a singular property then, it is contextual. So, Thomson’s account 
eliminates this issue by not focussing on what makes a good telos for a person or 
object in general. She achieves this by disregarding the idea that there are singular, 
functional terms that are necessary for our understanding goodness in a particular 
69 
 
object (say, time-keeping for watches), instead allowing goodness to be directed 
towards whatever function the object is used for at the time, regardless of its ‘usual’ 
purpose. If one wants a watch that will show off how rich one is then one coated in 
diamonds and gold, however heavy, uncomfortable and generally impractical this 
makes it, will mean that it is, here and now, a good watch. It is a ‘good watch plus 
adjunct’ – and whatever that adjunct might be, if its end is fulfilled by the watch (even 
if it is for throwing at cats) then to say it is a ‘good watch’ is correct in this manner – 
but only here and now. On this account of ‘first order’ ways of being good, there is no 
such thing as ‘just a good anything’.  
Thomson uses this analysis as a foundation for ‘second order’ ways, which while 
‘resting upon’ first order ways, do not follow the formula, ‘good plus adjunct’, we are 
told. Justice cannot be understood in this way, for example. That it is ‘good for Bert’ 
(1997: 282) is not enough to account for an act being just. In her mafia example 
(ibid: 274-275) - where Alfred is told by the mafia if he does not kill Bert then they will 
kill three other people - Alfred not killing Bert is indeed good for Bert, but bad for the 
three others. But, claims Thomson, there is a reason why we still want to say that 
killing Bert is unjust, even though, on balance, it is bad for more people. This is 
because such things as good acts and good people do not fall simply into first order 
ways of being good. They are second order ways of being good. Being just is good, 
it seems, because ‘it is better for us that the people among whom we live possess 
this trait [being just] than that they do not’ (ibid: 284). And being just is a ‘proneness 
to doing what one owes to others’ (ibid: 282). As Bert is innocent of any wrongdoing 
he is owed no harsh punishment such as the capital punishment the mafia would 
have Alfred commit. Alfred owes no such punishment to Bert so it is good (or right 
really, but we’ll stick with goodness here) that Alfred refuse, whatever the 
consequences to the other three. And importantly, Alfred cannot be accused of doing 
wrong to the other three; it is the mafia who will kill them after all.  
So how does this goodness get a foothold in Thomson’s account? Well, she seems 
to ground it upon the somewhat sketchy idea that it is ‘better [good] for us’ if people 
have the ‘proneness’ to committing just acts (as Alfred does in sparing Bert). The ‘us’ 
here implies a community. In fact she goes further than this and says 
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...it is better for us that the people among whom we live be just than that they 
not be just. Indeed, this is not merely better for us, but essential to us, since we 
can form a community at all and thereby obtain benefits which are essential to us 
and which only community can provide only if a substantial number of those 
among whom we live are just  (Thomson, 1997: 282) (my emphasis) 
I think this quote is revealing because it offers two possible readings of 
Thomson’s account, both of which are distinct interpretations of it. On one reading it 
is just better for us that people are prone to the virtuous types of action she will go on 
to describe and delineate in her usual elegant manner. This would imply that we will 
be told why it is better than any further option, and as we will see, there are other 
options available for this position, options she is competing against. As such, we 
seem to have opened up an evaluative debate about what sort of lives are the type 
that we ought to live. This moves past what sorts of principles we ought to have in a 
powerful way. On the second reading, these traits are not merely better for us in 
some evaluative sense, but they are essential to us – necessary features for our very 
existence as a species (which is taken as an intrinsic good, thus the move from 
‘better’ to ‘essential’). I believe that in some sense this is what Thomson is going for. 
Foot, who she praises early in the paper, had strong naturalist leanings also and she 
is generally taken to be of the naturalist ilk by various other theorists (McDowell, 
1996: 167-197) Likewise, Thomson’s analysis of first order ways of being good 
seems to be grounded naturally, by showing that good can be used non-
controversially (at least at times) as a factual matter, once the end is proposed that 
the suggested good thing is to be the means to, contextually speaking. Thomson’s 
account seems to allow this reading, if not promote it. There is an issue for Thomson 
if we read the account this overtly naturalist way, indicated by the ‘essential’ in the 
above quote; a problem we will discuss later on. I will start with the less naturalist 
reading of that same quote. 
Let us begin again with the idea that, ‘it is better for us that the people among whom 
we live be just’. The whole question comes down to the italicised phrase. Given the 
fact that good is ‘always good in a way’ - and ‘betterness’ is taken as an expression 
of something being ‘more good’ in a way than another option for that way – then, in 
what way, we should ask, is it better for us that people have these traits such as 
being just? We are told that ‘good plus adjunct’ does not sum up any second order 
71 
 
properties; that ‘X is Just’ is not ‘equivalent to ‘X is good plus adjunct’’. And yet there 
seems to be only one move for Thomson to make in describing how we come to 
think of just acts, or a proneness to commit them, as being good, if she does not 
want to return to the idea of substantives being understood where good becomes 
once again some type of property.  That way is, simply, that it is ‘good for us’, which 
is indeed, ‘good plus adjunct’.  
Saying ‘that is just’ is a way of saying ‘that is good’ – a specific way. But that 
specification needs to be grounded upon something in order that various rival views 
not compete for the content which Justice could plausibly hold. I don’t see a change 
in the sort of form of describing what it is to be good in this way from one that is good 
in a first order way. ‘Good for Alfred’ is highly specific. We can say ‘X is good for 
Alfred’ quite non-controversially, just in case X benefits Alfred in some way. If the 
means to that end are sufficient then ‘X is good for Alfred’ is a simple enough 
equation. But ‘X is good for us’ seems vague enough to evade being captured in this 
formulation in any meaningful sense. The ‘gap’ (Thomson, 1997: 282) in Thomson’s 
story seems like the most important part at this point; for what it is for ‘X to be better 
for us’ in such a way as us to think of ‘X being just’ seems hard to cash out. To claim 
that ‘X is better for us’ seems to be saying little more than ‘X is the sort of act that we 
characterise as being typical of a person who has grasped the best way to live’. But 
this seems to define nothing but itself; ‘how we should live’ is precisely the topic 
under scrutiny in moral philosophy. On Thomson’s theory, especially by way of this 
reading, what makes an act morally good is that it is better for us that we perform it. 
I’m not sure which other theory, even one which would assign a different content to 
Justice – a theoretical account in which it is thought that for Alfred to be just he must 
kill Bert, for example - would disagree with this point. 
It is clear at this point that ‘better for us’ is not enough to bring us into alignment with 
Thomson’s idea of what she wants from her account if we are already prone to 
disagree. A Utilitarian might think here that, as following the principle of maximising 
happiness is what makes an act good, it would be strange if it turned out that 
following that principle was not the best way ‘for us’ to live. What sensible theory 
would posit an answer to the question at the heart of moral philosophy ‘what sort of 
life should we live?’ and then proceed to claim that while ‘we should all live that way 
(or by these principles), it is better for us that we don’t’? As such, the idea that we 
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started with, that a proper sense of justice rules out killing Bert seems to be 
question-begging at best. It depends whose sense of justice we are defending here.  
The problem seems to come in the standard appeal to end/means instrumental 
reasoning as a deductive process that can be seen as non-controversial. In the 
cases of first order, it is exactly that ‘good for Alfred’ (or, making cheesecakes, 
reading, lawnmower repairs and so on) makes the equation simple by way of means 
and ends. But the object at the end of the adjunct, be it a well risen cheesecake or 
the health of Alfred, needs to be simple enough to already delineate obvious means 
which will promote their likelihood, or longevity, or whatever else is good in the 
context given, if the means to achieving this end is to be called good without any sort 
of serious issue. Once one complicates the ends in such a way as ‘better for us’ - 
where ‘us’ implies a whole species (or society) with a plethora of values and a 
seemingly endless possibility in terms of lifestyle that it would be near impossible to 
discover a standard for measuring - we are left with more questions than answers. 
The main question being the one at the heart of Thomson’s account: good for us in 
what way? And those with different senses of justice and so on will employ different 
definitions which may or may not allow for the killing of Bert. The very definition of 
justice that Thomson puts forward (‘proneness to doing what one owes to others’) is 
normatively vague enough to allow various formulations, any of which may or may 
not allow for the death of Bert under various conditions. Unless Thomson’s quest 
was a linguistic one, which aimed to show how ‘good’ (and adjectives such as ‘just’ 
which contain ‘good’ implicitly) function, by acting as a vessel for praise from a 
specific but undisclosed substantive normative view, rather than make any 
substantive claims of its own, then on this sort of reading it fails.  
Interestingly, it seems like on this reading the account is close to a utilitarian virtue 
ethic. It is similar to what was discussed when I aimed to show that any ultimate-
principle we attempted to put in to regulate further principles of action would need 
padding out from the evidence and values that we gain from living as functioning 
members within a community and which really provided the content for that ultimate-
principle, which in many ways acted only as a place holder. Thomson’s account can 
easily be seen as an expression of this, which would make the ‘better for us’ a lot 
more understandable. It would be saying that, with a wide enough scope to see, it 
brings a lot more ‘happiness’ if we act according to a very general understanding of 
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the virtues (one where Justice did indeed decree that Bert must live – and one which 
would be guided a lot more by our actual world than an idealised act utilitarian’s 
world). Happiness, here, need not be reducible to any one state but can be informed 
by our everyday understanding and learning about values at a base level. This would 
again require a bidirectional process where the knowledge we gain from everyday 
life and the values that we see exhibited in living such lives act as content and 
evidence for an ultimate-principle that is constantly changeable by way of this sort of 
evidence. As such, the ultimate-principle stops fulfilling the function that what we 
normally think of an ultimate-principle as fulfilling, as it can no longer be seen as the 
final point of reasoning, or a super reason. Instead it would be a modifiable, 
malleable and changeable understanding of what’s important in life, one that is being 
added to and altered by an understanding that takes place at levels lower than itself 
and specified in various ways to fit the situational features it is meant to be ruling 
upon.  
While I agree that the above is something very close to the form that moral 
reasoning does take I do not believe that Thomson has a right to help herself to this 
picture. The way in which it is ‘better for us’ that she is attempting to grasp feels 
vaguer than this picture, if we are to take her argument as meaning ‘better than 
various other possible ways of setting up a commensuration system’ and the fact 
value gap is to remain open. On this reading, the idea that there is a natural slant to 
something being good for us – in the same way it is good that a watch be accurate, if 
the person is wanting a watch that acts in this way rather than merely being a 
showpiece of one’s wealth – fades away. Instead it is a straight up statement of what 
is important in moral thinking that gives precedence to community formation as a 
feature for comparison, without much argument to that end. The meaning of terms 
like Justice would be required to rise up naturally from the living of everyday life, 
rather than being handed down legislatively from a set understanding that is handed 
to us by looking at merely the natural, empirical facts of living that life. 
The reading I think Thomson is actually aiming for is more naturalist than this; the 
clue in the above quote being the move from ‘better for us’ to ‘essential [for us]’. I 
believe she is very much aiming for judgements that any certain thing is ‘good’ to be 
read off in such a way as for them to be equivalent to any other natural facts about 
us; say, ‘it is essential for us that we do not all eat poisonous plants’. Morality, as a 
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practice, in this guise, serves a purpose or has a shared prudential end to which it is 
put which is definitively decided by our ability to get things done as a social animal – 
which is something that we just are. McDowell (McDowell, 1996), amongst others, 
has argued against this sort of naturalist attempt to ground moral statements and I 
believe those concerns, regarding the idea that a conscious being is one that can 
purposefully and wilfully subvert any sort of nature that someone attempts to say 
they must have, in such a way as to make the naturalist argument redundant, are 
relevant. However, I would like more to focus on an interesting point regarding moral 
motivation for such naturalist accounts.  
 
3.5 Motivation and Externalism: 
This point has more than one foothold in our end account of moral reasoning. It is 
important in coming to understand how we should view ‘goodness’ as connecting 
with reasoning, how we should view the ‘make up’ of claims that seem distinctively 
moral, and the importance of ‘motivational features’ in any account of moral 
judgements. 
Thomson’s naturalism – indeed all naturalist accounts share this weakness - puts 
her in a position of having to reject the idea that one needs to be motivated to follow 
a moral belief if they hold that belief. If it turns out to be the case that the best way of 
grounding the moral ‘good’ is for it to be actually be entangled within a naturalist 
understanding of praise for a particular thing which is inbuilt to its function (within a 
specific context or inherently) then when the object of that praise is meant to serve 
that particular function and it does so well - demonstrably well, in an empirical sense 
- then it would appear that the acceptance of the claim ‘X is a good act’ need not be 
intertwined with a motivational aspect in that person’s make up; one that would have 
them believe that having found it good they ought to perform it. An agent can 
correctly state that any number of acts are awful and feel no sort of remorse for 
doing them. It is just another fact that the act is bad, one that would only contingently 
impact upon the person who makes the statement.  
Such a position I will label as ‘externalist’ here. Despite its various uses within 
philosophy today, I wish to utilise it to signify any position that makes the case that a 
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sincere moral claim made by an agent need have no necessary link with an agent’s 
motivations. To clarify, this is not a case of ‘defeasible motivation’, where the agent 
has some motivational pull towards the moral claim that is outweighed by a stronger 
claim to act towards, say, their own rational self-interest. Externalist’s hold that an 
agent need have no sort of motivational pull at all towards a moral claim to be able to 
still recognise the legitimacy of that moral claim and make further claims themselves 
based on the remaining features of the situation at hand.  
This is of course not to say that this must be the case. The chances are that even if 
externalism turns out to be true, people’s motivations will indeed line up with the sort 
of judgements that they deem to be correct. That the objects of approbation and 
disapprobation (to use Humean language) common to a community in which one is 
raised will have the requisite attitudinative psychological effects on an agent is hardly 
going to be a surprising feature of coming to judge them as good or bad (or indeed, 
just/unjust, honourable/dishonourable,.../...). But for a naturalist, like Thomson, it is 
essential that this attitudinative aspect is an unnecessary extra within the whole 
enterprise of moral judgements. By the naturalist’s lights, we judge from the basis of 
natural fact only, the psychological component of having a feeling that aligns in the 
appropriate way with that judgement is more or less a serendipitous outcome of the 
whole affair.  
Many externalist theorists (Svavarsdottir, 1999 – Brink, 1989) have indeed urged that 
an agent with no such attitudinative extra can still be making correct moral 
judgements. They refer to this agent as ‘the amoralist’ (Stocker, 1979) Thus, if 
externalism is true then it must be possible for the amoralist to be a conceptually 
probable character, and if externalism is true then naturalism has a strong claim for 
grounding moral facts. If internalism is true (the antithesis of externalism, whereby 
one is seen as requiring the appropriate motivational pull –however defeasible – if 
one is to be making a genuine moral judgement), however, the amoralist cannot be a 
conceptually coherent character and naturalism must also likewise be false. So there 
is much riding on the supposed judgements of this agent who can know that an act is 
wrong while feeling no compunction to act in accordance with that knowledge. 
While this formulation of coming to understand something as good or bad certainly 
has the desired effect of evading the issues of the fact value gap, given that all 
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judgements would be made on the basis of facts and indeed turn out to be factual 
statements even if they have evaluative language within them, I will be disagreeing 
that this is the right way of viewing moral statements. The argument, that is 
somewhat well rehearsed these days, in favour of internalism, will take the form of 
striking at a central intuition we have about what it is to be making a moral statement 
in the first place. This intuition is that if one is not disposed motivationally to follow 
the judgements one is making then one is not really making that judgement in 
anything like a sincere manner. It is an interpretation of something that already exists 
in an authentic and sincere manner that they are mimicking.  
To get this across we could well adapt the context of a different thought experiment 
of Macintyre’s (112-3: 1981) and think of ourselves being placed in an unfamiliar 
territory: Hawaii, many decades before the breaking of the taboo rules by 
Kamehameha II. If we were to visit such a place and look at all the acts that the term 
‘taboo’ were applied to, we might start seeing a pattern whereby we felt we could 
begin on our own to avoid those acts that were taboo and only take part in those 
which were not. In so doing, we may not be motivationally invested in the appropriate 
sense for these to be our moral compass. There would be a point where, as an 
outsider, the thought ‘this act is not morally wrong, but it is taboo’ would cross our 
minds, whereas to a Hawaiian the thoughts would be one and the same; ‘morally 
wrong’ would translate to ‘taboo’ seamlessly. However good we got at spotting the 
patterns that were being used by the locals when they were referring to taboo acts, it 
seems that we are not doing the same as the Hawaiian person is doing in avoiding 
these acts. The practical significance of avoiding the act is driven, in the tourist’s 
case, by a propensity to avoid offending the locals - however silly she feels about not 
doing something which she sees as utterly permissible - whereas the locals avoid 
the acts precisely because they are taboo.  
The judgements are, for the tourist, a matter of discovering a pattern by way of which 
she will avoid punishment or causing offense (the latter of which to her may well be a 
sincere moral judgement) or simply of anthropological interest to her in documenting 
the practices of these people. For the local, however, the avoidance of such acts is 
central to ‘living well’ or ‘acting correctly’. If asked why they didn’t commit an act the 
only explanation that need be given would be ‘that it is taboo’, whereas the tourist 
uttering these words would imply a caveat such as, ‘...and they see this as wrong’, 
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‘...and I don’t want to undermine their customs’, or ‘...and I do not wish to be 
punished’, which would show how the practical significance of the judgement is 
separate to and distinct from that of the local in avoiding the act. Gibbard (2003) 
amongst others, has done much work to show how, without the underlying 
implication that a judgement necessarily entails that it holds practical significance for 
an agent who does not stand to the judgement in the way of an anthropologist, 
words like taboo - or in our community, right, wrong, good, bad, just (and so on) - 
seem to become empty words, or nonsense words (Gibbard, 2003: 137-159). 
Of course, for the non-cognitivist, such as Gibbard, this outcome of the naturalist 
attempt to show that there are moral facts, by essentially pushing all value 
judgements into the area of the natural by showing a ‘good’ something is necessarily 
tied up with the natural understanding of that something, is somewhat of a coup. By 
our own analysis it seems we are back to the position whereby moral judgements 
require an ‘attitudinative extra’ to be added to a descriptive item (be it a thing, an 
action, a state of affairs, a relation). And this attitudinative extra, they will claim, does 
not belong to the thing under evaluation; rather, it belongs to the non-cognitive part 
of the agent who is making the judgement. The right to appeal to the natural element 
itself as making the judgement has been repealed, except in cases where the 
specification of the thing’s end allows for certainty in the means being selected as 
the best means. Instrumental reasoning already allowed for this, however, and few 
non-cognitivist philosophers - be they neo-Humeans, emotivists or logical positivists - 
would have denied this position. It seems we must move beyond reasoning about 
just means if we are to give a solid account of moral reasoning which is in any way 
cognitive. It also seems as though naturalist positions, as I have defined them, 
cannot allow for this. On our analysis, naturalism dictates the ends an agent takes 
are either given non-cognitively - in which case the whole affair reduces back into 
instrumental reasoning, if our use of good is to hang on anything substantial - or they 
are chosen cognitively; but in such a way as to make that decision seem insincere by 
taking motivation out of the picture so as to require judgements be parasitical on the 
judgements of those who just so happen to have their motivations aligned with the 
judgements of a certain group at a certain time and place. We will now turn to non-
cognitivism.    
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Section 4:  Moral Reasoning, Rules and Motivation: 
 
Recap and Preliminary Discussion 
In this section I will aim to finally piece together a sketch of just how I believe 
we should see moral reasoning as occurring. The previous sections might well be 
seen as the project of beginning to dismantle, by way of casting doubt upon, some 
strongly held assumptions by theorists who have searched for a ground for morality 
that stands above any particular set of judgements. The motivating intuition seems to 
be that the epistemological clarity that a consistent, statable and general ground 
gives is a prerequisite for intelligibility. There have been various attempts to cash out 
this assumption: that the ground is self-evident by taking part in human existence 
such as to reveal either principles or a principle as being the very stuff of morality; 
that it can be attained by a priori reasoning; from a special sensory perception of 
non-natural properties; or from the natural world as it is anyway, once we have 
understood exactly how our evaluative language functions to pick out things that are 
beneficial for us to see as good, qua human, or qua societal member. The varied 
forms of attack on irrationalism and unintelligibility which the assumption represents, 
under various guises, are all genuine attempts to overcome positions which threaten 
our ability to say that evaluative claims are more than the expressions of mere 
biases and prejudices. 
The assumption, however, has its flaws. This is made manifest by the much visited 
idea that each and every theory we have so far examined, while picking out at least 
one major and important essence of morality, by way of emphasising one touchstone 
that seems pre-philosophically important, does so at the expense of some further 
intuition. In some cases that is merely norms of content: to take on board the 
important touchstone of consequences is to give up on the integrity of persons and 
vice versa. In other cases it is norms of form: to take a Rossian position that allows 
both consequence and integrity of persons and emphasises the role of judgement, 
we have to sacrifice the idea of a coherent system and give over too much heavy 
lifting to intuition - for which we have no real understanding.  
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This section will be a dedicated attempt to find a way in which we might satisfy as 
many of these norms as possible. As such we will need to explain why they are so 
important to us in the first place, and hopefully give an analysis of the moral terrain 
that allows it to keep its pretensions for intelligibility, put reason at its centre and 
keep the idea that moral reasoning has a proper and appropriate subject matter, 
such that an agent taking part within it can be said to be better or worse at it.  We will 
likewise want for them to be said to be going on in the right manner and in the same 
way when they are reaching a level of expertise in the subject matter, all without that 
claim seeming far-fetched or worryingly self-referencing. In so doing, not only must 
this theory of reasoning capture what is at essence with greater clarity and 
consistency than the theories which I have disregarded thus far, but to do so while 
evading the threat of irrationalism and subjectivity which lurks in the background.  
It is from the ashes of these assumptions about intelligibility and objectivity that I 
believe a more defensible and realistic view of morality might well emerge; or at least 
one which might act as a spring board for a new direction in the application of ethical 
thought to practical fields. 
The theories that we have looked at so far have always been trying to get a grasp of 
one key question: how might we know that our moral judgements are right? We can 
separate those that we have seen into rationalist and naturalists camps, whereby, 
respectively, any claim to knowledge is grounded within either a system of universal 
rules forced upon us by rationality, conceived in one way or another, or by reference 
to the way the world is anyway. The problems with positions from either camp have 
been manifold and strongly reported already within this thesis; however, a more in 
depth analysis, one which should apply to all examples of each type of theory, will be 
the first aim of this section. The majority of theories we have analysed so far have 
been rationalist. By this I simply mean to say that they ground morality, or see it as 
given some foundation, by way of reason itself. If the evaluative domain is to be 
more than a mixture of biases and non-cognitive feeling, if the domain is to have an 
actual chance at intelligibility, then there must be some claims which stand as 
universally true – that is, that the denial of which would simply be false - from which 
other claims can flow. We have seen different ways of going about building such 
theories from theorists such as Kant, Mill and Sidgwick.   
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In all these rationalist theories the predominant intuition is that intelligibility implies 
generality in one form or another, and as we have no reason to believe, ahead of 
any concrete cases, that any given agent is undeserving of being seen as morally 
equal, these generalities must therefore be seen as universal also. Thus, we arrive 
at a place where universal rules must really be the very objects of moral thought. 
What differs between them is the idea each theorist has about what constitutes the 
touchstone of morality, which acts to generalise the material. Some focus on 
happiness, others on integrity and autonomy of persons, but each, crucially, sees the 
proper foundation of moral thought to be made out via some rule or set of rules. 
Rules are the very essence of generality; as such it is rules which we must follow if 
we are to be lead in each case by the same ideas, to carry on, as it were, in the 
same way in each case without bias or prejudice, to aspire to universality and so on.  
The very idea of rule following has had much philosophical attention given to it over 
the preceding century, and each type of theorist we have come across so far has a 
stake in this argument. The rationalist and the naturalist both interpret rules as the 
very foundation of moral thought and intelligibility. The non-cognitivist, as we will see, 
has a connection with the way that naturalist-based moral theorists take rules to be 
important. The non-cognitivists are against the idea that rules in anyway act as a 
saviour for rationalist theorists against their claims that one acts according to their 
non-cognitive desires. Whichever rule one chooses, on their reading, will only show 
that agent’s personal non-rational preferences.  
My own position will be what has come to be described as particularist (Garfield: 
2000, Little: 2001, Dancy: 2001) It has its roots in Aristotelian philosophy. I will be 
explaining and defending this position as we move through the upcoming sections. 
At this very early stage though I need to make sure I distinguish it from a further 
position which shares its name. This other position states not only that moral claims 
are not grounded by rules (a position I agree with) but also that rules have no place 
in moral thinking whatsoever and moral claims are not universalisable. These last 
two points I stand firmly against. My own idea of how to represent and understand 
moral reasoning will in fact hold rules to be of great importance in explaining moral 
thought – what we need is to characterise how those rules function and what form 
they take. They may not be recognisable from a descriptive level, and it may take 
judgement to know when to utilise them, but the key point will remain that they are 
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there. Without some core of generality, intelligibility is under serious threat. Thus the 
point will largely be that rules are simply not foundational. While the 
particularist/generalist debate continues, I will maintain that it is a Wittgensteinian 
epistemology, to be spelled out soon, that best caters to the understanding of how 
rules are best characterised. This will be made clear by how much easier it is to 
explain that tricky idea of motivation in moral reasoning that we have already seen 
the naturalist has problems with. That is a problem that rationalism shares if it is to 
be made out in such a way that requires rules to be foundational to moral reasoning 
at all.  
 
4.1.: Non-Cognitivism Re-Visited 
Before we get to all that, however, I wish to first take another excursion back 
into the realm of non-cognitivism. It is through this area that I think we should 
proceed in order to get across all the points that this section needs to make, as it is 
via attacking this position that we might best get to grips with two points which 
themselves each have two facets. The first of these is what is needed for moral 
disagreement to occur and what is happening when it does so. The second is what it 
is for motivation to occur and what is happening when it does so.  
The latter of our two points makes up the very meat of the non-cognitivist’s appeal. 
After all, it seems that no cognitivist theory we have so far canvassed really comes 
close to explaining why it is we should be motivated to do some acts and not others. 
This inability to explain motivation to do good acts is the focal point of any non-
cognitivist attack upon normative moral theories. That this is the case should hardly 
be surprising. Non-cognitivist descriptions of reasoning seem to have an air of 
simplicity that has an appeal largely in virtue of this simplicity that revolves around 
motivation. The process seems to be explained simply and thoroughly via the 
instrumentalist model of desire (end) and rationality (finding a means to that end). 
Furthermore, in decreeing that such judgements can never be right and wrong, the 
picture of practical reasoning does not need to be compared with our more everyday 
understanding of theoretical and descriptive reasoning. The Humean picture of 
World and Mind remains intact, with the contrast between the two types of reasoning 
merely being presumed. This is a very important point. What any cognitivist is up 
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against is an entire Empiricist picture which explains where all of these sorts of 
judgements ought to sit. Again, the division between mind-to-world and world-to-
mind directions of fit is key. If the agent is implicated at all as being part of the source 
of some mental item they experience, then according to this picture the charge of 
subjectivity is a likely consequence. Only those items which present themselves to 
our sense as part of the world ‘as it is anyway’ are actually objective. And moral 
claims seem, on the cognitivist rendering, to try to have it both ways. The cognitivist 
seems to wish to say that moral reasons are objective, but that moral reasons are 
also born of an agent’s will; the right type of will.  Thus, it is usurping this Empiricist 
picture that it seems to me is the main task of cognitivists if we are to overcome this 
obstacle. 
On the other hand, the non-cognitivism, which takes this empiricist rendering as its 
lead, seems to have a hard time in explaining why it is that normative moral 
disagreement occurs at all. This seems to be a serious issue for the theory as a 
whole simply because it is very clear indeed that disagreement over the use of moral 
terms does happen all the time, and happens in terms of distinctive descriptive 
content of a term. While we may have some almost jovial arguments over our 
favourite flavours of ice cream, we do not do so over the application of moral terms 
to other actual events and features within the world. Unlike chocolate being a good 
flavour and mint being bad (something which, although true to any sensible person 
regarding ice creams, has no further court of appeal than one’s own sense data and 
non-cognitive response to flavour and taste) it would appear that disputes about 
wars, relations, deceitfulness, the moral status of different beings and so on, move 
beyond this. They ‘move beyond’ in as much as any position seems to require an 
explanation or justification as to why one might hold that position over an alternative 
position. In so explaining, we utilise the practise of reason-giving, moral assessment 
and argument which we see every day. Thus, if the non-cognitivist is to allow such 
features she must have a more complex explanation of what is happening than that 
provided by the Emotivist account - that we simply react to a situation and that is all 
there is to it. Emotional and evaluative statements, by the emotivist’s lights, are not 
apt for truth at all, as they are in no way a part of the world as it is anyway; explained 
by science and without any credence given to our contingent responses. Here, there 
is no explanation for why we utilise reasons to explain our difference of opinions 
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upon something. Normative disagreement, something which should be able to be 
explained away by any theory, becomes a mystery in itself. Without some regularity 
underscoring our application of evaluative concepts we would forever just be 
speaking past each other. 
The bulk of this section will be trying to overturn the key elements of this non-
cognitivist picture as the seeming alternative to there being a solid generalist theory 
which somehow compels acceptance. Having considered and rejected the idea that 
any generalist theory compels adherence, it seems that the following picture is what 
is left. It turns upon the components of what we do feel we can know for sure, and 
then draws an unfavourable comparison in the light of ethics.  
The picture of what believe we can just know falls into that which can be explained 
‘descriptively’; that which has a world to mind fit. The world spreads itself onto our 
minds. From sensory input we gather empirical data. That which leaves a sense 
impression upon us is that which we can know is there. For sense impressions we 
cannot immediately understand – what causes the movements of inanimate objects, 
say – we can theorise about what causes the impression of what is there anyway, 
and test them against basic standards for understanding. Anything additional to this, 
anything that we believe that we project upon the world, ought to be accounted for in 
terms of this interaction between human mind and the world, seen as two distinct 
components of that natural world. From this we can talk of subjective experiences.  
If facts, truth and objectivity are to fit into this picture, however, it is not to do with 
what is projected, but the actual circumstances under which it is projected, what 
‘inner’ elements causes the projections, how we learn to vocalise them through 
social institutions of language and what-have-you. We can give objective and factual 
accounts of such things as colour experience, a staunch empiricist would say, but for 
all that colours are not ‘there anyway’. They are a by-product of our very particular 
subjective make up interacting with other objective elements of the world. For such 
empiricists, our reasons belong to describing and theorising about what is there 
anyway. Evident here, in the background, is an idea of an ‘absolute conception’ of a 
world fully described by empirical data, where every primary and secondary quality 
was explained or explained away reductively in primary terms. The external world is 
just the external world, and we, as physical beings, are a part of it, and all our ideas 
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and actions and thoughts and experiences can thus be explained in these primary 
terms. There is an appealing sense of simplicity and unity within this picture, and 
indeed this picture is very much the functioning one that scientific enterprise 
embraces. Truth, objectivity and reality are determined by what is ‘out there anyway’ 
on this rendering. Anything which does not fall into that category can be downgraded 
to subjective, a mere projection of ours. Thus, in ethical terms, if someone wonders 
whether you ought to do something, the ‘ought’, by these lights, is not up for 
reasoning about, without the ends of the agent involved being known. Whereas for 
meaningful ethical discussion it seems a pre-requisite that ends and first principles (if 
there are such a thing) are open to be assessed by rational decree. We need to find 
a way to overturn this picture, which I will refer to as the Empiricist Theory of Mind. I 
will discuss the idea of absolute conceptions in Section 5 in relation to moral 
objectivity  
The first part of this section will discuss a more sophisticated non-cognitivism than 
that of the emotivist. This opponent to moral reasoning will be pitted against the 
arguments of Neo-Aristotelians who have utilised a Wittgensteinian epistemology; 
with the focus being on the work of John McDowell. The upcoming section will lay 
out the key ideas of our antagonist. The following one will give some programmatic 
and intuitive remarks as to why their analysis seems wrong. Neo-Aristotelians often 
bring charges from a Wittgensteinian inspired epistemology regarding rule-following 
in order to make their points. The upshot of this account will be that those who 
peddle this sophisticated non-cognitivism think that the descriptive elements of what 
we do can be ‘disentangled’ from the supposedly projected ‘shared evaluative 
commitments’ of communities in which we live. Following McDowell, I aim to show 
that this description of understanding is indeed counter-intuitive and destructive, not 
just for moral reasoning, but to our understanding of all reasoning. We will also deal 
with the charge that not relying upon descriptive generality catapults us into a 
regress of interpretations. This last charge is serious. If we are not to illicitly take up 
a rationalist or naturalist ground of our own and yet keep open a space for 
normativity and objectivity this claim will have to make good on this point.        
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4.2: Sophisticated Non-cognitivism and Rules 
What I think of as a more sophisticated non-cognitivism, and one which has a 
lot more clout to it by way of explaining normative disagreement, derides its earlier 
counterpart and rejects the thesis that we simply see a certain state of descriptive 
affairs and either find it agreeable or disagreeable. Rather, this version runs, when 
we see a state of affairs we judge it to be good or bad upon the descriptive features 
that are there - and because of the features that are there - coupled with a learned 
reaction to those descriptive features obtaining in just this way. We do, as a 
psychological fact, analyse and reason upon whether we should categorise these 
states of affairs as good or bad. That there is at least some conceptual agreement is 
evident from the fact that we do not merely talk past each other. This account thus 
has the benefit of accounting for moral disagreement, and the ways in which using a 
term in a particular context can be seen as a good or bad use of that term. This 
section is indebted to the work of McDowell, especially in ‘Non-Cognitivism and Rule 
Following’ (McDowell, 1981) 
While this, at first glance seems to be a description of a cognitive account, it is not. 
For what we are actually doing when we make this move is utilising moral concepts 
that can be said to have two distinct elements: a descriptive element and an 
evaluative element. Our reasoning is, the sophisticated non-cognitivist will claim, 
purely based upon the descriptive element; that is, the features that are present in 
this case and how they ought to be categorised into evaluative language. Whether 
an act falls under the terminology of courageous or foolhardy, for example, is open to 
debate and discussion. Whether it falls under the concept courageous or minty 
simply is not. It is this shared core of description with the addition of different 
attitudes and sensibilities in individuals that allows for the disagreement that we see 
day in and day out. Thus, discussions about wars and the such are rarely a matter of 
whether it is good or bad – thin descriptions - but whether it is just, whether (in a 
democratic country at least) the population of the country who attacks is aware of 
why they are attacking and agrees with these reasons, whether the force used is 
uncalled for, whether the intent of the leaders is not duplicitous, whether the acts of 
soldiers are honourable… the list goes on.  
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One could spend many hours looking at all the features of a war and come to a very 
reasonable conclusion regarding what parts of it were just and which parts unjust, 
the consequences it had for both countries, the probable intentions of the leaders 
and so on. But, by the non-cognitivist’s lights, at this point one would still not be 
taking part in proper moral reasoning. All one would be doing is categorising features 
that are ‘actually there’ into moral categories that could be utilised via description 
satisfaction alone. If there were many cases of one’s own army risking their lives in 
the face of danger to help others this would show many cases of courage. If the 
leaders who called for the war seemed sincerely to care about the ends that they 
claimed they went to war for this would show good intent and honesty. If the war was 
conducted with expertise, using technology to reach one’s end while causing minimal 
casualties on both sides, this would point to an attempt to keep the war as humane 
as possible, and so on. All these thick features (courage, honesty, good intentions, 
justice, credibility, humanity) seem to show that we have reasoned that the war is, as 
a matter of fact, at least permissible. But to the non-cognitivist this is not so. All it 
shows is that certain features obtained within the war that allowed us to categorise, 
as we are prone to do, the war as having those features, descriptively speaking. 
There is room for the rightness and wrongness of concept application within this 
account then – the concept is correctly applied if just certain descriptive features that 
obtained allow for that concept to be applied. But the addendum that these features 
speak to an evaluation is wrong. The evaluative element is still non-cognitive for it 
relies on an attitude that has a definite mind to world direction of fit. 
As far as moral evaluation goes, the evaluative element of such thick concepts, as 
those listed in the sentence before last, still requires an ‘attitudinative extra’ that 
shows that no such judgement that this concept applies is true in the full moral 
sense. While we can say, without worry, that descriptively speaking, the war had all 
those features, we cannot say that the war was actually better or worse for having 
them. For while, descriptively speaking, the soldiers were honourable to their 
captives, enemies and allies alike (by way of the relative commitments to concept 
application within that community) the evaluative addition, that this is a good thing, is 
one that does not appear in the world alongside those features, but is added on 
erroneously after the fact and in no way follows from those facts. It is, the non-
cognitivist will claim, projected from a very special position of concerns (ours) onto 
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the world itself. And concepts that are so projected, as opposed to having their basis 
in the factual domain of the empirical world, belong instead to a particular person or 
group’s psychological state at the time and their customs for applying such concepts 
and generally being emotionally effected by that which warrants their applications. 
So while we can say of a war, that it was fought honourably, courageously, fairly and 
with minimal force by the victor, and we can also say that these features definitively 
obtained – according to the standards of that group - and we can say that most 
people who view this war would find those features to be there and to find those 
features to add up to the idea that the war was won well, we cannot say the war was 
actually won well. The people of this culture applied the concepts correctly upon the 
basis of an agreed upon definition of those concepts, of what applying ‘courage’ here 
amounts to. But their motivation for application and the use of such categories is not 
held in place by the world as it is anyway. All that can do is account for regularity 
relative to that community’s practices and customs. Those practices and customs do 
not, however, relate to the world objectively; that would constitute that from a purely 
descriptive position, there would be evaluative properties in the world as it is anyway. 
This account, then, focuses on moral language and the concepts and predicates 
used in its prescriptions and judgements. There is agreement here between non-
cognitivists and my own thesis regarding the way certain types of moral concepts 
function. Terms such as ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ are what we call ‘thin’ moral 
concepts. These concepts are ‘verdictive’ (Dancy 2004: 16) judgements that make 
up the top layer of moral reasoning. What causes us to make such judgements is 
forced by the layer of moral concepts which lay underneath these; what have been 
termed by Williams (1985) and many others as ‘thick concepts’. Such concepts are 
said to have both a descriptive and an evaluative aspect to them. Concepts such as 
courageous, delicate, sarcastic, vindictive, petty, egregious, valorous, kind, and so 
on, all fit this description. The move common to the non-cognitivist tradition is to 
claim that whilst we can, in some respects, say that these are concepts which have 
truth conditions for their application embedded in their descriptive element - which 
accounts for normative disagreement - their evaluative element is still something that 
cannot be said to be a matter of cognition. 
Take the term ‘courageous’. The non-cognitivist idea here is that the term can, as 
McDowell puts it, can be ‘disentangled into two components’ (McDowell, 1981: 200-
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201); on the one hand its descriptive content and on the other its evaluative content. 
Descriptively, the non-cognitivist would claim, ‘courageous’ acts are those which can 
be properly described as something like this: ‘to begin or continue a course of action 
despite having to endure foreseen negative consequences in the face of conflict’. As 
human beings, who as a matter of fact, apply moral concepts, courage has a 
descriptive element. Courage becomes a moral concept in that we also ‘tack on’ on 
an evaluative element, to this effect: ‘and such acts are praiseworthy’. And it is this 
evaluative element of moral concepts which the non-cognitivist sees as being a 
matter outside of cognition; ‘ a non-cognitive state that constitutes the special 
perspective from which the items in the world seem to be endowed with the value in 
question’ (ibid: 221). It is an extraneous evaluative component which cannot be said 
to be apt for truth outside of the practice in which the concept is applied. We can 
teach others to apply the concept more or less correctly by tracking its descriptive 
elements, but we cannot say they have reason to find its being so applicable as good 
or bad from there. 
The importance of separating what is supplied by our practices and what is supplied 
by the descriptive element is crucial to the account. The picture which is allowing for 
something to be considered a matter of correct application – that which allows for the 
normative account of moral concepts that the more sophisticated account of non-
cognitivism seeks to keep - is the picture of a purely natural description of the world; 
an ‘absolute conception’ or full scientific explanation of what is actually there 
anyway, regardless of our practices or our own unique perspective of the world. 
Thus, courage can harmlessly be said to be a concept which is independent of our 
particular perspective, in that it picks out acts which can be brought together under a 
basic description, that human beings can, as a matter of fact apply: those which 
follow something like the rough sketch in the previous paragraph (‘to begin or 
continue a course of action…in the face of conflict’). What confuses the issue - and 
is a matter which cannot be said to be true, independent of our unique perspective - 
is that these acts should be in any way commended as being good acts. This would 
require that moral features such as goodness were themselves ‘in the world’. And by 
the non-cognitivist’s lights the world is made up only of natural, descriptive features; 
those features that have a world to mind fit, whereas the evaluative addition has a 
mind to world fit.  
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Thus the normativity of moral statements, according to the non-cognitivist, which 
allows for proper disagreement, is to be found in the descriptive element only. When 
we meaningfully argue about moral statements we are taking what I will call an 
‘anthropological’ stance towards them, in that we are saying that these people, at 
these times, would be said to describe act A as courageous because it exhibits the 
descriptive features X, Y and Z. This disinterested anthropological position is the 
only one where truth comes into the equation. From the position that appears 
meaningful to us, the one endowed by the special perspective, is in fact 
meaningless, because it is irrational. We can happily add, regarding the people who 
believe they are occupying that special perspective - as a naturalistic description of 
their mental states - that they would also believe this act to be one which warranted 
commendation, or would find this application agreeable and not that one; that they 
would derive happiness from such acts. But we can never say that the act is one 
which should as a matter of fact be commended. And this position holds as true for 
our own practices as for the practices of any tribe, community or set of persons at 
any time and in any place. The upshot of this account is that the meaning that we 
supply to words which carry evaluative content is purely relative to a particular time 
or culture. It is the evaluative elements that make us establish such concepts, by 
projecting ourselves and our attitudes onto the world. As any attitude is as 
meaningless as any other, from the point of view of the disinterested universe – 
which determines true propositions - correct or incorrect usage cannot be conceived 
as being how the term is applied here and now in the full sense in which we hear it. 
Thus, to explain away normativity and moral disagreement, the non-cognitivist 
places the burden of this with the descriptive content. When we start calling certain 
things courageous, we are, as it were, contractually obliged to maintain the same 
uses in the future, with that use being made out at the descriptive level. If we did not 
do this there would be no locus of proper disagreement, because there would be no 
means for genuine disagreement left; just a cacophony of variable interpretations 
with nothing to link them. Such a move thus allows the sophisticated non-cognitivist 
to overcome the threat of failing to explain the nuance of disagreement, which was 
the threat which does seem to incapacitate the Emotivist account. We will deal with 
the threat of interpretability shortly. 
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Overcoming this particular non-cognitivist threat has been paramount in not just re-
establishing moral thinking, but in ushering in a particular way of seeing just how 
moral reasons work and how they can be said to truly be a matter of cognition. I will 
follow the reasoning of McDowell (1984) here in taking up a Wittgensteinian 
epistemology. Doing so correctly threatens the very idea that these non-cognitivists 
can indeed account for the normativity of moral statements as they wish to. This 
leaves two options: either fall back into the Emotivist position, which cannot account 
for normativity, or accept that normativity can be accounted for in more ways than 
merely pointing to generalities at the purely natural level. Just how much of this 
attack McDowell gets right, and where his account takes the line of reasoning will be 
put under scrutiny in Section 5. There we will see that there are some possibilities 
left for the non-cognitivist even after the following argument has given the cognitivist 
some breathing room. As the account develops it will also become clear that 
McDowell utilises certain Wittgensteinian insights that many other cognitivists play 
down or reject. 
 
4.2.1: Denying the Disentangling: 
The non-cognitivist’s error is in many ways best brought out by pointing out 
that thick concepts actually belie a purely descriptive element that is not actually 
there at all to be understood by someone outside the practices. Mastering a concept 
such as courage cannot be done by means of description satisfaction alone, which 
could determine its correct usage by a competent agent in the anthropological sense 
implied by the non-cognitivist account. Whatever the description given, it appears 
that purely descriptive content cannot be easily used to capture such a term’s correct 
usage in any particular scenario. In our own description of courage, for example, the 
terms ‘endure’, ‘negative’ and ‘conflict’, which were used to attempt to reduce 
courage to its purely descriptive element, are, in themselves, not purely descriptive. 
Furthermore, scenarios in which the ‘more descriptive’ features seem to fit are not 
always ones in which a competent user would want to say that ‘courage’ is an 
appropriate evaluation.  
Someone who ‘endures’ the foreseen, ‘negative’ consequence of ‘conflict’ when they 
publicly harm an innocent person are not people whom we would happily describe as 
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displaying courage. All the same, publicly harming innocent people is an act which 
will generally cause one to endure negative, foreseen consequences. Surely no one 
would see this as courageous, even though it fits our description. Thus there is a 
thought such as possibly adding something like ‘for good reason’ to the description 
of courage. Yet what counts as a good reason seems to surpass being reduced to 
descriptive content. As does something like, ‘without being cruel, thoughtless, 
callous…’as each of these other thick concepts would surely suffer from the vast 
amount of possible misinterpretations that courage does. (Compare: Croom, 2010). 
If to apply courage we look for certain descriptive qualities obtaining and then tack 
on the attitudinative extra, ‘and this is a good thing’, we cannot appeal to the thought 
‘is this (overall) a good thing?’ to decide whether or not the concept applies. It is 
whether the concept applies that is supposed to tell us this. As Dancy says, 
‘verdictive judgements do not contribute to the situations on which they pass 
judgement’. (Dancy, 2004: 16) Equally as unedifying is the idea that we know all the 
descriptions in purely descriptive terms of what counts as courageous already. Yet 
this list might be infinite, and certainly beyond human cognitive reckoning. 
Understanding thick concepts such that one can apply them correctly seems to 
require we share a whole host of other evaluative concerns. 
This seems to undermine the anthropological position the non-cognitivist wants us to 
occupy, which they claim explains the normativity of moral concept application. 
Failing their ability to show that the normativity of thick concepts can be understood 
from ‘outside’ the practice, as examples of picking out the right set of descriptive 
features, it stands to reason that genuine disagreement over such concepts can only 
be explained by someone who is already within the practice (something they would 
claim threatens the objectivity of the account as it resists explanation in natural 
terms), or that the whole thing gives merely an illusion of reasoning (something early 
emotivists would agree with).  
It is perhaps worth pointing out at this point that non-cognitivism, at least the more 
sophisticated examples, shares this flaw of needing reduction of the evaluative to the 
descriptive with the naturalist accounts we pondered earlier, with Thomson. The non-
cognitivist account seems to require a position from which we can view thick 
concepts which allows for them to be reduced to a matter of description satisfaction. 
Naturalists, of course, share a similar position. They wish to claim that someone 
92 
 
being, say, just, is good as a matter of empirical fact, and both the goodness of that 
deed as well as the deed itself need to be understood in descriptive terms - if they 
are not to undermine their own account by assuming an evaluative understanding 
that is grounded upon anything other than the world as it is anyway. Of course, given 
the different aims of the two positions, and where they start from, utilising this idea 
has different effects for each account. In the non-cognitivist account, as we are 
starting to see, there is an issue with the idea that, unless we are understanding 
morality from within, being able to recognise the requisite descriptive patterns (to 
identify a thick concept’s correct application) as patterns that hold each time without 
issue, or resorting to further evaluative concepts, seems unlikely. While there are 
indeed similarities between all acts that can be labelled as courageous or all acts 
than can be labelled as honourable or just (and so on), there are always examples 
that either simply evade these precise descriptive features in which a competent 
user would still find it appropriate to apply the thick concept, or examples which have 
these precise features, even though a competent user would not wish to apply the 
concept. 
The naturalist account shares this flaw - this idea that we may well be able to show 
our thick concepts as supervening upon descriptive features in such a way as to 
remain static and recognisable from outside our practices - whilst also having the 
misfortune of not providing any notion of how one becomes motivated to be 
courageous just from coming to know that it is ‘good for us’ to have these traits. Even 
if one were to grant to the naturalist that there are definitive patterns underlying each 
thick concept that allowed for them to be cashed out as a matter of description 
satisfaction alone, or a naturalist was to attempt to ground the sort of epistemology I 
am utilising here to explain moral reasoning in a naturalist ontology, she would not 
be able to explain why this should motivate her in her actions. That is, were it 
obvious that doing action A at the descriptive level would mean her act could be 
labelled as courageous, whereas action B would make her act, by way of 
supervenience, as being labelled cowardly, this in no way gives her any motivating-
reason for doing act A over act B.  
What is a flaw in this naturalist account is the very area the sophisticated non-
cognitivist exploits to strengthen their own claims. While we can recognise acts at 
the descriptive level – allowing as they need to for moral disagreement, moral 
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education and moral assessment – the additional aspect, that these acts are to be 
avoided, or promoted, or done at all costs, and so on, is not entailed by that 
recognition. It is my contention, following McDowell (1981) (as well as others), that 
this ‘disentangling’ of thick concepts – into one of recognition and one of motivation 
to action – is not available to us. To be available to us in this manner would require 
us to be able to step outside our own modes of evaluative thinking and be explicable 
to anyone who shares none of our interest in our modes of evaluation.  
This point has, of course, been used by McDowell, amongst others, in defence of a 
virtue based account. I will also take this route, but I wish to give a clearer account of 
what is happening when we are reasoning, building upon the idea of bi-directionality 
available in holism to show that argument can be made out. While my account is 
broadly Aristotelian it makes less use of virtues as such, focussing on how values, 
empirical facts and norms interact. If we do this I believe we can actually give a lucid 
account of reasoning in general - moral reasoning included - which will in turn allow 
us to start assessing reasoning about ethics in the medical field well-armed, with an 
idea of morality that has a strong epistemology, explains away ontology, explains 
motivation and gives us an idea about how moral claims can be seen as an exercise 
in truth and objectivity.  
 
4.2.2: The Place of Rules in Reasoning: 
The non-cognitivist concern here, regarding objectivity, easily transfers over to 
the conception of how rules function in our thinking, a topic which Wittgenstein was 
famous for focussing on and elucidating in such a way that allowed for the 
McDowellian ‘anti-non-cognitivism’ account to emerge. Everything, Wittgenstein 
showed us, depends upon the position from which we account for the generality that 
is manifested by rules. The non-cognitivist thought is that if the rules that fix terms 
such as ‘courageous’ are not understandable from the anthropological viewpoint, 
then the rules don’t fix in place anything at all; there would be no point of reference 
by which to say a concept has been applied correctly or incorrectly. But this is an 
adherence to the scientific conception of objectivity, where the only things that can 
be said to ‘really’ be there are those things which can be understood from outside of 
specific human practices. And this adherence is, as Wittgenstein has pointed out, 
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suspect and most likely misplaced. Our perspective, he demonstrated throughout his 
later works, makes far more appearances in all of our areas of reasoning than the 
Empiricist rendering of the relationship of mind to world allows for. I wish to show 
that morality has only a few features that are peculiar when compared to science or 
mathematics. Each domain hangs on adhering to a practice that cannot be defended 
from a position outside itself or that is defendable a priori. The features morality 
exhibits which are not found in other domains of thought, I will endeavour to show, 
are not enough to disqualify it as a domain which can be understood as objective; 
instead these differences are precisely the sort of suis generis features which make 
it an independent domain of thought and which provide it with a unique and distinct 
content. Without such differences one would struggle to distinguish its content from 
purely descriptive content. Thus, to take such differences to act in favour of believing 
less contestable domains as granting access to truths, in a way that morality does 
not, is to already have accepted, implicitly or explicitly, that the contestable Empiricist 
position to be correct.  
To do so I will follow Neo-Aristotelians like McDowell, Garfield (2000) and 
Little (2001) and utilise these important remarks from Wittgenstein’s later philosophy 
regarding rule following; ones which challenge that very position by way of exposing 
the idea that certain data comes to us uncoloured by our assessment of them from a 
specifically human position. Having used this position against the non-cognitivist 
arguments - that facts and values should be conceived of in such a way that 
interprets the latter as including a move that precludes them as being fit for cognition 
- I will move on to show how it likewise debunks the idea that intelligibility requires 
generality at the level of statable general principles. This should undercut the 
intuitive adherence to rationalism, for those who wish to show that the moral domain 
is indeed still intelligible, without concession to descriptive generality or system 
based rationality which runs from a touchstone definition of the right or the good. The 
implication, here, will be that the same theory of mind has been accepted by those 
who see a certain conception of universal rules as being a necessary feature of 
defending moral reasoning as being cognitive as those who argue the whole matter 
is non-cognitive. The next section will address a way of conceiving of motivation 
which is amicable to this same position.  
95 
 
We will, then, begin with our assessment of what it really means to follow a rule. I will 
follow Garfield (2000) and use rules outside of morality to make my point. Take these 
two rules from the world of soccer: 
 
1) Fouling a player in your own penalty box by tripping or pushing an opponent 
prior to taking the football from them will result in a penalty kick for the 
opposing team 
2) If, whilst committing such a foul, the player also prevents a clear goal-scoring 
opportunity then that player should be shown a red card.  
 
Whilst the two rules both direct game officials in decisions as to what should happen 
in the event of either situation occurring, there is a significant difference in how each 
rule is learned and applied which is also the crux of the matter regarding moral rules.  
Regarding Rule 1: The rule can be learned by reference to description satisfaction 
alone, and its application in any given instance be deemed as correct or incorrect on 
this basis. No examples need be given to show how such a rule works. Instead, one 
can simply learn the descriptive formula, ‘a penalty kick should be given when a 
defending player trips an opposing player in the penalty area prior to kicking the ball’ 
and then go on to apply it to future cases without much issue. One can get better at 
applying the rule to a point. But it is the rule, not the judgement that its application is 
relevant here, which appears to be foundational in determining it has been used 
correctly. 
Regarding Rule 2: The rule cannot be learned in such a way that it might be applied 
correctly without examples of its correct use, via inculcation into the world of football 
officiating, being given to the person learning it. What counts as a ‘clear goal-scoring 
opportunity’ calls for judgement beyond the scope of description satisfaction alone. 
Instead, one can only learn from seeing various cases of goals scored from various 
angles and positions, all of which depend on a myriad of factors, including but not 
exhausted by such things as: ball control at the time of the foul, the supposed shot 
back-lift needed to score, the skill of the individual in question, the angle and 
96 
 
distance from the goal they are positioned at when fouled, whether the severity of 
the contact constitutes a trip, and so on. 
How we come to grasp and understand rules so we can apply them to future cases 
then is paramount to the non-cognitivist account.  Being inculcated into a practice 
such as soccer officiating is, for the non-cognitivist, insufficient as an explanation, as 
it leaves open the threat of subjectivity and arbitrary application of the rule. That is, 
the non-cognitivist thought goes, if we refer only to how we do apply a concept or 
rule to justify future application, then we lose any account of how we can be wrong in 
that application. If we are to apply a moral term such as courage correctly in each 
case, its application must be fixed from the anthropological position and conform to 
something more like the example of Rule1; where a series of counterfactuals are 
insufficient as the only explanatory device for saying someone is going on in the 
same way when applying the rule or concept. But we have seen that, at first blush, 
evaluative language evades precisely this sort of description satisfaction. Moral 
rules, if there are any at all, as we have seen, resemble Rule 2. They resemble it, 
that is, in that attempting to give a purely descriptive explanation of what acts, states 
of affair or agents a concept applies to seems impossible. We seem to require 
further thick concepts in our explanations of the correct application of any particular 
thick concepts. But if this is the case the non-cognitivist position is under severe 
threat. The epistemological hook – the generality of the natural world as revealed to 
us by our senses – cannot be thought to account for the normativity of concept 
application.  
The non-cognitivist response to this is that, rather than learning mere responses to 
certain factors through a lengthy enculturation which requires counterfactuals and 
prompts (think of Rule 2), we can postulate a ‘psychological mechanism’ (McDowell, 
1978: 206) which allows us to grasp patterns which are, in the descriptive sense, 
actually there. These patterns, however complex, once divined from the examples 
we are given, then lead us to make more or less or correct applications of the rule or 
the concepts the rule determines (depending how well we have grasped the pattern) 
whenever that pattern (or if we have not grasped it thoroughly, similar patterns) 
appear. This postulation of the psychological mechanism, then, alleviates the threat 
of apparent arbitrary application that the counterfactual learning needed for grasping 
rules like Rule 2 seems to throw up. For example: we cannot describe fully the 
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pattern which accounts for the phrasing ‘clear goal scoring opportunity’ – this is just 
an anomaly of our linguistic abilities – but this complexity does not necessitate that 
such a descriptive pattern does not exist and ground correct applications. The 
psychological mechanism can do the work that our linguistic minds cannot and tacitly 
find the descriptive patterns underlying correct applications. We could, theoretically, 
with precise language, describe every example of a ‘clear goal scoring opportunity’, 
but we use this phrase as short hand instead. Thus, with enough care and time, we 
could indeed explain the term to someone who takes up an anthropological position 
to soccer officiating. If we cannot do so, we are using the term arbitrarily. As such the 
concept is not open to normativity, as what is a right or wrong application of it has no 
grounds. 
 
But this appeal to the ‘psychological mechanism’ has been shown by Wittgenstein as 
being misguided. And without such a mechanism to help us grasp rules from the 
anthropological position we also have reason to doubt that our use of rules can be 
grounded as such. Here, the mathematical examples readily available in 
Wittgenstein (1953: §198), McDowell (1978: 205) and Kripke (1982: 9) are edifying in 
helping us come to see how even rules which we believe to be completely separated 
from our being involved in the practice which employs them have the same 
dependence upon our responses as those in practices such as soccer. We like to 
think of mathematics as existing anyway; as its rules are understandable platonically, 
from a position outside that of being an agent who practices arithmetic. As such, the 
consoling thought goes, the rules which govern this practice, at least, are not open 
for interpretation in the way that Rule 2, or a given thick concept seems to be, and 
from our preliminary discussion, moral rules seem to be. As such, surely this is a 
prime example of the mechanism at work.  
 
Kripke (ibid) is quick to point out that even the rules of arithmetic seem to be open to 
vast interpretation, if we hold onto this purely objective position from which 
similarities need to be grounded. For example, Kripke offers the example of 
someone who interprets the plus rule as the ‘quus’ rule. Quus states that: for any 
numbers <57 when you see the + sign then add those numbers together. For any 
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number >57, when you see the + sign the answer will be 5. Whilst a child learns the 
rule, we believe initially that they have indeed grasped what we believe to be the 
plus rule. But once numbers larger than 57 start appearing, we become confused 
when he starts reeling off the answer 5 to each problem, and even more confused 
when he states with certainty, ‘but I know that I have the right rule in mind’. 
Furthermore, the + sign could be interpreted in infinite further ways, meaning that the 
plus rule could really be identifiable with an infinite range of behaviours. Thus, until 
an agent has shown us he can add every conceivable set of numbers, we can never 
be certain that he has in any sense ‘grasped’ the rule. But a certainty in the grasping 
of such rules is precisely the thing the non-cognitivist account assumes. By their 
lights, rules cannot be grounded by the responses of agents who are following the 
rules of the practice in question. This would allow for the arbitrariness of application 
they need to avoid so as to say that we are really going on in the same way at the 
descriptive level – that at least this is a matter of cognition. The same worry ought to 
be shared about anyone who leans towards an empiricist theory of mind. 
The non-cognitivist may well respond again, at this point, that Kripke’s argument - 
that a whole myriad of potential rules of the ‘quus’ variety could well be what is 
interpreted by someone learning the rule - is somewhat beside the point. One such 
rule will in fact be the plus rule as we know it, and that teaching rules such as this 
just consists in continuing the teaching until that person has shown that they really 
have grasped the rule by answering a variety of examples and always in line with the 
actual rule they wish to say that he has grasped. When this has happened, then the 
non-cognitivist can still say with some certainty that the ‘psychic mechanism’ they 
postulate will interact with the correct rule and guarantee that the student will now 
exhibit the correct behaviour whenever faced with this rule. The psychic mechanism 
essentially divines the rule, which is there anyway, independent of our practices, and 
places its dictates clearly at the forefront of one’s mind whenever one is asked to 
follow it. But just what form this dictate takes becomes the crux of the issue, and in 
showing that no such form seems sufficient or plausible so as to explain the capture 
of the rule, the idea that the postulation of the psychic mechanism is ‘an idle 
intervening step’ (McDowell, 1981: 206), as McDowell argues it is, becomes all the 
more appealing. 
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The idea, following Kripke (1982: 8-27) is that what ‘appears before one’s mind’ has 
to take a form that thus explains the kind of predictable behaviour that understanding 
the rule affords us if we are to see the rule as existing independently of our practices. 
But the form itself seems debatable in any format we wish to give it. The idea that 
every infinite possible application of the rule appears there, all at once, seems simply 
implausible; after all, we have finite mental powers and cognitive abilities. A second 
option is that just some applications appear before our mind, with a prompt (‘and so 
on’) to carry on the algorithm. But the idea that the prompts can guarantee future 
behaviour is just to assume that one will carry on the rule correctly, which is exactly 
the idea we are questioning. All we have done is move the doubt from the practical 
sphere to some mental state. What was under question was ‘how is it, that in 
practice, when given a rule to follow and after only seeing examples of it in practice, 
a student comes to apply the rule correctly, rather than follow one of the other infinite 
range of behaviours the rule could dictate?’. This second suggestion just moves the 
same problem into the mind of the student, away from the practice, but the same 
scepticism still recurs here as to how a few examples and a prompt can lead to 
correct behaviour. Without a way of being able to describe precisely what it is that 
the psychological mechanism does in order to delimit certain options such that the 
student can grasp one, it seems to be an extraneous asset in the explanation of our 
coming to know and follow rules. If we instead take the idea that we are just 
disposed to follow the rules thus, then we lose our claim to normativity, which is what 
this sophisticated non-cognitivist picture wishes to keep. Our being communally 
disposed to act like this and not that does not seem to amount to objectivity. Other 
dispositions might have prevailed and they can indeed change. We will have a fuller 
discussion of this point in 4.3. It is this set of arguments that Kripke poses which 
McDowell turns against the non-cognitivist.  
This is precisely why an idle intervening step seems to be a suitable way of 
summarising the ‘psychological mechanism’ that Gibbard (Gibbard 1992: 278) and 
other theorists of this ilk postulate. The importance of the Wittgensteinian account is 
that it shows that the fear - that this means concepts cannot be applied correctly or 
incorrectly - is misplaced. Leaving the learning of rules as being embedded within 
the practices that those rules come to govern does not, as the non-cognitivist seems 
to think, determine that the authority and objectivity of such rules are a matter of us 
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merely assigning them authority and objectivity in some arbitrary sense – as though 
one might simply stop seeing them as valid and use some alternate set at will, and 
claim that these are her rules on the matter.  
…obeying a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a 
rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one 
was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it (Wittgenstein, 1953: 
§202) 
Normativity, then, is not something we can obtain from the anthropological position, 
as it leaves open the ability for vast interpretations of the application of rules. 
Understanding just why a concept or a rule applies here requires that one is 
immersed within the practice that the rule is said to govern. Just like with Rule 2 from 
the soccer example, one is required to understand the game of soccer before one 
can come to apply the rule. This ‘coming to understand the game’ is a sort of 
education by enculturation; by means of which the rules in question come to have 
the meaning and force that they do to participants who understand the practice or 
‘form of life’ as active participants within it. From a position that is not within the 
practice, certain relevant features may be spotted as endowing an act as falling 
under a particular evaluation to those people and thus warranting the use of a 
concept that such an evaluation determines (think of our tourist attempting to 
determine through descriptive features alone what acts count as Taboo in Hawaii). 
But there are no guarantees here; and to make the mistake that a concept can 
always be categorized into requisite descriptive features, which make up the rule 
upon which the non-cognitivist supposes the correct application of the concept is to 
supervene, simply misses the point. As McDowell puts it:  
Supervenience requires only that one be able to find differences expressible in 
terms of the level supervened upon whenever one wants to make different 
judgements in terms of the supervening level. It does not follow…that the set of 
items to which a supervening term is…applied need constitute a kind 
recognizable as such at the level supervened upon (McDowell, 1981: 202) 
McDowell, following Wittgenstein, thus shows that not only does it not follow, but that 
such a position will leave one unable to comprehend vast swathes of rules, meaning 
and concept applications that one would understand if they were to go through the 
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process of inculcation and learn the ‘techniques’ that this form of education bestows 
upon one when one is asked to ‘follow a rule’ within a particular practice common to 
that ‘form of life’. Whether the rules under question are moral, or arithmetical, or 
otherwise in nature, they still have the same dependence upon those who 
understand just why they apply here being immersed in the practices which make up 
our distinctive ‘form of life’. And it is this which holds together and gives our practices 
the meaning and sense that they do.  
That the rules are not grounded from a position external to our practices does not 
render them merely an ‘agreement of opinion’ (Wittgenstein, 1953: §241). This 
dependence is not in some way lesser than that proffered by grounding them 
externally. The lack of grounding them externally seems suspect in itself, but this is 
more so due to the fact that we cannot start to explain just how any psychological 
mechanism we possess could come to really interact with what we know to be the 
right application of the rule, when, from this anthropological position, any 
interpretation of it seems as good as the next. Without the ‘apparatus’ for discerning 
which interpretation is the right one, the idea that a rule can be assessed as correctly 
applied by someone standing outside our actual practices, and the agreement in 
judgements such an inside position works from, falters fatally. The Wittgensteinian 
reflections upon rules, thus drives a wedge between intelligibility and generality that 
is made out at the purely descriptive level. And this pushes up against the image of 
our collecting in purely sensory data which we split up into portions for the 
application of meaningful concepts and can be taught from the former level. I will 
again follow McDowell (1981: 214) and refer to these combined arguments against 
the non-cognitivist idea that we can disentangle thick concepts and find patterns for 
correct application at purely the descriptive level ‘the uncodifiability thesis’  
The psychic mechanism, I suppose, is meant to be something like that of pattern 
recognition; but that we have the mental faculty of pattern recognition in no way 
means that the patterns we recognise could be meaningful or even comprehensible 
without inculcation into the practices in which those patterns have meaning. 
Extending a series, or applying a concept, requires that we first grasp the practice in 
which such patterns are meaningful - and we cannot appeal back to those patterns 
to explain how we come to understand the practice we are taking part in without 
circularity. As Wittgenstein says,  
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If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not 
only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments (Wittgenstein, 
1953: §242) 
While all these ideas give us reason to doubt the idea that we can cash out rules and 
extensions of concepts in purely descriptive terms, it has problems of its own. The 
next section will consider some of these in details. In short, the worry is simply that 
even though we know by way of communal inculcation into practices that certain 
things are right and wrong, there seems to be no way that we can say that this is 
definitively right and wrong. Were the practices different, we would have learned 
differently, and there seems to be no further recourse for appealing that the practice 
we do have is better than another we run into, or some hypothetical one. As such, 
while we can chide the non-cognitivist for reducing normativity to the purely general, 
we now have to show that we can hold onto it all, or that it is not merely a culturally 
relevant matter. We surely want more than this for the account to qualify as realist. 
These worries will be overcome or quelled by the analysis of the next section.  
 
4.3: Getting Things Right without Foundational Rules: 
At this point there seems to arise some serious issues regarding what it is to 
make claims rightly or wrongly. The terminology of the anthropological position does 
not help matters. It seems, using such language, that we push up against an intuitive 
idea that what is happening when we get things right is more than merely coming 
into step with a community, or a culture who are separated from other cultures and 
communities by way of the sorts of judgements that they make. This leaves open the 
distinct possibility, it would seem, for more than one conception of truth. In fact, if the 
anthropological position is unavailable, one from which we can know what is really 
happening by taking a God’s Eye view, the community claim seems to be the best 
we have. And yet there is an intuitive idea that it is not the judgements of a particular 
community or a particular culture as to what truth consists in.  
Any sort of realism, then, seems to require both, that, as a matter of necessity, there 
is no way to grasp a rule that can be made out as consistent from a God’s Eye View, 
and yet that we have to do so, because truth cannot be fixed by way of our 
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judgements. We come to learn language by way our being integrated into a 
particular society, even at a particular time. The uncodifiability theory seems to pay 
homage to this. The differences that pertain between the correct uses of particular 
words at a particular time cannot be fixed from a position that is somehow outside 
our own special perspective, in a way that could be mastered by merely tracking the 
presence of certain descriptive features. As we saw, language users seem to require 
the evaluative aspect in order to be able to recognise and utilise the thick concept; 
yet we know that different societies in different times and places have different 
evaluative components to match the descriptive components we have. Without a 
position to tell between these – which appears to be something equivalent to the 
God’s-Eye View – we seem committed to a community based truth.  
But then from where do we obtain our sense of correctness that seems to be implicit 
within our saying we are carrying on a concept the right way? The whole business, 
under this Wittgensteinian analysis, seems to break down into something like a sort 
of anti-realism, whereby what is seen as correct application is done so by way of 
ratification from the community. The issue being that this opens up the question of 
whether the community can ratify their own applications in a way that seems 
independent enough of their own judgements to claim that they might be correct in a 
more fixed way. There seems to be two positions about the status of statements 
being true, both of which give up on a specific intuition while holding another firm:  
1) The Independent Reality Position: This holds onto the intuition that those 
things that we say that are true are so independently of what we say and do. 
The intuition this runs up against is ever having a vantage point to reality 
itself. We seem to need a form of life to start explanations, but all explanations 
can only be couched in that communal language, and the community is 
always once removed from the independent reality by way of this language. 
Objectivity and normativity are maintained conceptually but seemingly 
inaccessible. 
2) The Communal Truth Position: This keeps the intuitions that we learn our way 
around the concepts in such a way as to explain how we come to understand 
normativity and have varying views, as well as giving us something we can 
have access to in easy to understand epistemological terms. The intuition it 
rubs against is the idea that things can ever be ‘thus and so anyway, 
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independently of our ratifying the judgement that that is how they are’ 
(McDowell, 1984: 222). Objectivity and normativity are kept but diminished to 
a communal artefact.       
This is the precise problem that McDowell tries to grapple with in his paper, 
‘Wittgenstein on Following a Rule’ (McDowell, 1984: 221-262) the article from which I 
took the quote at the end of 2). There McDowell wrestles with how one might 
reconcile these two ideas of the normativity of concept application – the same getting 
applications right and wrong, the absence of which I argued was a flaw in the 
emotivist account – and the intuition that when we say that X is indeed an apt 
extension of a concept we are doing more than just appealing to the learned 
behaviours of a particular community’s consensus upon the issue.  
It was indeed with the community that this thesis left the issue. The sophisticated 
non-cognitivist turned our objection against the emotivist against us. They argued 
that if we could not show how the same concept applied to different objects from a 
position external to the practice in which concepts were applied (i.e. the 
anthropological position) then there seemed to be no room for right and wrong. 
Every application would be instantly deemed to be correct because we deemed it so. 
As such, there seemed to be nothing to say that we are going on in the same way, 
as independently-ratified. We settled with the claim that as there was no way for us 
to understand just how it might be that we could ever grasp rules from outside our 
own practices - using this to cast doubt upon the claim that independent-ratification 
was available – and, as such, took a position that could be read as making the claim 
that internal ratification or inter-community-ratification would have to do. 
But the inter-community-ratification of 1) seems hard to stomach as well, precisely 
because it seems to make the claim that all there really is to our agreement in 
judgement is that we do agree. As McDowell was the theorist I followed in 
disagreeing with the non-cognitivist - and his use of Wittgenstein in emphasising the 
falsity of a psychic mechanism, thus, seemingly placing the normative constraints for 
going on in the same way as being inculcated into a community - I will again follow 
his lead and see if he can ward off this assumption that 1) or 2) are the only options. 
I will map some arguments from ‘Wittgenstein on Following a Rule’, here, with some 
elaborations. The hope of this section is to free us from worries, further down the 
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line, that giving up on ‘explanatory theories’ in ethics will mean following the fashions 
of our communities.   The aim of this section is to see if there is a way to find a 
position between 1) and 2) above which keeps hold of both of the intuitions in a 
satisfactory way. McDowell does have an answer that I will try and bring out and 
expand upon in small part. But this answer has been seen as issuing in a sort of 
Quietism, which is the highly disputable position that philosophy ought only be 
descriptive of our practices and should never put forward explanatory theories. The 
problem here is that the answers available to a challenge such as Wright’s seem 
light on the ground. If, as we absolutely must, we are to keep the possibility of 
certainty within our practices, then it may well be that an explanatory theory of such 
certainty will always be challengeable - which once again puts that certainty into 
doubt. I will look into this issue in Section 5, along with a few other issues that the 
McDowellian account brings up. For now I will track and elucidate the arguments 
between McDowell and Wright, which the former puts forward in ‘Wittgenstein on 
Following a Rule’. 
 The main competing view in Wittgenstein on Following a Rule is indeed that of 
Crispin Wright, and his position as explained there is essentially 2). As such he 
prescribes to the view that the best position we can aim for is ‘anti-realist’. Both he 
and McDowell express normativity of meaning in the form of a commitment to using 
concepts in a certain way – the right way. How they envisage this commitment being 
fulfilled is quite different, however, as we will see. It is a commitment that McDowell 
describes as normatively ‘contractual’, which can be put like this: If we use a concept 
once, then, if normativity is to be possible, there must be some pattern of ways of 
usage of that concept that one is committed to. Or in Wright’s (1980) explanation of 
the pattern idea (one he eventually disavows) “committed to certain patterns of 
linguistic usage by the meanings we attach to expressions”.  
Given this sort of analysis, we might add that applying a concept in the right way is 
simply always using it in accord with that pattern, while making a mistake is coming 
out of step with the pattern (normativity of human judgement seems to loosely 
presume fallibility), and getting things wrong is not having grasped the right pattern 
(despite, one would assume, at least some overlap with the correct pattern’s 
extensions). 
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Wright’s position, following 2) above, is that “there is…no rigid, advance 
determination of what is to count as [a concept’s] correct application” (Wright, 1980: 
21). From this we get the idea that objectivity of the intuitively pleasing sort which 
McDowell seems concerned to try and salvage, is discarded here by Wright. It is 
done so largely due to his reading of what Wittgenstein says regarding explanations. 
When we try and learn a concept and are trying to find our way with the supposed 
pattern, any explanation that we receive as to how to go on is couched likewise in 
this same language that we are trying to grasp. Thus a gap opens up, between what 
is meant to be gotten across to us, and what we interpret that to be. The same 
applies for samples of examples, as well as definitions.  
Wright thus takes this cue, regarding the ever present interpretability of language 
that Wittgenstein mentions, as pre-determining the idea that our understanding 
requires a leap, “…we move towards the idea that understanding an expression is a 
kind of ‘cottoning on’” (Wright, 1980: 216). As such, the best understanding we can 
ever have is ‘idiolectic’ (McDowell, 1984: 224); an understanding we believe we have 
privileged access to, given the representational quality it has, as my best guess of 
the understanding the pattern that you were trying to get across. The issue with this 
is that it seems impossible to find a vantage point from which to distinguish between 
cases in which I am getting things right, as such, and cases in which I merely believe 
I am. This closes off the pattern idea as existing at an objective level, given the lack 
of vantage point here for knowing I am following it or not. The representational 
quality of the pattern, as I happen to see it, is the best I can ever have.  
This relates, quite obviously, back to Kripke’s idea of a ‘quus’ rule from our attack on 
the non-cognitivist. Unless my instructor were to push me for every conceivable 
application of the plus sign, it would be quite possible that my interpretation of the 
rule were not correct in as of yet unuttered applications, even though I assumed it to 
be so. Eventually, however, I might go out of step with my community – and this 
would show that indeed I did not have the pattern right.  
Wright points out, however, that while appealing to the community’s application is a 
way of getting back in step with them, it is not a way of trying to show that there is 
some access to what the pattern in and of itself ought to be. For the problem of every 
interpretation standing behind the next that motivates the quus rule just reappears at 
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the community level. Each member was taught at some point in the same way we 
are being taught and there is simply no way of bridging the gap between their joint 
application (assuming it is joint and at some point each won’t come out of step) and 
a pattern that exists anyway as a right extension of the concept – the same pattern 
we wish to say we follow contractually when we start to use the concept. The 
idiolectic commitments, it seems, become a sort of colloquialist commitment to 
certain uses. But from here there is no court of appeal left. Person A can come out of 
step with the community and be corrected back into that pattern as best they can, 
but there is nothing the community seems to be able to appeal to in order to find their 
feet if, say, they are met with new situations where a concept needs applying. As 
such, there is nothing for them to come out of step with. And as such what the 
pattern ought to be rests with the community. A driving Wittgensteinian theme behind 
this notion might well be that abbreviated slogan, meaning is use. The ‘pattern’ is 
only meaningful because it is the one we use. Our changes to it therefore change the 
meaning of the concept, as opposed to the driving intuition behind the objectivity 
McDowell seems to want to salvage, where it seems we would change our use to 
accord with the pattern that best captures the actual meaning of the term – at least 
the one we are normatively committed to. In order to distinguish his position and 
make it credible then, McDowell will be required to show that meaning and cultural 
use can conceptually come apart in such a way for the community to use to be 
deemed in certain instances as incorrect by an individual who holds their ground on 
the meaning.  
So from Wright’s picture, the idea of objectivity in applications which stands above 
the community’s attitudes to what is right disappears completely, and he shares this 
part of the anti-realist picture with Kripke. The key premise seems to be the idea that 
the pattern always requires our reaching out to grasp it, and yet this seems to always 
require an interpretation on the part of the person learning. In terms of objectivity, 
both thus condemn to failure the idea of a pattern that determines correct 
applications, because both claim the best we have is a representation of what is 
being put to us. The best we can get is a community-ratified-understanding. The 
community has nowhere to turn because ratification-independent patterns cannot be 
plausible. The looming intuition is that McDowell’s own position is sending him back 
towards the Platonism we have just tried to leave behind, where rules track features 
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of a fully independent reality that exist beyond any perspective. As this is one part of 
the non-cognitivist’s ploy of disentangling thick concepts, and also the illusory 
measure of certainty they claim we get from empirical claims, against which, post-
Wittgensteinian analysis, we can now safely say they unfairly compare evaluative 
claims, McDowell has every reason to refute the independent reality position. 
However, without thinking of a way that makes it the case that we can understand 
concepts in way that defies the interpretation picture, then, we seem stuck with this 
conception: Interpretation stands in the way of our understanding anything more than 
what the community decrees, and even this normativity arrives after the individual’s 
judgement – as their own understanding of the community’s pattern is itself an 
interpretation. If the community changes its collective mind there remains no position 
for the individual to claim they are wrong.  The position is a strong one and it is 
crucial that we overcome it if we want to hold onto realism at any level.  
 
4.4: Rejecting the Interpretative Regress Picture: 
McDowell courts two pictures of breaking through the interpretative picture, 
both of which Wittgenstein puts forward as implausible. The first is the Platonic idea 
of a ‘super rigid machine’ (McDowell, 1984: 231). On this picture we interpret what 
the person puts across to us, trying to find an interpretation which holds the 
application in place as our instructor seems to require of us. In each case, however, 
the Kripk-ensteinian sceptic is readily poised to claim that the mental rule we put in 
place as the real interpretation of what our instructor means is, likewise, open to 
interpretation. But if an interpretation could be found which could not be argued with, 
then from hence we could work back towards correct applications. We can perhaps 
think of this like an epistemological touchstone, mirroring the idea in the moral 
theories that we have canvassed, that there must be some sort of grounds from 
which we can run deductions that stands apart from, above or in special relation to 
any intuitive position or interpretation of application for the concept. From this view, 
however, such a stable rock seems worse than implausible to find and we are 
always cast back into the idiolectic conception of understanding. No such super-rigid 
machine can exist; the arguments against foundational rules preclude this.  
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The second idea – a ‘concomitant’ (ibid) of the first - is the idea of ‘rules as rails’, 
where the pattern exists outside all our practices and goes on to extend itself to all 
possible cases. This is another picture that McDowell, Wright and Kripke’s 
arguments are set to reject, with all three reading Wittgenstein as rejecting also. The 
picture after rejecting these two most obvious ways of finding an understanding that 
is not an interpretation therefore resembles a ‘dilemma’ (McDowell, 1984: 230) I will 
paraphrase: Horn one is the idea of infinite interpretability, while horn two is the idea 
of doing the impossible and finding an understanding or fact which is not an 
interpretation by way of one of the two ways above.  
Given the talk of practices and communities that is ever present in Wittgenstein, 
Wright takes it that what Wittgenstein is claiming is that we cannot accept either horn 
of this dilemma, and so we ought to see truth conditions of a concept’s correct 
pattern of application as being those simply  which the community ratifies. If the 
community changes its mind then so be it. The community cannot go right or wrong, 
rather ‘…the community just goes’ (Wright, 1980: 220). Interpretation is allowed 
because it is simply a fact that we cannot step outside our own position. This would 
be Wright’s version of bedrock: my spade is turned when the community decrees. 
One might want to say: This is just what we do. Wright says that community cannot 
go right or wrong. It sets the standard for individuals but it sets its own standards 
without a standard to be measured against. 
The pattern cannot extend itself, nor can interpretations ever come to an end. As 
such, as McDowell makes clear (McDowell, 1984: 236-238), Wright’s explanation of 
Wittgenstein shares quite a lot with Kripke’s. The upshot being that both claim that 
the notion of truth conditions needs to be relinquished in favour of something more 
fitting of this analysis: for Wright, justification conditions, and for Kripke, assertability 
conditions. I will largely focus on Wright’s account, however, as I believe firstly that 
there is already good evidence for rejecting Kripke’s reading on the basis that I 
cannot buy into the sceptical solution idea, and secondly, because Wright’s account 
is less sceptical it moves us past the idiolectic conception and into community 
ratification as it does, and therefore more attractive because of it readily explaining 
the normativity we experience in concept applications, whereas Kripke almost loses 
all sense of meaning from the get go. 
110 
 
Thus, we have an issue as to whether we have, with the two positions - 1) and 2) - 
used up all the logical room in which normativity can still get a foothold. McDowell, in 
searching for objectivity which moves beyond judgements that have already been 
made and can be made out at the level of patterns, seems to require that the facts 
are just ‘out there’ (a phrase he courts but doesn’t take up (1984:255)), whereas 
Wright wishes to claim that there can be nothing out there that wouldn’t require 
interpretation, and thus all normativity belongs between individual applications and 
community ratification. There is then a challenge for both theorists. Wright will need 
to show his position can in fact keep normativity, and I will put the challenge that 
McDowell makes to this case forward next. But McDowell also needs to make sure 
that when one says the pattern is ‘out there’ he is not illicitly holding onto the second 
horn, the one Wright quite rightly rejects, and making the case for a pattern that 
extends by itself.  
What McDowell questions is Wright’s ability to be able to ‘purge’ the picture of the 
idea of ratification independent patterns, and yet keep the normativity of meaning – 
the idea that we are contractually obliged to extend the pattern of concept application 
in this way and not that, which allows us to be right or wrong in our applications. The 
issue for Wright is of course that all that this normativity consists in is determined by 
the community ratification. Our being right or wrong is decided post-judgement for 
Wright, as nothing can determine our being right given the possibility for attitudes to 
change and the impossibility of anything grounding those judgements that does not 
itself require interpretation.  
McDowell makes the case, however, that the unsatisfactory nature of answering as 
basic an order as, ‘bring me a yellow flower’ (1984: 234), in the idiolectic case, like 
this: ‘I brought you the one which gave me a feeling of satisfaction’ – an explanation 
Wright would agree is unsatisfactory due to its inability to register normativity against 
the community standard - can be easily transposed to Wright’s communal case with 
this answer: ‘I brought the one that received approval from the bystanders’. That 
neither answer seems satisfying raises the question whether Wright’s answer can 
actually be properly reduced to the idea of identifying a yellow flower, thus 
completing the order in a way that respects the normativity implicit in it, such that 
only certain actions will satisfy the request. And McDowell doubts that it can so 
satisfy it. There is no such thing left as just ‘calling things yellow’ (McDowell, 
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1984:235) on Wright’s account, or indeed a thing’s being yellow. The cognition of 
what is happening by Wright’s picture is vastly different than merely applying a 
concept because some fact about the world (the flower is yellow) obtains. 
Everything then hangs on this idea of how we might say a fact obtains. If it means 
that yellowness extends itself as a pattern logically independent of us which guides 
our actions on receiving the order then we fall into the trap of believing we have a 
way of recognising this pattern which would end all interpretations. As this 
judgement-transcendent pattern seems to be open to varying interpretations – on the 
basis that no super-rigid machine can exist which cannot also be pointed to as the 
right interpretation the real ‘meaning’ of yellow - we have no point of reference for 
our actions being labelled good or bad in accord to our actions. If my idiolectic 
understanding of yellow flower matches that of the person who issued the order then 
this is mere good fortune. Regardless of how sincere my personal belief that I am 
going on the same as before, there is no fact I can cite outside that sincerity which 
can confirm this.  
The same lack of a fact outside our judgements is true of the community as well. 
They can keep me in line with their own applications of yellow by showing 
contentment or discontentment with my bringing this or that object, or extending a 
pattern or a series just so. But the same problem arises, of their having nothing 
determinate above these judgements to appeal to as holding them in place. So there 
is not independent fact of the matter as to why just this command sets just this 
pattern of future actions.  
So there is no fact outside of our own judgements which allows for me to extend this 
pattern and not that one. Accordingly: objectivity, along with facts and truth, drop out 
of the picture entirely. There are no truth conditions involved in my making a 
judgement. My coming to feel normatively constrained in the application of my 
concepts thus cannot be made out at the normative level, the level of contractual 
obligations. The explanation of my actions thus requires description at what 
McDowell calls ‘the basic level’ (ibid). Something’s being right is no more than 
something’s attaining communal agreement of its being so. And its being so 
depends, it seems, purely on the judgements of the community which are 
colloquialistic. From this position, judgement precedes truth and as such normativity. 
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With no norms to appeal to, it seems that judgement has to be described at a non-
normative level: and this is the basic level. My wanting to get something right or 
wrong is not explainable by my valuing right actions to be better. Rather, we are just 
trained, at the basic level, to commit certain actions when confronted with certain 
sorts of vocalisations and gestures and respond in this way and not that. If then the 
training changes, due to the fact that we stop receiving affirmative vocalisations 
when we bring a certain object, we are re-conditioned to start to do different actions. 
McDowell calls this a ‘brute sounding off’.  
What we have is a full ontological reduction of the normative and meaningful actions 
and thoughts such as following a rule or signpost or command, to the basic level and 
non-meaningful behaviours laid out in empirical terms. At least, this is how I read 
McDowell’s analysis. On page 235 while explaining the basic level, he italicises 
certain phrases: 
…does Wright’s reading of Wittgenstein contain the means to make it intelligible 
that there should so much as be such an action as calling an object “yellow”? 
It is problematic, however, whether the picture of the basic level, once 
entertained as such, can be prevented from purporting to contain the real truth 
about linguistic behaviour 
The problem for Wright is to distinguish the position he attributes to Wittgenstein 
from one according to which the possibility of going out of step with our fellows 
gives us the illusion of being subject to norms   
Due to this emphasis it seems that McDowell’s reading suggests that what Wright is 
saying commits him to an ontological reduction of the normative to the purely 
descriptive. The normativity of our actions via our relation as sentient beings to the 
world would thus be an illusory emergent property which itself ought to be dispensed 
with. ‘Real truth’ exists outside normativity on this reading. Yet, clearly, Wright 
wishes to preserve a role for normativity. It was only the appeal to ratification 
independent patterns and determinate concept usage he wished to purge the picture 
of. He still believes that we have contractual obligations, but that those obligations 
cannot be made out by appeal to an antecedent truth. He might, then, think that the 
reducibility of the normative to the non-normative is simply explanatory. There are 
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simply two distinct levels of analysis: the level at which we consciously operate and 
interact, and the level at which those operations and interactions are best explained. 
So Wright might simply maintain that norms are not illusory mental phenomena. 
What is an illusory phenomenon is the idea of objectively set patterns of concept 
application that we somehow grasp without interpretation. All his arguments show is 
that ‘Y is Yellow’ is explanatorily reducible to ‘Y is an item which receives community 
assent when I am asked to bring or point out something yellow’. 
This latter position, however, runs into its own problems. If Wright insists on holding 
onto the idea that there are no truth conditions for statements and that normativity as 
experienced reduces to a normativity of community acceptance - community 
acceptance being that which allows for justificatory conditions to hold - then anti-
realism, as a theoretical position postulated within a common language, has nothing 
to appeal to in order to prove its own truth. Its only appeal would be made within the 
parameters that it sets itself. This conclusion has the double defect of being both 
self-defeating and absurd. By denying truth conditions are in some way antecedent 
to certain judgements, anti-realism of this variety has, to borrow a phrase from Cora 
Diamond, sawn off the branch on which it is sat.  
The absurdity comes in the idea that our theories, that which give us a sense of the 
relation in which we stand to everything else – be it other subjects, objects, reasons, 
actions and so on – can, on Wright’s account, be made good from a position that 
itself only utilises the norm of ‘assent to community’. This can be made out by trying 
to consider precisely how one might change the mind of another without appeal to 
any further shared commitments than this. There would simply be no explanation 
that was better than any other. All ‘betterness’ would consist in the communal 
assent. Disagreement itself thus becomes a major problem from here. Holding one 
theoretical position and not another needs justification, and yet all justification would 
need to be made in terms of community assent. That communities that share a 
common language and form of life are often vastly divided on opinions, and it is quite 
possible to hold the thought ‘my explanation is better than their explanation’ (with 
‘their’ encompassing almost everyone else there is) it seems mysterious where the 
normativity for such a mental condition can come from. Assumedly, it is explained in 
terms of an idiolectic conception of what is meant from just these terms (the ones 
that pay homage to theory creation) that pays no heed to the community standards. 
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But as community standards are the start and the end of all normativity in conceptual 
pattern application, then stepping outside the confirmation to use these terms this 
way would make one wrong – or at least make one’s position lose all justifiability 
conditions. If one convinced their community to accept this and not that reading, it 
likewise seems mysterious as to how the reasons one employed to do so would 
manifest themselves in order to do so; they would only become pleasing reasons 
once the community had determined them as such as, “there is…no rigid, advance 
determination of what is to count as [a concept’s] correct application”. That is, there 
is no understanding of a rule which is not an interpretation according to this reading. 
There is no interpretation which can move beyond community assent for its 
ratification.  
In diagnosing what has gone wrong here, it seems sensible to turn to Wright’s 
conception of what he is arguing against. And from here I believe we can see 
precisely why it is that he lays all the weight of normativity in the remit of the 
community. Wright’s argument is Anti-Realist, as he firmly believes there is no 
position from which we can say that X is just right or wrong independently of our 
judgements. But just like the obtaining of facts, everything hangs on from where we 
picture this independence as arising. Not the super-rigid machine or the self-
extending pattern, certainly. Without these in place, Wright seems to think that we 
have lost all notion of the independence of judgements. He equates Realism with 
having to defend one of these two positions which Wittgenstein rules out. This is 
made clear by his insistence that “…the root idea of objectivity is that truth is not 
constituted by but is somehow independent of human judgment. Realism gives this 
independence the obvious interpretation: logical independence - the idea that for 
particular true statements it is either unnecessary or insufficient, or both, to meet our 
most refined criteria of acceptability in order to be true” (Wright, 1980: 199) 
One might well take Wright to be correct here – and yet this seems a worrying 
position. Kripke’s position seems to usher in the ‘abyss’ where a sceptical solution is 
all we can have. Interpretation follows interpretation with nothing holding anything in 
place. As such, in our daily lives, we constantly oscillate between this idea - when we 
analyse the situation – and the comforting idea of the super-rigid machine. The other 
option, Wright’s, which avoids the oscillation, is to place all the weight onto the idea 
of conformity to community patterns – and yet this puts everything into either a 
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reduction that defies normativity or one which creates a self-defeating thesis of 
meaning. Kripke’s and Wright’s positions are seen by McDowell as equivalent to the 
twin monsters of Scylla and Charybdis (McDowell, 1984: 242), which we must steer 
a course between. If this course is an option we can show that all the available 
logical room was not used. Were it used, we would almost be forced to fall back into 
the idea that meaning is an illusion – which is such a counter-intuitive conclusion as 
to cause major issues for every theory there is. As McDowell says – there ‘must be a 
middle position’ (McDowell, 1984: 256) 
 
4.5: The Middle Position: 
It seems utterly imperative for own purposes, then, that we find this way of 
explaining just how we come to gain normativity in a way that respects objectivity – 
in the sense that we do not create right and wrong decisions by making those 
decisions. Other than showing these other two options as falling into chaos, we must 
find positive arguments that do not do the same.   
From what we have said so far, however, it would be quite understandable to see the 
project as one that is doomed to failure. If we accept a picture of these two levels, 
one where normativity at least appears prevalent, and one where there is no more 
than a mere sounding off of brute behaviours, it would appear at first as though any 
analysis either starts with the former – which would lead us to an ungrounded and 
ever idiolectically interpretable account of meaning – or the latter – from which it 
would appear meaning simply cannot arise. Yet surely these are the only two 
positions available to start to ground any arguments towards a solution. 
McDowell seems heavily to endorse the Wittgensteinian suggestion that there is a 
way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in “what 
we call “obeying the rule” and “going against it in actual cases”. The endorsement 
gains some small amount of detail is this quote: 
I think the thesis that obeying a rule is a practice is meant to constitute the 
answer to this question. (McDowell, 1984: 238) (My emphasis) 
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This quote is inspired by his reading of Wittgenstein (1953: §§201-202). It is here 
that the paradox of infinite interpretation is stated explicitly. Kripke takes it that 
Wittgenstein buys the paradox and offers a sceptical solution. Wright, like McDowell, 
does not accept this reading. They both agree that the second half of §201 and §202 
both work against this reading (‘there is a mistake here’ (ibid)). Wright seemingly 
takes the suggestion of a practice to relate to the consensus. But McDowell is 
concerned, for the reasons already stated, to find more within this idea of a practice; 
more than what Wright makes of it, which might be thought of as such: one 
conceptual scheme amongst many possible ones, contingently ordering an 
otherwise unknowable reality that we are brought into line with conceptualising in this 
particular way by way of conditioning at the basic level. 
I do believe that there is enough in McDowell’s writing to make a decent case for the 
idea that we can do better than that which Wright is offering; holding onto an idea of 
both normativity in meaning and objectivity at the intuitive level, although he doesn’t 
lay out a detailed or systematic case. This itself is barely of any surprise; 
Wittgenstein did not seemed concerned to give a reading which could be laid out in a 
theory of meaning, given his reservations in his later work for such theorising, but 
was instead concerned with highlighting certain errors, assumptions and oversights 
in the way that we thought about these topics which could be employed against 
certain other theories. What I will try and do here is to give a decent account of the 
picture I think that McDowell is trying to get across from certain elements of the 
paper we have been discussing. I will add a few small remarks of Wittgenstein which 
I think will help his case. It will be brief, and programmatic. But as there needs to be 
a third way – as to not do so would be to endorse the nonsensical idea that anything 
is meaningful – then we need to at least have something.       
The elements that I believe are the key to McDowell’s reading take the form of key 
rejections of Wright and positive suggestions of his own. One of the key comments 
he makes about Wright’s suggested picture is to be found in his rejection of the idea 
in Wright’s writing of reality being completely detached from our actually judging 
things, and thus realism needing to find a position that was ‘somehow independent 
of human judgements’. Of this McDowell says that: 
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A genuine fact must be a matter of the way things are in themselves, utterly 
independently of us. So a genuinely true judgement must be, at least potentially, 
an exercise of pure thought; if human nature is necessarily implicated in the very 
formation of the judgement, that precludes our thinking of the corresponding fact 
as properly independent of us, and hence as a proper fact at all. (McDowell, 
1984: 254) 
And: 
We can find this picture of genuine truth compelling only if we either forget that 
truth-bearers are such only because they are meaningful, or suppose that 
meanings take care of themselves, needing, as it were, no help from us. This 
latter supposition is the one that is relevant to our concerns. If we make it, we 
can let the judging subject, in our picture of true judgement, shrink to a locus of 
pure thought, while the fact that judging is a human activity fades into 
insignificance (McDowell, 1984: 255) (my emphasis) 
That this is a rejection of Wright’s idea of realism and logical independence thus 
means that we need to start to think of realism as being formulated in a way in which 
our judgements do not immediately disqualify the judgement as being true – due to it 
being (at least) once removed from the reality that is ‘out there’ anyway. And the way 
in which we go about this ought to give us a stronger ground for thinking of 
judgements as true. If we can make this picture appealing and defend it well, then 
we can reinstate, with less worry, the idea of the truth conditions that Wright’s picture 
rules out as a default. The only way of so doing requires itself that we find a way of 
understanding that is not an interpretation. But the very idea of interpretation itself is 
ushered in primarily by way of the fact that this is the picture we paint for ourselves. 
There stands outside us, and independent of us,  all of reality, all of the truth there is, 
and then we are left to interpret it like so many shadows dancing on the walls, what 
casts them being forever out of view.  
This platonic image is not an unwarranted one, I believe, as an analogy for the 
picture that Wright is painting, and yet it seems to beg the question about realism 
from the start. It is also problematic for Wright. The problem becomes clear when we 
think of it thus: If truth necessarily stands outside us, then whenever we have said 
before that X is true, then X has not been true. For Wright, this is made out as ‘while 
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X has all the justifiability conditions to make talking of it true correct – it is relatively 
true, given the scheme we have taken’. But it is not true as such. Thus we have, 
implicit in Wright’s account, two standards of truth. The first is the way the world 
really is. The latter is how we best characterise it given the tools we have. This is 
pre-determined by his conception of realism as demanding truth that is logically 
independent of our judgements: “…the idea that for particular true statements it is 
either unnecessary or insufficient, or both, to meet our most refined criteria of 
acceptability in order to be true”.  
What McDowell seems to want to say, is that there is no flaw in thinking that our very 
own ‘refined criteria of acceptability’ are what determine truth conditions. Wright 
thinks that all truth really takes place from the position of the basic level. And yet as 
there is no normativity there, there is no truth either. To be true is to be meaningful, 
and to be meaningful is to be normatively related to other judgements. Truth as a 
concept does not exist beyond our forms of life. It is used within it to classify certain 
states of affairs in a manner that is meaningful and practical and is intrinsic to that 
form of life. Something is only meaningful if it can be right or wrong; if it is true it is 
right. But truth requires a perspective to be true from. This is why I started the 
section with claim that the picture of the anthropologist’s position is problematic. It 
gives the confused idea of a ‘perspective-free’ perspective – of some creature 
anthropologically studying us who judges us right or wrong against how things really 
are. But all the arguments of interpretability that have gone before, for us, would just 
reappear here for our supernatural anthropologist. Her truth could only be her own 
‘most refined criteria of acceptability’ established in the practices that she has been 
trained into. Either truth is equivalent to ‘our most refined criteria of acceptability’ 
which allows us to keep the concept, or those criteria do not seem to demand that 
what we say needs to be true. This whole thing then opens up the question, which of 
these two ideas of truth is the true one? Is it true that truth is a concept we cannot 
properly use? The confused nature of such a question seems to show there has 
been a mistake here. For anti-realism to be true, it requires that we consider it from 
the position that it states, as part of its formation, that we cannot have access to, 
which means we cannot know that it is true. If it instead claims that it is true 
according to our most refined criteria then one of the criteria it has to be using is that 
it is justified. So take any true claim you want – the earth is not flat – and using all 
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our criteria we can ask whether or not we are justified in believing it true. If we come 
out with the answer ‘yes’ – then anti-realism is false; we have found a statement we 
are justified in thinking to be true. To then keep the thought ‘but anti-realism is also 
true’ would contradict your previous claim that ‘the Earth is not flat’ is a true 
statement. The only defence against such a statement as ‘the Earth is not flat’ being 
true is to once again appeal to the ‘perspective-free perspective’ and then we are 
again left with the idea of not being able to say that anti-realism itself is true 
according to its own criteria. 
So on neither the perspective free perspective of truth, nor the most refined criteria 
for truth can anti-realism be true. Realism, however, can be justified and is justified 
on the most refined criteria picture; the picture at which norms and justifications are 
readily available and admits of the necessity of some perspective for truth. The 
picture which purports to reject it is one that is naturally self-defeating.    
Wright’s entire picture seems to be infected with this image of a perspective-free 
perspective. It is also the inspiration for the idea that our world of meaning is 
reducible to a picture of the basic level, where all we have are brute movements and 
sounding offs. It is hard not to take this picture seriously, whether or not we are 
thinking about where or not truth applies. It cannot help but seem that if we could 
step outside ourselves we could easily be analysed in this way; from some position, 
to some other intelligent species, who were yet unaware of our customs, manners 
and language, this would be how we would appear. And this, I believe, is the biggest 
challenge for McDowell. Given that such an analysis seems possible – given, that is, 
that it seems necessarily true that we are organic beings who train each other in 
ways that could be explained as brute movements, inner states and brain chemistry 
– how do you imagine meaning ever getting a significant foothold? Given what we 
have said about the perspective of truth there seems there must be something to say 
here to quell the worry that meaning is an illusion. Such a position would require the 
idea again that this form of analysis is the ‘real truth’, ‘out there’ in the ‘world as it is 
anyway’ independent of all human interaction. From this I believe we can rule out the 
ontological reduction – something we have already cast doubt upon. What McDowell 
would seem to want to say is that this picture of the basic level is best conceived as 
an explanatory reduction.  
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Given that explanatory reductions didn’t sit kindly for Anti-Realists, we may at first 
think we have worries here. But the reason it didn’t sit well was Wright’s insistence 
that there are no such things as truth conditions. For McDowell’s form of realism this 
is not such a worrying problem. What opens up as a possibility for McDowell is that 
two statements regarding the exact same phenomena can give true accounts of 
what is happening, regarding that phenomena, both of which are true, but where 
each of which take the form of a distinct type of explanation to the other.  
…the denial of ratification-independence…yields a picture of the relation 
between the communal language and the world in which norms are obliterated. 
And once we have this picture, it seems impossible simply to retain alongside it a 
different picture, in which the openness of an individual to correction by his 
fellows means that he is subject to norms. The first picture irresistibly claims 
primacy… (McDowell, 1984: 248) (my emphasis) 
This idea of primacy, I believe, will go a long way to explaining just how McDowell 
could hold both pictures in place as reasonably co-existing on separate planes of 
analysis, both of which have a claim to being true. In terms of Wright’s account, 
where ratification independence is denied, norms are obliterated because they are 
secondary; they are an illusion we have of our understanding that is properly 
conceived of as the interaction of a certain species of organic being, with just this 
sort of brain chemistry, situated in just this sort of environment, interacting with the 
primary objects around him within the confines of certain natural laws of motion.  
But given that from this position there seems to be no idea of either anti-realism or 
realism being a justified position to take we have reason to doubt this idea of primacy 
of one picture creating the other and thus constituting the real truth. The intuition that 
is driving this whole idea may be one of temporality. The universe, we rightly think, 
existed anyway as a set of natural laws into which we were thrown. Then via our 
interactions with it, we began to analyse it and thus we came to place upon it a 
perspective. Thus everything we know should be reducible to that which was already 
here prior to our perspective. Thus that picture of brute forces at the basic level 
demands primacy.  
What I think McDowell wants to suggest is the opposite. And it is indeed more fitting 
to what we are properly discussing to do so. The argument we are making is about 
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meaning and understanding and the ideas - such as fact, illusion, objectivity, 
relativity, truth - which go with that. In terms of understanding things, what came first 
is, in fact, this understanding at the most normative level: a full blown ‘naïve realism’, 
if you will. It was then from the concepts that emerged from within this language of 
normative interactions that the idea of other layers of analysis became possible. And 
once we see this there is this possibility: that this other level of analysis we imagine – 
the supposed perspective-free perspective – is still our perspective, just another one 
of them, for a different type of analysis that is as much a part of our practices as the 
more normative ones are. We study other phenomena in this way, claiming it is a 
disinterested position. But it is not and cannot be fully removed from the language in 
which it arose or the interests or practices of the members of a community or form of 
life which utilise it. Our actions can be explained in a way that does its best to strip 
them of our everyday concerns and interests – but it is still of interest to us. It is still 
of interest because it makes up a huge part of our practices and explanations.  
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Section 5: Painting a Non-Reductive Moral Picture 
 
5.1 From Brute Movement to Norms: 
What we have said so far can now lead us, at least to some degree, to answer the 
question of how norms and meaning can exist in an external world that can rightly be 
thought of as norm free, without contradiction: the two are both perfectly acceptable 
explanations of the same actions, objects, relations or events. As long as both 
qualify according to their respective ‘most refined criteria for acceptability’ that we 
have, then two explanations can be true at the same time, as long as they exist on 
these distinct levels of analysis.  
And this two level conception thus not only explains how we can have norms while 
also appealing to brute movements and the like, but also a way in which 
understanding need not always be seen as an interpretation. I will aim to bring this 
out in due course. 
McDowell hints at the two distinct levels on a few occasions. The most obvious being 
the way he appeals to Wittgenstein’s concept of bedrock as functioning. He quotes 
Wittgenstein to help his analysis.  
what has the expression of a rule—say a sign-post—got to do with my actions? 
What sort of connexion is there here?—Well, perhaps this one: I have been 
trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it. 
(Wittgenstein, 1953:§198 in McDowell, 1984: 238-239) 
When Wittgenstein’s interlocutor reacts in the way that we would expect of someone 
who was gripped by the anti-Realist picture,  
“But that is only to give a causal connexion: to tell how it has come about that we 
go by the sign-post; not what this going-by-the-sign really consists in” (ibid) 
he responds thus: 
—On the contrary; I have further indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only 
in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom (ibid) (my 
emphasis) 
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Thus, the training at the basic level is what explains the lack of interpretation. We are 
trained in a way which means that sometimes at least, there is a way of 
understanding a rule which is not a mere interpretation. The explanation for the 
certainty and the lack of interpretability is thus accounted for on these certain 
occasions precisely because the training in question is what we start from and as 
such defies interpretation. We are conditioned to accept that certain things just are 
what the people who train us say they are. We are, that is, trained to accept a form 
of life, of finding certain similarities and differences salient, and as holding firm 
certain judgements at certain times. If we are to question this we will become 
unstuck from the glue which holds us together. We will have misconstrued a 
foundational pillar of our communal understanding - from the normative level - as 
something built normatively on top of it.  
From our actual perspective, a norm-laden perspective, from which blossomed this 
idea of an alternative conception – which while detached from our cultural norms is 
still meaningful enough to strike us as meaningful (i.e. for it to be a right or wrong 
analysis here) – what is being taught is just another normative statement. At the 
basic level what is happening is a sort of conditioning which explains away the lack 
of interpretation available and thus grants us certainty at the very beginning of the 
language game. As some evidence that Wittgenstein wouldn’t withdraw from this 
view we can quote these sorts of passages with McDowell:  
Someone asks me: What is the colour of this flower? I answer: “red”.— Are you 
absolutely sure? Yes, absolutely sure! But may I not have been deceived and 
called the wrong colour “red”? No. The certainty with which I call the colour “red” 
is the rigidity of my measuring-rod, it is the rigidity from which I start. When I give 
descriptions, that is not to be brought into doubt. (Wittgenstein, 1978: VI - 28 in 
McDowell, 1984: 240) 
And: 
How do I know that the colour that I am now seeing is called “green”? Well, to 
confirm it I might ask other people, but if they did not agree with me, I should 
become totally confused and should perhaps take them or myself for crazy. That 
is to say: I should either no longer trust myself to judge, or no longer react to 
what they say as to a judgement. If I am drowning and I shout “Help!”, how do I 
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know what the word Help means? Well, that’s how I react in this situation.—Now 
that is how I know what “green” means as well and also know how I have to 
follow the rule in the particular case (Wittgenstein, 1978: VI-35 McDowell, 1984: 
240) 
So we are trained at the basic level and taught at the normative one. These two 
processes are one in the same, but seen from two distinct levels of analysis. In our 
day to day lives we inhabit the normative level. As such, we think of things which in 
themselves are normative as explanations of what we do. We follow the sign post or 
the rule, we obey orders, and we justify things according to these ideas: we play all 
the games that we are taught to play. On the other level of analysis this is not what 
we are doing. From this perspective we act as we are trained to act when someone 
makes this sound or these gestures. Between these two sorts of analysis, says 
Wittgenstein, lies bedrock. Bedrock thus plays the role of demarcating two separate 
and distinct modes of analysis and explanation. Above it, at the normative level, lays 
justification; below it lays causal explanation. At PI §217 Wittgenstein says this:    
"How am I able to obey a rule?"—if this is not a question about causes, then it is 
about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do. If I have 
exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. 
Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do." (Wittgenstein, 1953: §217) 
(my emphasis) 
Here Wittgenstein clearly demarcates justification as presiding above bedrock, while 
causal explanations lay below it, thus the ‘if – then’. Clearly the justifications we give 
to each other are effected by the sorts of training that we have received. Gaps in 
someone’s training would mean that certain justifications fail to come across as 
seeming salient to them. Thus they might become confused as to what seems to the 
rest of us as the obvious justification. If we reach bedrock and no justification we 
have given convinces our interlocutor we should be happy resting on the idea that he 
has not been taught properly and put the mistake down to being a causal one. Such 
a diagnosis can be useful and we may have him undertake the training again. 
Wittgenstein would be quick to warn us not to conflate these two sorts of 
explanation.  
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That was perhaps the point of the quote, above, regarding the colour red as the 
‘rigidity of our measuring rod’. As a normative comment we think it can be justified. 
But at bedrock the justifications run out and any questions need to be made in 
causal language. Wittgenstein seems to think our conflating the two sorts of 
explanation (which is hardly surprising when the language of the basic level arose 
from the language of the normative level) is the root cause of major issues in 
philosophy and thought in general.  
I’ll leave this section with the same quote with which I started it. It seems to me to be 
the quote which best sums up the reading of Wittgenstein that I have made, while 
following McDowell’s line of thought. McDowell is less explicit about the two levels of 
analysis. Although the idea of there being a ‘basic level’ indicates there must be at 
least one more level. More likely is the idea that McDowell was letting Wittgenstein 
speak for himself through the aphorisms he quoted. Likewise, McDowell was more 
concerned with pointing out the flaws of accommodating normativity in Wright’s anti-
realist picture than in promoting another. All he needed to do was show a route from 
the final dilemma that did not force us to live with Scylla or Charybdis and which 
accommodates normativity whilst staying true to idea that certainty is not 
underscored by our minds interacting with a logically independent pattern that 
extends by itself. That picture does not and cannot accommodate normativity, 
leaving us without truth conditions and thus without certainty. He certainly does 
enough to intimate this route.  
Before the quote though, it is worth saying one more thing. Our answer to the 
problem of understanding always being an interpretation (or being best described as 
involving interpretation) seems to occupy a similar area as that of the super-rigid 
machine. But it was always going to have to if it was to avoid the idea of 
interpretation all the way down, as it were. If we are going to incorporate this idea of 
bedrock, which explains where we get these intuitions of justifying normatively, while 
holding onto the intuitive notion of objectivity and diagnosing the cause of so much 
conceptual confusion in philosophy, then what we have to say, with Wittgenstein is 
this:  
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If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only 
in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments (Wittgenstein, 1953: 
§242) 
 
 
 
5.2: Objectivity, Analogy and a Space for Morality: 
 
McDowell’s argument against Wright, then, is one which wrestles with the underlying 
assumptions which underscore Wright’s own anti-realism - which is, as previously 
noted, an attempt to show that objectivity must be reducible to how groups happen to 
think and thus is always one step removed from what is there anyway. The ‘is there 
anyway’ is itself given force from the prevailing notion of objectivity which is the 
mainstay of the empiricist: that which discerns the label true is that which could be 
thought as existing prior to and independent of any sort of perspective whatever. The 
falsity in such a picture is that it rids us of any hope of ever discovering the truth and 
thus makes truth (and its related concepts of real and objective) a redundant concept 
for us, when in fact these concepts do play major roles within our thinking. It is only if 
one buys into the idea of a perspective-free perspective as necessarily underscoring 
the correct use of these terms that one need to buy the sort of anti-realism that 
Wright is pedalling in the argument he has against McDowell. Wright’s picture does 
change in his later writings (Wright: 1995) but it is key that we see this earlier attempt 
at least as flawed and to see why the idea of some perspective is necessary.  
However, the argument between Wright and McDowell, and the fact that McDowell 
manages to show Wright’s thinking to be flawed, is only a partial victory for the moral 
realist. For the argument is a generic one which covers the use of concepts in 
general and does not show that moral concepts are necessarily of the type that can 
be salvaged. That is, McDowell may show that in general one can say that X is 
objectively correct, if X stands for the bringing of a yellow flower, or if X is that 
diamonds are hard. Or perhaps more cautiously, he at least shows that the idea that 
it can never be correct - due to the fact we can never escape our perspective and 
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see whether what we think of as being yellow can be saliently grouped together 
regardless of any perspective - is a flawed worry.  But the generic shared concerns 
that reinforce the idea of ‘shared forms of life’ could only be said to stretch out to 
encompass moral concerns if one were willing to completely overlook the sorts of 
differences there are between what one would usually mean by ‘shared concern’ 
when applied to such moral concepts and what one would mean by ‘shared concern’ 
when considering how we seem to know whether we are, for example, playing a 
game with strict rules, or merely throwing a ball around for fun.  
In the latter option we see just how practical our concepts in general are and how 
necessary it can be to be integrated into a form of life to comprehend the ends and 
purpose of what we are doing, and why two distinct things like throwing a ball around 
aimlessly and baseball can both be categorised under the concept ‘game’; both 
share so many similarities and yet both be seen to imbue similar actions with such 
different meanings when we are undertaking them. It is explaining this to an outsider 
that we believe that we will have very little chance of doing without her first having 
grasped at least something of what it is to be like us. In the moral sense so much is 
meant when we think of shared concerns, namely, do we believe this thing (whatever 
it is) to be bad, good, laudable, reprehensive or whatever. Concern here does not 
imply merely having the right grasp of the situation to know how one is to go on 
using a concept, but to take up a motivational stance which informs actions and the 
use of concepts; to feel how we feel towards certain things. This is what is meant by 
Mackie (1977) when he says that the same duality we find in thick concepts – 
concepts which both describe and give reasons for action – seems to imply a queer 
metaphysical entity.  
So McDowell rescues the idea of truth and objectivity for our general concepts from 
Wright, allowing that the invocation of Wittgenstein need not throw us into a 
communal subjectivity which leaves truth forever outside our grasp. In so doing, 
however, he cannot be seen as yet rescuing morality. If one stops here one loses 
sight of just what makes the moral a distinctive category in the first place. Objectivity 
may require a level of perspectivalness, but whether that level stretches to the sorts 
of perspective which makes moral concepts appear to provide us with reasons for 
action (the very thing which makes them distinctively moral in the first place) remains 
to be seen. Clearly, sophisticated non-cognitivists could grant that description might 
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be such as to require the former type of perspective without having to relinquish that 
the extra level of perspective - the type which sees certain concepts (thick moral 
concepts) as providing as part of their very meaning reasons about how we ought to 
behave - is added on as a motivational extra by the individual agent. With this being 
the case, the challenge would revert back to the idea that if thick moral concepts are 
really (from some perspective) descriptive and evaluative then the two components 
could be disentangled such that the concept can be separated into its two 
components. The idea of an outsider being challenged to grasp moral concepts only 
based on pure descriptions no longer makes sense, as we have be shown by the 
McDowellian analysis of Wittgenstein that they would not just struggle with moral 
concepts, but concepts like game as well. Thus the challenge must be altered to fit 
someone who shares enough of our form of life concerns to grasp descriptions of 
complicated cluster concepts that are underpinned by shared concerns, without 
having to share our evaluative concerns.  
Thus, the challenge might be put thus: 
that an agent who doesn’t share the usual reaction to such concepts - that is, 
someone who felt no compunction to be honest or courageous - would 
nonetheless be able point out honesty and courageousness wherever they 
were to be found by an agent who did feel such a compunction. 
But straight away it should be clear that such a challenge admits of a flaw. It is the 
same flaw we found in the externalist idea from earlier when we were discussing 
Judith Jarvis Thomson. That any sort of guess by the supposed amoralist, whom the 
reformulated challenge assumes exists, would be necessarily parasitical upon the 
normal understanding of the concept which would carry with it the evaluation within 
the meaning. As Wiggins notes in his argument against Gilbert Harman (Wiggins, 
2000: 150–3), what keeps such concepts grouped together is the shared 
perspectivalness of those concepts with their full meaning – that is as answering to 
our moral concerns.  
It is important we make this point clearly as it is a crucial piece of the puzzle as a 
whole. The position we are trying to defend is one of a full blown non-reductive moral 
realism, where the meanings of moral concepts include the evaluative portion. This 
certainly makes the whole category quite odd, but the oddness is a double edged 
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sword. Here is what I mean by that. Mackie notes that the very essence of moral 
concepts is quite unlike anything else postulated because they claim to describe the 
world while also giving us reasons for action. Unlike the non-cognitivist, he takes 
morality at face value as a describing game. But, he claims, those concepts describe 
nothing at all. They are like concepts such as magic or witches, which may appear to 
have properties which fit their descriptions but which in fact refer to nothing at all. If 
they did refer, the things they referred to would be awfully queer. The classic method 
for deciding whether something qualifies as objective is to define what makes 
something apt to qualify and then to determine whether the candidate has the right 
materials. We have noted that such a tactic seems to beg the question, for where 
one draws the line is rather arbitrary. The empiricist assumptions that Mackie clearly 
brings to the table are the demarcating point for him, but for all that the oddness 
which we see in moral concepts does indeed give us pause for thought. These are 
no normal concepts.  
However, as the sword swings the other way, it seems that this may well be a 
blessing for morality, for of course moral concepts are unlike other concepts which 
are not moral, this is why we have a distinctive category for them in the first place. 
The only defence we are likely to have for moral concepts will then be a suis generis 
defence which matches their suis generis character. We are not arguing that all 
moral claims can be seen as objective claims in the precise same way which 
perfectly descriptive claims can. For them to do so they would need to be perfectly 
descriptive claims; and clearly they are not so. Thus, while prima facie their 
distinctive character works against them, in as much as they do not simply fall into 
any preconceived notion of the empirically objective; the same distinctiveness is 
precisely what would be expected for any sort of concept or property which is not an 
empirically objective concept. Otherwise the distinctions between the categories of 
concept would be mysterious at best and both pointless and unfathomable at worst. 
It is only if one has pre-set assumptions to the effect that only purely descriptive 
properties can be objective that this would call into question the possibility that moral 
concepts can be objective. And in the current argument such assumptions would be 
question-begging in a most obvious manner. As such, an argument must be made 
that the category of the objective is not nicely demarcated along such lines.  
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Wiggins and McDowell have both claimed that the sort of empiricist assumptions that 
Mackie carries can only be seen as marking out the borders of what counts as 
objective at quite a cost. The cost at its most destructive is the idea that we cannot 
explain how we come to know what another is thinking, that we will be left 
interpreting the thoughts of others at all times. The Wittgensteinian argument 
regarding concepts in general which was detailed above is the focus of this. The 
pragmatic points there went to show that meaning cannot be simply thought of as 
arising from the mind’s interaction with a fully mind-independent world. There needs 
be some level of communal agreement at the start for communication between 
participants to occur in such a way as to provide a meeting of the minds. The 
implication here is that objectivity ought to be conceived as pertaining to the sorts of 
judgements which hold firm once the perspective which allows for the meeting of 
minds is admitted of. Once we have brought the idea of human perspective into the 
fold – something we are forced to do to allow for a coherent picture of certainty to be 
manifest - then appealing to that which we see as fully independent of us as also 
being that which defines what is true is problematic, as full independence is seen as 
a fallacy. The way we think of subjectivity is thus now understandable as not simply 
the input of some perspective, as even those domains of thinking we see as 
characteristically aimed towards objectivity (the natural sciences) admit of some 
perspective, it is just that it admits of no particular perspective. Thus, such an input 
cannot be akin to relativity.  
What must be made out is just where the perspective enters into the equation and 
what influence it has. And Wiggins and McDowell both believe that there is truth to 
be found in certain domains which a strict empiricist would likely see as subjective in 
the pejorative sense of equating to relativity. By explaining how a shared perspective 
enters into these domains they lay out an alternative account of what amounts to 
objectivity which, they believe, can be used to bolster, by way of analogy, the hopes 
of the moral cognitivist. The aim here is simple: to show that ontological concerns 
(the idea of primary qualities) needs to be replaced as the demarcation point for 
objectivity by epistemological concerns - standards for what we can know about, with 
an emphasis on the ‘we’. From hence we can start to understand which domains of 
thinking are subjective in the pejorative sense and which speak of a shared 
perspective but still allow that the content of the mental states we are in when we 
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have them are proper belief states.  The two analogies (neither of which are 
seamless analogies for morality, but which open up the idea that ‘things which can 
be said to exist outside our perspective’ cannot be the right metaphysical rendering 
of all that can be objective) are those of colour categories and of mathematics.        
Before we begin with the two analogies then it is crucial we consider just what is at 
stake here. What we are trying to uncover is what might demarcate the objective 
from the subjective, how these categories stand in relation to each other and 
whether or not, at least sometimes, moral statements can be counted as belonging 
to the former category. The reason I mention this is that McDowell has decried any 
such attempts for us to try to formulate an explanatory thesis for what it is for 
something to be objective or what objectivity consists of. He opts, on the basis of his 
reading of Wittgenstein that I posited above, that the best answer here is a sort of 
quietism to such affairs. That is, he believes that we cannot and should not be 
explaining the metaphysical status of variant domains of thinking. To do so would be 
to stop describing what is in front of us and to instead start explaining what, 
according to his Wittgensteinian groundings, we cannot explain – namely, the 
metaphysical status we ought to say those things have. I have sympathy for this 
position and am inclined to agree that there is an exegetical case to be made that 
Wittgenstein took it at the very least as serious contender for how to address certain 
questions that arise in philosophy. As I read Wittgenstein, he rallies against the 
position of the perspective-free perspective more than any other, that is, against the 
Platonic ideal of something like a transcendental realism. This initially can make him 
seem like someone who would be better labelled as a transcendental idealist - 
allowing for empirical realism only from this immanent position. However, the 
question of transcendental realism only arises once one has asked some very 
serious questions about what various items of knowledge consist in. And for me, 
Wittgenstein rejected those very questions as leading us into philosophical fictions. 
This means that ultimately the transcendental idealism position is itself rejected as 
the answer to a dubious question. The ideas which carry it – those of meaning being 
carried along only within linguistic communities with shared forms of life – are not 
themselves a positive thesis, but best thought of as an attack on the Platonic picture, 
a picture we needed to escape from. If, once the rejection of Platonism is complete, 
we then reject the sort of questions which place transcendental idealism in an 
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explanatory position, we are left with merely the empirical realism – that which is, 
from a human perspective (the only perspective we can actually have) truth. This, as 
far as I can tell, differs somewhat from McDowell’s reading which, especially in later 
writings, keeps the idealist pretensions, but all the same ends up with the closing off 
of questioning about what various things, objectivity included, really consist in. For a 
quite recent defence of that quietist position see his 2009. 
I will openly discuss possible conceptions of objectivity here, especially in relation to 
morality, and I believe that this can still be done and respect what is good about 
McDowell’s work. Firstly, what it leaves open are arguments from descriptions of 
how we do act and how we do think which, as Wittgenstein maintained, were the 
hallmark of good philosophy. As we will see, those thinkers who do demarcate the 
objective and subjective along strict theoretical divides are best countered by way of 
descriptions of areas of thinking which, however intuitively, do not follow these 
divides (the previously mentioned analogies will play a major role in this). A further 
point is the doubt that explanations and descriptions come apart so easily as to 
themselves demarcate distinct and contradictory categories. Rather they seem to be 
interdependent categories held together by the very act of reasoning. As humans, 
we do things for reasons, we do things which are justifiable and this includes 
describing. Describing is more often than not an act of clarity or demarcation which 
allows us to reason more clearly. As such, one only describes towards an 
explanatory end, and yet one can only explain that which is describable. Thus they 
are both things that we ‘just do’. What we mustn’t do is add metaphysical fictions that 
take us further away from describing what is actually there, but conversely, we 
should surely not refuse to give an explanation of what is describable, so long as the 
explanation is not seen as diverting our attention from what is actually in front of us. 
The key point of quietism is to not try to go so far with philosophy as to try to 
describe the inexplicable or explain the indescribable. Here we will have run into 
fictions of the metaphysical sort. Surely it is not beyond us to say something sensible 
about of objectivity. This may not be a global thesis of everything that falls under the 
term, but this does not stop the project of wishing to say whether certain domains 
can be ascertained as being more or less objective in their own terms, and what 
those terms might be, even if this is not from some transcendental standpoint 
.McDowell’s own position indeed goes a long way to showing this for morality, by 
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way of descriptions of how we think of other domains of thought. From such 
descriptions certain things follow, if only the rejection of various metaphysically 
fantastical pictures. By thus narrowing down the options of understanding the 
domain we can get a better grasp on explaining what that domain is all about. Thus, 
while I sympathise with McDowell’s position, I am lead to believe that simply ignoring 
various challenges regarding the objectivity of the moral could be counterproductive 
to anyone who believes themselves a cognitivist and wishes to recruit others to that 
cause. If one prefers to overlook the points at which I may be seen as delving below 
bedrock as unsatisfactory, that’s fine. But one might also rest easy with the idea that 
such comparisons of language games needn’t be thought of as merely explaining 
one to be more or less objective in comparison to others, but as elucidating the 
descriptive differences between them, even if such differences are seen as not 
casting any connotations on their metaphysical status. In this way it can be seen as 
an exercise of a deeper description of each language game, of what gives each its 
distinctive character. In my own mind, given the vague and contentious nature of 
Wittgensteinian comments regarding this matter, I will envisage the idea that we 
should not offer explanatory theories as being a check against offering theses which 
go beyond our right to make them, rather than a total ban on offering any 
explanations whatsoever.   
As noted, McDowell does make a certain case for moral objectivity based on an 
argument from analogy. Alongside David Wiggins he postulated that there are 
examples of statements which we see as being simply true which cannot be upheld 
by the empiricist theory of mind which under pins the accounts of detractors such as 
Mackie. Mackie, as previously, noted held certain staunch empiricist views which he 
barely hid at all in his arguments against morality, from queerness and from relativity. 
The arguments from analogy do not only work against those such as Mackie, but 
they are particularly effective against such an opponent, one who effectively seemed 
to believe into a Quinean naturalised epistemology. Mackie’s argument was that 
morality is a describing game which falls into error due to the fact that the properties 
it aimed to describe simply did not exist. No property could be both descriptive in the 
full sense and also move one to action. Any property with such a dual characteristic 
would, according to Mackie, seem awfully queer. Furthermore, these properties did 
not seem to imbue a central level of communal agreement. Different cultures utilised 
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the same ethical concepts to describe different properties and even within cultures 
disagreement can be rife. This is not so with clearly descriptive claims, Mackie 
noted, and thus these two arguments went on the record for the cognitivist to 
debunk. As previously mentioned, the queerness need not be seen as an issue; one 
can simply assume that this is the laying out of a feature of a domain (the 
descriptive) in which we are happy to assign objectivity and then asking the 
cognitivist how it is this can be so and yet moral concepts and properties can be 
seen as objective. This is not an attack, more the laying out of a task any good 
cognitivist would believe themselves able to rise to. (Grice: 1991) 
To rise to it will necessarily include a departure from the conception of objectivity 
which Mackie brings in tow. And it is precisely this that the cognitivist project that 
McDowell and Wiggins are suggesting uses a Wittgenstein analysis to achieve. In 
doing so they set up an alternative to the strong and unitary empiricist picture which 
gives the grounds for buying into error theory and also non-cognitivism of the sort 
one finds in Blackburn and Gibbard. Once this is achieved we will have good reason 
to think that the sorts of differences that these theorists love to posit between moral 
claims and descriptive claims set up a telling unfavourable comparison only if one 
does not relieve themselves fully of the overturned picture. The argument that we 
cannot understand any sort of knowledge as occurring without a perspective has 
been well rehearsed now, so these two analogies must offer something more than 
this, and they do. They offer a picture of how it is that a shared perspective can be a 
foundational pillar of a domain of thought without showing up in the specific 
judgements that are constitutive of that domain of thought so as to threaten the 
judgements at this level. The domain is beholden to our perspective, but once we 
adopt the perspective the judgments need not be thought of as such. The concepts 
and properties of such domains transcend the pragmatic explanation for their 
existence such that beliefs generated about them can be apt to be true or false in a 
proper sense. As we will see, such a picture is particularly complimentary for the 
moral domain. 
Let’s take colour first. Colour properties are properly anthropocentric. Take away the 
first order perspective colour is perceived from and colour stops functioning as a 
proper category. That is, there is a fundamental explanation about how we come to 
perceive colour which can be made out in purely physicalist terminology and 
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includes instead a description of light bouncing off variously textured surfaces to 
create variant wavelengths and enter our optic nerve in such a way that will produce 
in us a perception of something which we as a creature of a certain sort finds 
interesting. Without our physical make-up, such surfaces may produce no such 
differences, and without our interests we may not find such differences of interest 
enough to assign them different colour concepts. It is perfectly contingent on us 
being us which means that we have the category of colour. Colour does not ‘exist 
anyway’ in the empiricist sense. This is what makes it a secondary property in the 
empiricist literature. The texture, the light, the optic nerve and the brain exist anyway. 
But the colour property and the corresponding concept do not.  
Pushing up against this point are the various Wittgensteinian considerations we have 
previously rehearsed about there being perspective-independent worlds, but also 
another point – that explanations about colour are clearly thought of as being true or 
false. It is simply true that blue and yellow will make green. And there is nothing one 
adds to this by adding ‘from our perspective’, other than to demarcate that which we 
categorise as fundamental building blocks of the universe and that which we do not. 
But to be reductivist here is to discount the point and purpose there is in colour 
explanations and the sort of consistency and convergence that is necessary for such 
a point and purpose to be manifest within that explanatory space. To discount the 
truth of the whole category is to discount also the truth of the explanations therein 
and yet, as McDowell succinctly puts it,  
A [colour] is a property the ascription of which to an object is not adequately 
understood except as true…in virtue of the object’s disposition to present a 
certain sort of perceptual appearance (McDowell, 1998: 133) 
Thus, categories of thought needn’t aspire to being objective in the empiricist sense 
to also be thought of as apt for cognition. As long as one shares the perspective then 
one can start to conceptualise the consistencies that there are within the category 
and make inferences from them. The contingent nature of our own subjective 
psychological make up is fully on display here. But it doesn’t itself enter into the 
explanations of one who has access to the category. As Wittgenstein showed, there 
is no transcendentally realist ‘true anyway’, to be distinguished from a perspective-
free perspective, so true and true for us do not come apart meaningfully. Deep 
136 
 
enough down everything is ‘true for us’ in that one must admit there is no truth 
outside of a perspective. The argument thus pertains to the idea that perspective can 
be omitted from the equation when we are considering whether concepts can be 
seen as fit for cognition - assuming we want anything at all to be fit for that purpose. 
Thus, explanation takes over from ontological considerations of the fundamental sort 
in demarcating whether we can cognise a property. And we have an explanatory 
space for colour which has strong internal relations, allows for convergence between 
agents in judgements and has a point and purpose which is wide ranged and holds 
essential functions in our way of life. As such, the explanatory base transcends its 
physicalist base. The physical elements which allow for the explanations to be 
meaningful are a necessary element of colour explanations but they are not sufficient 
for a full reduction of the explanatory base to the physical components.  
Key to this point is the idea that, without the manifest image that the empiricist 
wishes to explain away with reduction, there can be no explanation of colour as there 
would be no category recognisable from the basic level to explain; as Wiggins puts it, 
we could not ‘saliently group together’ the items constitutive of that category without 
having an understanding of the category from the position of those who have access 
to the explanatory space of colour. The properties which constitute the manifest 
image are conceptually and explanatorily prior to, and are a necessary pillar of, the 
empiricist explanation of them, whilst the primary properties the empiricist points to 
are a necessary element of accessing the manifest category. This is not enough for 
reduction. The physicalist rendering will not be able to be swapped out non-
controversially for the manifest image rendering enough to show the former is an 
identical but ‘more objective’ equivalent of the latter. In the case of water reducing to 
H20, reduction is possible, precisely because this swapping out can explanatorily 
occur. H20 is ‘more objective’ in that it allows us to differentiate between water and 
other liquids which might share all its supervening properties with water other than its 
molecular make up.  
If we grant the above, which I firmly think we should, we also come to a further 
realisation. What counts as the standard for what constitutes good and bad colour 
categorisation and conceptualisation can only be ascertained from the point of view 
of the ideally placed observer within the first order perspective. We cannot even 
consider the idea that we ’all have colours wrong’ without trying to understand colour 
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from outside of our perspective – but from there, as mentioned before, the colour 
concepts and their corresponding properties cannot even be sensibly grouped 
together. We thus judge others’ ability with colour concepts against an agreed upon 
standard set by the practice of assigning colour properties to objects that cannot be 
understood from outside the perspective. Thus, our analogies are giving us a new 
conception for conceiving of domains of thought which admit of a perspective but 
where that perspective is considered as a key element in conceptualising an 
independent explanatory basis, made out as a space of reasons, which is not 
reducible to the physical components which allow for that perspective to take shape.  
The key disanalogy between colour properties and moral properties is that moral 
properties merit the application of the concept to them, whereas colour properties 
causally invoke the response of colour perception. This is indeed the point at which 
the analogy breaks down. But here the cognitivist can utilise the mathematical 
analogy. Maths leaves us with no other way to go on but this, once we have become 
embedded within the practise of doing maths. It has, from a pragmatic analysis, as 
part of its make-up, a necessity embedded within it which is intertwined with the 
practice of maths itself. Whereas we are struck by colour as a category we simply 
cannot deny the existence of, despite the fact it is shared from some perspective, the 
internal relations in mathematics gives us a grasp on the idea that we are involved in 
working out the internal relations and the idea that those relations are pre-set by the 
necessary nature of the domain by our involvement. Alan Thomas (2006: 38) has 
usefully described the two analogies as reflecting, on the part of colour, an analogy 
with the category of value as a whole – a set of concerns that cannot help but make 
an impression upon as being very real – whereas on the part of mathematics we get 
an analogy of a domain of thought which, once we have grasped it, has embedded 
within it deliberative standards which elicit a deliberative must or ought from us. 
Wiggins in particular draws heavily on the mathematical analogy to draw a distinction 
between a conception of objectivity that is heavily enforced by perception in 
empiricist terms and the type of perception that comes from a person occupying a 
particular perspective. The opponent he has in mind is Mackie.  
Wiggin’s analysis of Mackie is illuminating as it reads him as a moral constructionist, 
which is indeed the best place to situate Mackie, and explains the alignment 
between himself and Korsgaard in thinking that realism must be explained as a sort 
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of Platonism, implying that moral properties are real and would require a Moorean 
type non-natural sense for us to detect. Mackie believe that ethics was an attempt at 
describing real properties, but it described properties which are not real, but merely 
postulated as a response to the interests that we happen to have, such as living 
civilly together and co-operating on projects. The sorts of moral properties we ‘find’ 
are best explained as constructions which aid us as groups of persons. But they are 
not there in the way those objects which are apt for our senses to grasp are there. 
Thus belief that these properties are real is identical to the idea of believing concepts 
like witch and magic have corresponding properties. They are an invented set of 
prescriptive bonds which allow us to get along. Wiggins takes umbrage with such a 
conception of morality when seen through the filter of the error theorist or projectivist.  
His first complaint is against the constructivist conception. If morality is to act as 
means to some end, he points out, Mackie should be able to delineate just what that 
end is. And yet, as Mackie goes through his book, showing us how variant concepts 
can be used in such various ways dependent upon context, mostly in order to bolster 
his own claim of relativity, what he reveals is the fact that morality as a whole has no 
singular end which is understandable from the outside (or the inside for that matter). 
Its concerns are various and manifold and with such an analysis the constructivist 
picture seems far less likely. For something to be invented as a means to certain 
ends those ends must be clear. But in fact, in order to understand the various places 
we discover ethical thought as being necessary, and how those change in various 
circumstances, requires that one already be a functioning member of a moral 
community.  
The second point that Wiggins makes is against the idea of queerness. The ‘queer 
nature’ of morality, in postulating properties that are not available to the senses, is 
equally there in mathematics. In that domain of thought we start to understand of a 
structure of mathematics which is almost unarguably cognitively graspable but which 
does not exist as a fundamental component of the universe. Rather, it 
understandable only as a means of explaining how we come to categorise things in a 
way which is indispensable to our form of life – the counting of objects. No sense 
organ can detect ‘twelve-ness’ without one being armed with the concepts that come 
from the learning of mathematics. This is because, as Putnam maintains and 
Wiggins endorses, perception properly understood is an ‘exercise of our concepts’. 
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The ‘our’ here is key, and points back to the idea that there are various examples of 
non-natural properties that are only painted out to be fantastical and in need of 
specially postulated sense organ if one buys the simplistic empiricist picture. Again, 
to use Putnam’s example, one does not have a sense organ for ‘detecting elation’, 
but once one ‘acquires the concept’ one cannot help but find it in the world. The 
objection to Moore’s work comes from the idea that all the properties which there are 
all the properties which ‘are there anyway’ – that is, all the ones which can be 
identified by independent means. But this opens the question of just why this is the 
case.  
The argument that concepts which pick out properties which defy independent 
physical ratification is furthered when we consider how many properties unlike this 
are required to reason about those properties and come to any conclusions at all 
other than conclusions such as ‘X property is there’ or ‘X property has these further 
physical features’. Reasoning takes agreement about fundamental background 
assumptions about levels of analysis, good theorising, what normative standards are 
required for good theorising and which indicate bad theorising based around a grasp 
of consistent assertions, inferences, circularity of thought and so on, which pay no 
homage at all to physical properties. And yet we can see the property of consistency 
and inconsistency in arguments and theories and we criticise these in those we think 
lead to poor levels of analysis. Anyone who argues against this point will be 
manifestly doing precisely that in their counter argument. The kicker with this 
argument is that an argument to the contrary is itself an exhibition that non-primary 
properties can constitute knowledge.            
So the analogy with mathematics further gives us license to believe that morality has 
some chance of being made out as a domain in which truths and knowledge can be 
ascertained, despite the fact that its properties are non-natural. All we need to show 
here is that non-natural properties do not require some special sensory organ to 
detect, but that perception correctly conceived is not best thought of as explained in 
empirical terms. Mental content requires that we are utilising our concepts and the 
justification for those concepts are best thought as being postulated in the public 
domain. The argument from Mackie which stays on the record and which is the 
hardest for the cognitivist or objectivist to argue away is the argument from relativity. 
Here maths gives no respite. For convergence and the sorts of necessity we find in 
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maths is constitutive of its domain, whereas in morality this is clearly not the case, at 
least in the same manner. Disagreement is clearly rife, not just between various 
societies but within them as well. Overcoming this problem will be the one which will 
be telling for morality and ought to shape the way we think about morality. 
Furthermore, it is a problem which is easily explained away by any non-cognitivist 
who is willing to take notes from the Wittgensteinian lesson. 
The analogies with colour and maths thus only take us so far. What is not shared by 
either of these domains and yet is the mainstay of morality is that there is a 
motivational response, a psychological response, to the sorts of concepts and 
properties which are in play. It is this mix of description and prescription which is 
what makes the moral domain so distinctive in its constitution. As mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter, the non-cognitivist who argues for a distinction between 
these two features of moral concepts in which there is a description made out in 
empiricist terms will struggle, as Mackie does, to explain how this idea of description 
can be successfully made out. It is not, I have argued, a hallmark of an objective 
property that it need to be instantiated by an independently verifiable structure made 
out in primary quality terms. Therefore properties can exist which defy this rendering. 
But the non-cognitivist needn’t take this turn in particular. Description and 
prescription can still come apart if description is meant as applying to properties 
which are conceived as finding their verification not via their exhibiting independent 
empirical features, but instead as being ascertained from a perspective which implies 
a shared interest or set of judgements, where an appeal to an observer who is 
embedded within that form of life is necessary for understanding when that concept 
is being used well. The classic example will be games. Noticing that something is a 
game is noticing distinctive features which defy articulation in terms of reducing the 
concept to its physical properties. Similarities at this level evade us for certain 
concepts. Rather, one would have to be inside the form of life to be able to 
understand the connections, made out as something like Wittgensteinian family 
resemblances, which allow for something to be categorised as a game. But those 
various concerns do not have any active force on the will of the person who notices 
that something is game-like. This is not so with moral concepts. If morality is to be a 
non-reductive domain then, the evaluative or motivational aspect that is carried 
within thick concepts like honour, will be required to be a part of their meaning and 
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not tacked on non-cognitively.  And this task requires that the cognitivist can indeed 
tell a story in which the desiderative nature of moral concepts can escape being 
categorised as (non-empirical) description plus non-cognitive like or dislike, which 
becomes psychologically active once the property is recognised in some agent or 
action, and is merely mistaken as belonging to the concept, such that it can be 
analysed away. Instead, the story must show that an agent who is able to reliably 
pick out the concept must have just these evaluative interests as a part of 
recognition of the concept. Minus the proper interest the concept will fail to have any 
semantic bite.  
 
 
5.3: Moral Motivation and the Idea of a Standard 
Thus, it seems we need a picture in which the appetitive element does not enter the 
picture at a late stage, as this will always invite a non-cognitivist rendering of the 
situation. And it is this picture which the cognitivist/realist David Wiggins paints for 
us, in both his ‘Needs, Values, Truth’ (2000) and his ‘Ethics: Twelve Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Morality’ (2011).  
A huge player in Wiggins’ account is the idea of how our needs and interests can 
manifest themselves into concepts of certain sorts. Drawing inspiration from 
Wittgenstein but focussing mainly on the work of Hume, Wiggins makes the case for 
conceptual practices which both depend upon and yet transcend their humble origins 
in our actual needs - which are made out as elements of our first nature. This picture 
allows those who share those needs and have access to the conceptual armament 
of some community, however broadly defined, to adduce conceptual ‘ideologies’ and 
‘ontologies’, which are themselves seen as standards of justification and modes of 
reasoning which are both structurally dependent upon but explanatorily independent 
of, those needs and interests – standards that members of this community will 
‘steadfastly adhere to as if by second nature’. (Wiggins, 2006: 329)             
The second nature is the level of analysis at which semantic concerns come into 
play. But highlighting the structural relationship here between the pragmatic and 
semantic features helps us to better understand just why reduction of what the non-
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cognitivist will wish to say ought be reduced, namely the part of a thick concept 
which claims ‘and this is a good thing’, would be to misunderstand the nature of that 
relationship. The motivational and appetitive concern does not come after the 
recognition of the concept, as in the non-cognitivist picture, as an extra, but in fact 
underscores the distinctive nature of the category of the moral in the first place, as 
being one which necessarily invokes emotional responses from us and provides 
those who are within a fully functioning first order ethic to respond to certain 
properties, moral properties, with certain actions guided by certain feelings.  
The non-cognitivist can be seen as essentially laying down a challenge. It cannot be 
true that honour is good because you desire it (the non-cognitivist claim) and that 
you desire honour because it is good (the cognitivist claim). But here the mistake is 
made that these two claims need to be made out at the same level of analysis. The 
additional claim that is that once this is done, the non-cognitivist rendering seems by 
far the more understandable. You come to see the property as you come to find any 
other property in the world, and then you additionally add onto this an evaluative 
extra which is not included within that recognition. The alternative seems to be that 
honour would have to have goodness built into it as a part of it. And yet it seems 
unfathomable as to how that would be so. Here we truly would have a non-natural 
property that seemed mysterious and that we may well need a special faculty to be 
attuned to. 
But Wiggins denies the challenge made out as such really represents circular logic 
because he sees both claims as existing at different levels of analysis, with the levels 
being separated as a structural claim and an explanatory claim: 
1) Honour is good because we desire it 
2) We desire honour because it is good 
Wiggins here makes the claim that the ‘because’ in each claim works differently, and 
this stops the idea of a circle in the illegitimate sense, and instead highlights the fact 
that there are two different sorts of analysis here. In 1) the ‘because’ should be seen 
as a demarcating a structural relationship between desire and the category of things 
we find good (one of which is honour). We necessarily need to have the sort of 
psychological elements of approbation and disapprobation in order for there to be at 
some point a manifest category of the good. These act as the marks of the interest, 
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which is then filled in by content to make a specific category. But just as our 
physiological and psychological make up need not enter into the category of colour, 
so too should the sort of motivational interests that demarcate the moral not enter 
into our category of morality. 
In contrast, 2) is an explanatory relationship which is made out once 1) is already set 
up. Desire thus enters twice into the category of morality. Firstly in an unspecified 
form that, via our existence within a specific world, transcends that basis and 
become a standard against which we judge the actions of others. Desire here 
informs, as it were, the sense of the entire category of the moral. But this subjectivity 
does not enter into the specific judgements made by an agent who is in the position 
to grasp that category. Asked why we (as functioning agents whose second nature is 
so attuned to the standard) desire specifically honour, we will explain the desire in 
terms of the properties and concepts which are constitutive of the category. 
Alternatively, asked why ‘we’ (as a group of human beings) come to find honour 
good, the explanation will make reference to the contingent nature of our interests as 
social animals, the fact we have appetitive natures, the fact that bonds of trust are 
important and so on. Again, pace those theorists such as Foot and Thomson, these 
considerations should not enter into the normative explanation of why we find a 
particular thick concept good or bad.  
Thus, not just the ‘because’, but also the ‘we’ and ‘desire’, exhibit equivocations 
between their referents in the above supposed two point circle. And a circle only 
applies as a point of criticism if the two propositions are mutually self-supporting in a 
manner which ends up being fallacious. This is not the case here. Thomas (2006: 
42) makes the claim that there is an irreducible virtuous circle of philosophical 
explication. But in some ways he is wrong. There is no circle once we have seen that 
matching terms which provide the content of each proposition ought to be seen as 
equivocations and thus two distinctive propositions. 
This way of reading Wiggins’ position should also not be seen as a sneaky way to 
manipulate an honest question asked by the non-cognitivist. It is supported strongly 
by an analogy with colour. There too we saw how the reduction of colour to its 
physical components would have caused confusion. Anyone who wishes to grant 
some level of perspectivalism should grant that properties need not be independently 
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characterisable in primary quality terms. Instead, within categories which allow for 
assertions to be made and convergence, and which do not seem to allow for their 
content to be easily reduced or explained in other terms – that is, for those 
categories which seem to develop an independently understandable ontology and 
conceptual network – we ought to consider the status of the property in terms of how 
we come to encounter them, and not judge our ability to cognise them properly by 
way of an analysis of the property in some independent manner.  
This puts the non-cognitivist into an uncomfortable position. If she is to hold that 
perspectivalism does enter into the equation then she must allow that we can have 
descriptions that find their generality exhibited in the way it used by those who 
occupy the first-order position. This, it will be maintained by the cognitivist, will 
require that as part of the pragmatic explanation of this generality, she allows the 
interests of those persons to play a structurally explanatory role in their grasp of the 
language game. Now, moral concepts assume the sharing of a wider and more 
motivationally efficacious set of interests than more descriptive concepts such as 
game. The interest presupposes, once the sort of genealogical account that Wiggins 
has in mind is complete, that one will feel motivational compunction to do or withhold 
from doing certain things when one sees the property in question. However, to use 
this as a stick to beat the cognitivist with would require the perspectival non-
cognitivist to disallow that these sorts of interests are relevant to the concept. But to 
do so would be to deny the distinctive nature of moral concepts as action guiding. 
Yet, as perspectivalism has already been agreed upon as a necessary feature of 
descriptions of all sorts, this blocking move would appear to be motivated by and pay 
homage to the sort of Mackie-esque claim that meaning is decided by purely 
descriptive qualities. 
This move would push up against the idea that the contingent interests we as a 
species have can license descriptions of the game sort. Thus, the non-cognitivist 
would either be pushed back towards a position where supervening terms ought to 
find their generality in independently determinable primary features, or to draw an 
arbitrary line as to which sorts of interests can contribute structurally to semantic 
content. In the case of colours, no notion of motivation is carried with the concept. 
Thus the analogy breaks down here. But while this implies a distinction is to be 
drawn between how these categories characterise their respective contents, to see it 
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as a position from which to attack the moral cognitivist is to move away from the idea 
that we ought to consider the legitimacy of the property in light of how we come to 
grasp it. The non-cognitivist would thus be left with three options. Firstly, to conceive 
the property independently which would require generalising at the empirical level, 
which I claim with Wittgenstein is impossible. Trying to distinguish in independent 
terms why we use rude in variously different ways in various contexts would leave 
one either desperately postulating physical similarities which are impossible to make 
out (the same goes for terms like ‘game’ which would thus stop being classified as 
descriptive when no similarity could be made out) or to claim that there is massive 
error in various uses of rude and game, which is a disguised version of Platonism – 
that rudeness can be made out in a rules as rails format. The second option and the 
other pole of the debate, seems to be to accept the analysis of the cognitivist. The 
third option, and middle ground then,  is to claim that certain sorts of descriptions 
such as game and colour do speak to categorising properties in terms of shared 
interests creating an independent explanatory ontology, but that specifically moral 
properties and concepts are unlicensed to utilise this model of justification because 
in so categorising its properties the interests which foster the categorising follow 
through to play a role as an active psychological feature in the decisions of agents. 
As a quietist sympathiser, I can here see the point of the McDowellian warning that 
we are now in danger of creating a dispute that might be thought of as extrapolating 
meaning from metaphysical distinctions which have no merit. If a category of 
properties ought to be conceived in terms of our coming to grasp them, and the 
numerable concerns they answer as an agent from that first order position, then 
surely the answer shuts down there; there will be no further merit in postulating that 
distinctions between those categories should then imply a difference of status. There 
is something stopping me making this move, however, and it is this. The difference 
of the psychology of an individual agent as pertinent in morality – while it is not in the 
status of colour - reflects the fact that the moral reasons we draw are practical 
reasons, whilst both mathematical and colour reasons are theoretical. Someone 
might not have the best ability at picking up differences of colour, but the standard is 
set, quite neutrally in the theoretical disciplines such as colour recognition, by the 
best occupied observer. An agent may not see the difference between types of 
green, say, but there is no harm in saying he is just bad at colour recognition. The 
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standard is set somewhat holistically around the idea of an idealised observer in an 
idealised setting but can be formulated in terms independent of any particular agent. 
Moral reasons, however, are practical, and this is reflected within the way we already 
do conceive of the standard. It is not set perfectly independently in the way that 
colours are. Colour charts exist and mathematical formula exist and they are 
standards that easily transcend, theoretically, the position of any one agent. An 
agent who disagrees is simply wrong against the independent standard. If one were 
asked to justify why they were in a belief state as to why they saw X as red, or why 
they took the answer 1000 as coming after 998 in a number sequence of +2, they 
would point to the object or the +2 as constituting their reason. This is the hallmark of 
theoretical reasoning. In the practical case, however, the motivational aspect of the 
reason which is required disallows this simplistic justification method without adding 
an extra; namely, something about the agent themselves. This is the distinction 
between internal and external reasons. Internal reasons invoke as a part of the 
explanatory efforts the motivational set the agent happens to have in a way that 
external reasons do not. Thus, the middle ground for the non-cognitivist who holds 
firm to the idea of non-cognition and also denies the empiricist rendering of 
description will be this: that the reasons which there are ought be external even if 
this externality need pay reference at some point to the fact that the agent occupies 
a form of life. The intuition this would grasp is one which pays homage to an intuitive 
notion of objectivity that was on display in McDowell’s ‘diamonds are hard’ equation. 
In contrast, non-objective reasons would apply to someone who has the ability to 
understand all of the meaning that we ascertain from our form of life but who does 
not share, for whatever the reasons, a motivational set from which good practical 
deliberation will deliver the correct reason.  
Personally, I am not impressed by this attack. It once again takes the form of 
pointing to a metaphysical difference which one can simply point to as a hallmark of 
the moral and tries to use it as a club to beat morality with. But, the differences can 
only be taken to be of note from outside the first personal stance. It is however a 
problem which Alan Thomas takes very seriously. He believes that the attack, which 
is mostly associated with the work of Bernard Williams (1985: 146 – 155), ought to 
be met if were to salvage morality. I believe that the argument stands and falls with 
the proper understanding of the idea of a transcendent standard. All the argument 
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does is to ask us once again to retrace our steps and to reaffirm once we have done 
so that, no matter the differences, the similarities there are in building a standard 
which arises from contingent human interests (whatever those interests may be) 
allows one to appeal to the standard - and not the abilities of any particular agent to 
conceptualise the standard via their own neurological make up, psychology or what 
have you – as independent. Once this is done then if we are impressed we will have 
given ourselves licence to say that the properties the categories pick out are real and 
that we can have knowledge of them. As far as I’m concerned this amounts to us 
having moral facts. There can be factual knowledge about moral properties. There 
will be further elucidation of distinctions between realms of facts and how these 
ought to be conceived. However, once we have the basic picture, a picture which 
Thomas shares (or to be specific, shares with the addition that we should take up a 
negative reconstruction of the same idea, a standard which could not be rationally 
rejected rather than one whose content is positively assented to) I struggle to see 
how the Williams inspired argument gets off the ground. 
Williams charges that theoretical reasons are external while practical reasons, of 
which moral reasons are a type, are internal. This is because internal reasons ‘sever 
the link’ between explanatory and normative reasons .This is put forward with force 
and clarity by Thomas: 
Consider theoretical reasoning directed towards the acquisition of true belief. 
A judger comes to accept a belief P, because this is seeing the matter aright, 
and one way to gloss this remark is that the judger comes to believe P 
because P. A philosophical understanding of this ‘because’ would take it to be 
both normative and explanatory: that given the norms of reasoning governing 
the acquisition of beliefs of this class, and the judger’s proper application of 
these norms, there is nothing else for him or her to think, but P. In addition, 
from either a meta-level perspective or an explanatory one, an account of the 
same judger’s cognitive economy would see the fact that P as being causally 
implicated in the aetiology of the judger’s belief. In this case we have a 
compatibility between a justiﬁcatory and a causal account and a fully 
satisfactory philosophical understanding of the ‘because’.  (Thomas, 2006: 71 
- emphasis is mine) 
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While this is of importance, whether it downgrades the claims of morality or merely 
situates their position once properly understood is yet to be determined. And I would 
claim that the whole affair comes down to where we consider the restructuring of 
what can count as an explanatory reason that we have been trying to foster 
throughout the last section as acceptable. I will explain what I mean.  
In claiming that internal reasons sever the link between explanatory reasons and 
normative reasons, what Williams means is that there is an explanation of our 
coming to have the normative reasons that morality seems to bestow upon us, and 
which we believe we are reaching to when we justify a moral action, which does not 
end in a ‘…because P’ format. Rather, in explanatory reasons terms, we believe that 
‘P because we are a type of creature who has just this set of motivational 
propensities raised in just this world at just this time with just these sorts of social 
influences…’. This explanation explicitly rules out the idea that the sorts of properties 
which moral reasoning must presuppose can exist within the world. However, this is 
now a picture which clashes with precisely the sort of claim that we have been 
making: that these properties are there in the world.  
On the rendering I have been giving, moral properties fit the analysis of ‘P because 
P’, except that the belief of the property comes with the caveat that one has the eyes 
to see just those types of property. Granting this, the link between the explanatory 
and the normative need not be severed at all. That there is a separate explanation 
that can be made in terms where the property does not really exist is just, I would 
claim, recognition of the fact that all non-fundamental properties have a physical 
basis upon which they supervene. But this basis is not enough to enter into any 
explanations without there being explanatory interest from some perspective for 
grasping just those types of property. Williams needs a strong analysis of ‘…because 
P’ here. Are we considering this to include descriptions of the purely empirical sort? 
If so he falls to the basic Wittgensteinian critique. This, I believe, is how Alice Crary 
(2009) reads him in her analysis of his absolute conception. Alternatively, given the 
focus on motivation and its link to prescriptions, is Williams allowing that descriptions 
which rely on some shared perspective might still be objective? For instance, would 
colour fit the format ‘P because P’, or would it fall foul by taking the following 
formulation in explanatory terms ‘P because I am a creature who has just this sort of 
physical make up for detecting differences in light waves which strike me as both 
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phenomenologically different and explanatorily important once I am raised in a 
community which takes explanatory interest in these phenomenological differences 
conceptually in various ways’? If we allow that colour does allow the ‘P because P’ 
formulation despite the perspectival nature which is implied in colour descriptions, 
then Williams will have to contend with the arguments detailed above about drawing 
arbitrary lines between domains of thought which utilise different anthropocentric 
features to demarcate acceptable properties. If he does not, he will fall into the non-
perspectival empiricist camp which has even larger concerns to contend with, as 
drawn out by Wittgenstein. If he is making a point about motivations then we can 
clearly leave him on the record as rightly showing that there are differences in the 
deepest fundamental explanatory terms about which parts of the human psychology 
and physiology are required for various properties to be conceptualised well. After 
all, as Wittgenstein showed, all judgments pay homage to an agreement of other 
judgments. To believe something is to stand in epistemic relation to it. And thus this 
sort of agreement plays a structural role within the explanation of coming to believe 
anything at all. Thus, even regarding the simplest formulation of ‘P because P’, 
where P could stand for as simple a proposition as you wish, the ‘because’ does not 
come for free, explanatorily speaking; rather, it disguises a set of norms and 
interests. The ‘because’ thus implies both norms and fundamental properties.     
We can thus agree with Williams that ‘P because P’ in the moral case involves the 
inclusion of a motivational set as a part of the explanatory basis of the ‘because’, 
while disagreeing that this in anyway disbars moral properties as being there in the 
world. That is one analysis – the fundamental analysis - but this needn’t be the 
correct level of analysis for moral concepts. This is because, and this is key, the 
entirety of moral sense, or rather the sense of the entirety of morality, is what is 
presupposed by ones having such a motivational set. Certain motivations are a 
necessary feature of one who grasps the point and purpose of morality from a first 
order perspective, just as certain physiological and neurological features are 
necessary for one to grasp the point and purpose of colour categorisation. Both 
categories rely on shared judgements and these judgments supervene upon physical 
features, but unless those features (characterised in precisely the way we 
characterise them) are to be made out as fully independent of our capacities and 
explanatory interests, then there is nothing against which the former properties can 
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be cast in an unfavourable light. The better way, I would suggest, is to conceptualise 
the world as made out of an unknowable amount of possible properties and that 
those that we do conceptualise will be those which are beholden to our explanatory 
interests. Those properties must always be thought of as supervening upon an 
independent physical world, but as soon as we cast our explanatory net over this 
independent world it loses its independence and becomes conceptualised by a 
group who do have explanatory interests and a limited way of conceiving and 
conceptualising those properties. The only way of conceiving ‘the world’ as a 
comprehensible whole is thus from a perspective. As it is the perspectival world not 
the independent world which grounds the concepts of truth, objectivity, rationality 
and so on which structure it; complete independence becomes a nonsensical 
position 
This still allows, however, for us to differentiate between those explanations we see 
as more or less fundamental and those which are not. Here objectivity stops picking 
out what’s there anyway, contrasted with the subjective which will include some 
blend of mind and world. Thus, that distinction must be given a separate form. And 
that seems to be, following our earlier discussion, that objective properties can be 
thought of as those which include reference to some standard impartially considered 
apart from any specific agent’s viewpoint and which pay homage instead to being 
categories we cannot see as anything but indispensable and which have an 
understandable ontology and conceptual network which can be taken as 
explanatorily independent of the make-up of any specific agent. This point is crucial 
as it lays down a distinction between those theorists from the cognitivist side who 
make a virtue of the independence this brings and those who do not, those, that is, 
who remain open to the threat of the externalist/internalist distinction. The very fact 
of motivation implies that morality is internalist but also explanatorily independent.  
The latter camp, I believe, contains McDowell. His attempt at creating a transcendent 
framework does not make use of the idea of a social standard rising up from but 
transcending a set of agents with certain concerns. Rather, he utilises the idea of the 
idealised observer or Phronimos. This is an extension of the idea that we saw when 
we were developing a standard. The standard for what counts as green is what 
would count as green to an ideal observer in ideal lighting. But this acts as only one 
structural move in developing the agreed upon standard and cannot replace the 
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standard once it is developed. It is the tacit agreement amongst the numerous 
people who take part in the standard which gives that standard its clout. Without the 
second pillar the idealised observer seems structurally unsound, for different persons 
with differing motivations/physiological make-up could herald a different ideal 
observer. To someone with quite weak moral grounding – and we must admit these 
people exist – are more likely to postulate a much less morally strict Phronimos than 
we think they ought. We thus would not be appealing to the same thing when were to 
justify our actions. There is no transcending here, and given that we have, with 
Thomas, settled on the idea of an internalist account which aims at objectivity by way 
of the development of an impartial standard, we should claim that McDowell’s idea of 
an externalist account based on the Phronimos seems unlikely to get off the ground.  
Morality, we have claimed, has the possibility for providing an explanatorily 
independent ontology. Yet there remains one sort of major issue left for morality here 
that can be made out via two formulations of relativity. Those standards seem to 
change vastly between different communities – say, Sparta in the 5th century BC and 
today’s Britain – and also internal to certain communities regarding specific 
judgements. If the standard is impartial, why are there so many disagreements that 
seem impossible to solve?  
 
 
5.4: Relativity and Pragmatics: 
We have now reached a point at which the unfavourable comparison can do little 
work to make us worry about the status of moral claims. Subjectivity enters into the 
very core of morality at the level of a shared sense of what structures the conceptual 
terrain, and in so doing need not be thought of as infecting the picture at the level of 
reference. This expansion of where and how subjectivity can show up in accounts of 
domains of thought can then be placed alongside a corrective to the view of 
objectivity as truly being independent of us as thinkers occupying a particular 
perspective, even when we are considering the most fundamental properties we 
believe there are. With these two corrections in place we have reconceived the 
objective/subjective distinction in such a way that domains of thought can contain 
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propositions that can be both subjective and objective. Objectivity thus pays homage 
to the idea of an impartial standard, which can be thought of as a complex of 
ontology and ideology, and which while not strictly theoretical and as such 
contestable, can still inspire convergence between analyses. It is crucial to 
remember that this is the nature of the domain. Disagreement at the highly specific 
level not only, for good Wittgensteinian reasons, implies agreement at a background 
level, but also in many instances can be explained via normative reasons in such a 
way that each of the disagreeing parties can understand the position the other takes. 
Subjectivity can still be considered as the necessitation that at some point a 
conceptual scheme which pays homage to individual make up or community 
standards will, from an explanatory reasons point of view, be implicated within the 
explanation of how an agent reaches a reason. The remainder of this section will try 
and situate what form morality takes between these two poles. I have, I believe 
argued that there is enough for morality to be an objective category. However, I 
hasten to add, this will not mean that all moral decisions are objective. There is then 
still the philosophically elucidatory task of considering just how morality fits the bill in 
the case of specific judgments and how these different types of judgment ought to be 
classified.  
What I will be trying to bring out here is how a final challenge to objectivity, borne 
from a final intuition about the same, which is embedded within this vision of moral 
objectivity which has been borrowed from the McDowellian/Wiggins school of 
cognitivism, ought to be deflected so as to give the moral domain its most realistic 
characterisation. The challenge is one of the most obvious and numerously 
mentioned in the literature: if morality really is objective (in our terms because it 
comes with an impartial standard that transcends the bonds of the directly 
subjective) then why are there so many variant answers to moral questions? How 
can we square the idea of an impartial standard with the undeniable fact that in so 
many cases people actually do disagree? Shouldn’t the standard aid people to 
delineate between right and wrong? 
I believe the above formulation works well as a description of the challenge at the 
inter-community level. There is however a second challenge, that of differing 
moralities between communities. And this might be laid out in a thought experiment.     
153 
 
Objectivity as made out via an impartial standard seems to imply the standard could 
be recreated even if (via some tragedy or another) human civilisation disappeared 
and then came back with only the most basic understanding of previous social 
institutions and our human nature. If this were to happen can we really believe that 
there would be anything that might resemble the moral standard we adopt? And if 
not, is the whole affair not too local?  
I think both these challenges need to be taken seriously. There is a common idea 
that can be found amongst Wittgensteinian inspired philosophers that the latter 
question asks too much. Perspectival or local objectivity seems to offer a way out of 
answering it while, by way of leaning on the same perspective as a pillar of support, 
allows us to answer the former question by placing the objectivity of the domain as 
the background ontology which allows us to see the positions of those we disagree 
with as complete, defensible and reasoned conceptions of how the terrain ought to 
be organised, despite that disagreement. I am concerned that is offering too much to 
the relativist; that one would be stretching the terms of impartiality far too thinly if one 
were to claim that something is impartial only between, say, those of a particular 
small town or other group. This looks, prima facie, like bringing in a post-modernist 
rendering of truth and objectivity, where one group’s truth needn’t meet another’s in 
anyway and thus the idea of truth and objectivity can be abandoned. To take this 
route, I would claim, makes a mockery of what we fought for in allowing perspective 
in the first place. To answer the above questions then, I want to make use of two 
ideas we have already seen. The former is a Wittgensteinian epistemological point; 
the second is a complimentary point about ontology of the moral domain.     
The Wittgensteinian point might be put thus: for there to be such a thing as 
disagreement there needs to be a backdrop of agreement. The ontological point can 
be put thus: not all instances of moral thinking need to be categorised as wrong or 
right in any necessary sense. There are varying level of goodness and badness that 
one can reach to and which define the difference of a specific individual outlook and 
which we may disagree with more or less strongly but which we needn’t see 
ourselves as morally obliged to put a stop to. We can call this domain the 
permissible. The deontic ‘must’ sort of moral claim might inform us contextually 
about how we can delineate other moral norms without running up against it and 
remaining a consistent outlook, but it does not do this alone. It does this alongside 
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various amounts of other norms that provide us with meaning; namely, those which 
we find in cultural institutions which moral norms are meant to partly inform. These 
are largely culturally enforced and may well take the perspective of a particular form 
of life in this narrow sense to understand, but they are informed by a development of 
what are necessary concerns of human nature, however contingent that nature might 
be from some perspective-free perspective. 
One theorist with whom I share a lot of ideas, but who for me, transgresses 
regarding a proper rendering of objectivity by giving too many intuitions about 
objectivity away, is Alice Crary. In ‘Beyond Moral Judgment’ (2009) she makes use 
of the same sorts of Wittgensteinian insights which I do regarding changing the 
subjective and objective distinction to allow the idea of perspectivalism to carry the 
weight of objectivity. She does this via what she describes to be a pragmatic account 
of language. She believes that once one has understood Wittgenstein properly one 
ought to see that language is properly thought of as ‘a moral acquisition’. Pragmatic 
features stop the idea that moral judgments are the full hallmark of morality. Whether 
a (moral) concept applies must take into account the pragmatic considerations of 
how we do utilise expressions, not just the meaning of the concept, as if it could be 
extracted and its meaning abstracted from the ways and contexts in which it is used. 
The learning of language, of how expressions ought to be used, thus impinges upon 
the propensities and sensitivities one utilises to discern beyond meanings 
understood as atomistic semantic definitions. A philosophical focus on semantics 
stops us from seeing just how far into our everyday lives our theory of value goes, 
and how it is best understood. To use Machiavelli as a guide here, one cannot 
semantically define the difference between the attribution to oneself of either 
‘untrustworthy’ or ‘cunning’ by way of definition. It depends upon the context of ones 
actions, one’s own position (and other agents’ positions) within that context, the 
consequences the act begets, one’s actual intentions, one’s perceived intentions, 
one’s manner, the success or the failure of those intentions, unexpected 
consequences of the action… the list goes on. These are pragmatic features which 
impinge upon how we think that a concept ought to be used, which do not speak to 
some conditions of that concept which can be separated from the rest of the world 
and brought to bear upon it when circumstances semantically laid out allow it to fit 
into place like a jigsaw piece to a whole picture. Rather, the picture cannot be seen 
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without one having developed (or been ‘taught’ – non-theoretically) the sorts of 
sensitivities and propensities needed to know one’s way around. 
There is little to be disagreed with here. I buy Crary’s picture of pragmatic concerns 
as guiding complicated concept acquisition without argument. I have made many of 
these points myself. However, I do not buy completely what she claims follows from 
it. Crary believes two things which might be thought as startling claims follow from 
this. The first is that thoughts and utterances which make no sorts of mention of 
overtly moral concepts, and which are not judgments of any type, can still be moral 
thoughts and utterances. The second claim is this: once we have the pragmatic 
picture we cannot ask for such a thing as an ‘abstraction requirement’. I see the 
benefit in both of these ideas, however, without caveats I cannot find either fully 
acceptable, and taking them as Crary takes them, I believe, is damaging to an 
intuitive notion of objectivity which is necessary not to fall into post-modernism – 
something I believe that Crary is in danger of falling into at the end of her work when 
she applies her moral epistemological theory to feminist theory (2009: 164 - 191).  
The difference between Crary’s analysis of Wittgenstein’s attack on the Platonic 
notion of objectivity and my own is her purposeful omission of an aim to a standard 
which is impartial but internal. When Crary talks of ‘abstraction requirements’ and 
‘absolute conceptions’, towards the beginning of her work, what she has in mind is 
the idea which should be discarded by shedding Platonism: that the world ought to 
be thought as fixing the meanings of terms (‘maximally’) independent of any 
perspective. Thus her argument against the ideas of semantics as conceived minus 
the pragmatic features which contribute to conceptual application. Upon that we can 
agree. However, this means that what is determining objectivity is a perspective as 
contributed to by the interests of the people who occupy a first order position. And 
there is now no telling between the sorts of interests people happen to hold and the 
sorts they ought to be able to justify. Let us call what the standard gives us an 
‘impartiality requirement’. If we are to understand each other properly, there must be 
something upon which we agree, which we hold firm to in order to be able to make 
points, namely that which Thomas calls a standard of reasonableness, however tacit 
this might be. Crary aims to provides the very same with only her idea of shared 
pragmatic sensibilities and propensities. These are what allow for the agreement 
which can be the base of disagreement. But I would argue this is one pillar which 
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holds up the standard and cannot be equated with the idea of a standard itself. A 
reminder regarding interest might be apposite here. On the picture upon which we 
are working a broad conception of interests underscores that which we share, and 
that which we share allows for the agreement which gives us access to the 
conceptual apparatus and ontology of the domain. Individual interests can vary, thus 
the disagreement (that which is constitutive of the character of the domain); but if 
these interests are such that a person who doesn’t share them, despite otherwise 
sharing the background, can never deliberatively reach the insights they provide, 
then interest is not just settling the domain at the broad level. It is also doing too 
much work at the level of specific, individual interest. I say ‘too much’ because this 
invites with open arms William’s critique.     
Crary puts to work her idea of the full blown rejection of an abstraction requirement 
in defence of a conception of feminist theory which walks the line between 
postmodernist views on objectivity (there is no such thing as objectivity) and 
traditionalist views on objectivity (objectivity is to be conceived as picking out 
features of the world which are independent of us). Between these pillars is a fully 
comprehensible version of objectivity which fits her (and so far my) conception of 
‘wider objectivity’ – namely one within which we can find general levels of agreement 
by way of occupying a position which is grounded by pragmatic features – the 
concerns which we come to ascertain by way of being inculcated into a form of life 
which conceives the world by way of a conceptual network which we learn to utilise 
not merely by application of semantic rules, but by way of learning when these rules 
apply according to various contexts.  
All of the above I agree with, but her wider conception itself is, in my humble opinion, 
too broad. The end at which it meets the traditionalist conception of objectivity is 
clearly demarcated by the idea of a rejection of abstraction requirements, platonically 
conceived. However, the side which touches on post-modernism blurs into the post-
modernist critiques she criticises. It does so, I believe, because she places too much 
weight on distinctions that can be made between perspectives of inter-community 
groups specifically defined - namely, given the nature of her analysis, feminists. The 
same would apply if we were discussing racial theory or class theory. This critique is 
not, in my view, anti-feminist. Instead it correctly attacks a conception of objectivity 
that does not do enough to demarcate it from the properly subjective. I will soon 
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suggest a corrective to Crary’s account which, while born from a structural ideal 
which works against it, will in fact strengthen the methodological chances of 
feminism.  
What demarcates my own account is the standard which aims at impartiality and 
aims to find, from first order thinkers, those properties which we can appeal to which 
cannot be reasonably be ignored. None of these properties are thought of as fully 
independent from us, but nor are they thought as only ascertainable from some 
particular perspective which is imbedded within a wider perspective of 
understanding. That is, if one can grasp the general gist of another’s complaint, and 
both those persons share enough background assumptions for them to also find 
agreement in various cases about the use of moral terms, by way of my account, 
there must also be enough shared between those persons that one of them could, if 
correct, show the other where they have deliberatively gone awry by way of the 
utilisation of the concepts which they share. I will leave open the means in which one 
might make this argument for now, although I certainly do not believe this 
deliberation need be a strict theoretical exercise. I believe that this much is implicit in 
any account which wishes to combat the critique of non-objectivists such as 
Williams. If this is forgone, then what we will be left with is internal reasons which do 
not even allow for an appeal to impartiality. And such an account is a fair description 
of Crary’s account as it is laid out in Beyond Moral Judgment. 
Everything here hangs on the idea that if one is to have a form of perspectivalism  
which still allows for objectivity, then the perspectivalness must be reined in, at some 
point, so as to not allow any individual perspective or perspectives to enter into the 
ways the owner/owners of that perspective is/are deliberatively cast adrift from 
others who utilise the shared conceptual networks, such that those distinct 
perspectives cannot come to a meeting of the minds on the basis of good 
deliberation. If the concepts characteristic of feminist debates, say, such as 
‘oppression’ and ‘fairness’, are not to start to take on additional instances of correct 
use, such that a member of an anti-feminist camp and a member of the feminist 
camp would be merely talking past each other when they utilise them, then there 
must be a way to deliberate about whether those terms are being correctly used in 
these instances. If we forgo this idea, we forgo a level of analysis at which we can 
say ‘P because P’ about moral terms, such as ‘oppressive’. The correct analysis will 
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not be that we share enough of a motivational set to fix the sense of the terms, which 
then allow discussions, however contestable, about whether a certain set of actions, 
practices, institutions or what have you count as oppressive. Rather, the analysis 
would be Williams’ analysis – that if someone does not share another’s motivational 
set there may well be no way for her to ever deliberate towards a motivational set 
which includes disapprobation of those purportedly oppressive actions, practice and 
institutions. And this latter formulation looks a lot like non-objectivism. Moral truths 
would become very much ways of conceiving the world from certain identities like so: 
‘it is true for … that oppression ought to be descriptive of …’ (where ‘…’ stands for 
any agent or group of agents you like, and any action, practice or institution you like, 
respectively). It is the emphasised ‘true for’ that I claim reveals the doorway to 
subjectivity inherent in Crary’s account, and does so in a way which threatens the 
good parts of her Wittgensteinian analysis.  
That Crary takes this view is made apparent in her analysis of the perspective one 
requires to see the truths made clear in the feminist literature. 
If we are to fully understand considerations for identifying a particular abuse 
that women are made to suffer, we need to survey matters from a perspective 
informed by an appreciation of the injustice of sexism (2009:176) 
and 
Appreciation of the insidiousness of particular forms of gender inequality is a 
necessary precondition of a full underst6anding of the [wrongs] at issue 
(2009:175) 
There is a clear way in which these are quite innocuous. One does require the ability 
to grasp the perspective in question for a full understanding. What is less clear, but 
implicit in the work of Crary, is that those who do not have the perspective may very 
well not have the means to grasp the perspective. Rather, the perspective is a pre-
requisite for the grasping. This is what worries me. At no point does Crary challenge 
this assumption. If I am correct in her intention I fear we have entered a relativity 
rabbit hole. If I am not then there is no problem to be had. For in order for one to be 
able to grasp the extension would be precisely a deliberative process that moves 
one from one perspective to another by way of any mode of reasoning which is 
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available. And in so doing reaches out to grapple with terms, concepts, ideas, 
principles and whatever other deliberative tools are available to both converter and 
converted in order to inform the imagination and awareness of the latter so as to 
open their eyes to the possibility that the more nuanced and credible perspective 
allows for. Minus this, there are simply two perspectives which differ and nothing by 
which to say that either is better. It is this impartiality to perspectives that Crary 
leaves out and in so doing allows in relativity and methodologically hinders the work 
of feminist theorists by fostering the belief that those who do not share their 
perspective cannot be so converted. Conversions are not guaranteed, but they must 
be theoretically possible via deliberation if we are to keep some vestige of objectivity 
by disallowing the subjectivity necessary to underpin the ontology of the moral into 
that very ontology itself.  
This correction regarding a distinction between abstraction requirements and 
impartiality requirements is one I believe accounts such as that of Wiggins and my 
own can offer to Crary. Frustratingly she does consider the idea of impartiality (2009: 
198 – 204) and very nearly agrees with my own position here, noting that she is for 
the idea of impartiality as long as the approach does not “…insist on conceiving 
impartiality in narrowly rational terms” (2009: 204) However, being generally for 
impartiality is one thing, having it inbuilt into the structure of moral discourse is quite 
another, and I believe that this is what the standard offers us the chance to do in 
explicitly wide conception terms. What cannot be overturned is a general standard of 
concerns which give morality its very sense and meaning, a standard of the 
‘unforsakeable’ in Wiggins’ terms and a standard which ‘is not to be reasonably 
rejected’ in Thomas’s. From hence, morality can take many forms down many 
different pathways of different lives inspired by different experiences and cultures. 
But this standard locks down the idea that if morality is to be anything, it better be the 
same thing, in at least some small way, wherever it appears.  
Moving on to Crary’s second startling claim, I believe another correction can rightly 
be made, or at least a reconceptualization of what I believe she is postulating is 
called for. The second startling claim mentioned above was that thoughts which were 
not judgments and which made no mention of ‘moral topics’ could be thought as 
being moral. This is grounded upon her claim, from her Wittgensteinian analysis, that 
all our concepts can be thought as practical because different concepts belong to 
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various language games and between different games, and different contexts within 
the same game, both the meaning of the term and the criteria for its suitability can 
change. These differences cannot be easily theoretically tracked and included within 
the definitions of the concepts, and so are best seen as underpinned by pragmatic 
features of our language acquisition which are grasped by a practical sensitivity once 
one is inculcated. As part of our interests and sensitivities are properly thought of as 
moral, and as interests cannot be semantically demarcated, this means that 
language is rightly thought of as a moral acquisition. 
My complaint with this claim is that it places too much emphasis on the moral. Crary 
does not merely claim that an agent utilises practical sensitivities and propensities in 
all areas of language and also in morality, but that we are ‘justified…in representing 
these same sensitivities and propensities as composing her moral outlook’ (2009: 2-
3) Whilst I agree with the former claim, that pragmatic features of language 
acquisition, in some broad conception, are necessary for one to grasp all areas of 
language – this is just the rejection of the Platonic semantic claim - I cannot agree 
that the very same propensities and sensitivities which ground understanding the 
point and purpose of, say, describing the formation of electrons and protons around 
an atom, are the same sorts of sensitivities and propensities which allow one to 
delineate courageous and foolhardy actions on a battlefield. Getting the former right 
and the latter right require distinct sorts of analysis and distinct sorts of interests and 
this must be the case if we are to distinguish between moral concepts and other 
sorts of concepts. But Crary explicitly rules out she is looking at moral judgments 
(such as which concept applies to which action) and instead says that thoughts that 
are distinctly non-moral in conceptual terms can be thought of as moral. The 
question becomes what she means by this.  
One interpretation would be that all practical discernments are moral; that the moral 
and the practical are indiscernible from each other. This position has some merit but 
I am not sure that it survives reflection. A set of psychopaths who had no shared 
feelings of interest which could be traced back to benevolence may be very different 
to us, but we could surely still see that they had practical reasoning. They would 
have ends and means of attaining those ends, and upon knowing those ends we 
could rightly say they had reasoned better or worse than others. Morality, 
contrariwise, includes the invocation of certain ends which act as bonds between 
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each other and prohibit certain behaviours. If I am dehydrated and in the desert and I 
see water, discerning the quickest route to that water does not seem to have any 
moral inflection to, as I am benefitting an unconsidered desire and no one else is 
affected.  
However, in most cases I am not so isolated and in variant ways my actions will 
interact with things that, upon reflection, I can see as having a moral dimension. If 
this is the point that Crary is making - that once we have ideas of benevolence thrust 
into our set of rational concerns, then even decisions which themselves contain no 
specific reference to moral concepts can still be reflectively or from a third-personal 
perspective morally judged – then I have only no quibble with her claim. Morality is 
not just about what we do, but also how we go about doing it. Helping is selfless, but 
helping begrudgingly or with constant reference to how helpful one is can be classed 
as self-aggrandising and prideful. 
Backing up this second conception are Crary’s various examples of literature. 
Regarding Austen’s marvellous Pride and Prejudice, Crary gives examples of 
various characters with various character traits, showing how their everyday and 
seemingly non-moral actions and preoccupations which include, “Mrs Bennett’s 
culinary arrangements, the prospects of her daughters marrying, Mr. Collins’ social 
habit, etc.” can “bring us to a good understanding of these things by getting us to 
reflect on them in a manner informed by the shift in our modes of 
responsiveness...the shift that…is internal to an appreciation of what pride is 
like…and further, that this shift in the novel’s central moral teaching” (2009: 143) 
Pace Crary, however, the shift does not indicate there is such a thing as a stretch of 
moral thought which pays no homage to moral topics and includes no moral 
concepts or judgments. Rather it pays direct homage to what must be seen as a pre-
existing idea of pride and its various extensions. It may add to these extensions, or 
alter one’s perceptions of them, but the ‘mode of responsiveness’ which allows for 
this analysis is precisely a moral stretch of thought that has us bring pride under the 
microscope. We are expanding or specifying how and when we ought to judge within 
the mode of responsiveness – as such, the mode is presupposed by that very 
expansion or specification. Not all moral judgments really focus on concepts 
themselves. Rather, in judging, we bring moral concepts to bear on otherwise non-
morally conceived items. It is every day actions which are thing under analysis, but 
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the analysis is dependent upon a shared mode of representation which includes that 
one has concepts, such as pride, at their disposal. Rushing into battle with a sword 
in your hand is just a description, if you like, of a non-moral action. Sure, it is 
possible that one might think, ‘this is my chance to be courageous’. But one might 
simply think, ‘this is the best way out of this mess’, or ‘this is my order’, or ‘that hill 
needs to be captured’, or what have you. Crary has not given us access to moral 
thoughts which are beyond moral judgment. She is describing that which is common 
to almost all Wittgensteinian commentators regarding what moral judgment consists 
of – namely, that perception involves the exercise of concepts, and that seeing moral 
concepts in the world requires being imbedded within a shared moral outlook.   
This is moral judgment. We can cast it upon almost any situation we come across. 
We look back at our actions and wince at our cowardice or brashness and feel pride 
at our courage our humility. We sometimes first-personally try to decide what the 
best action would be in a way which takes into account what it really means to be a 
good person here, what would be the most courageous route. But we often just act 
and assess why we acted later on. Reasoning so often comes post-action and our 
motivating reasons are often disguised to us until we do act and reflect. This is a 
psychological fact of people. But I cannot buy into the idea that the analysis of a man 
who runs from danger and thinks ‘that’s the safest route’ or to go back to Austen, Mr 
Collins’ overtly practicality-focussed marriage proposal to Elizabeth Bennett, should 
themselves be seen as moral stretches of thought. They are practical stretches of 
thought which – like almost all practical thoughts and actions - can be assessed 
morally. The thoughts or utterances in question exhibit the moral character of the 
actor that can be assessed as moral, but I can’t say they are themselves moral, they 
are merely indicative of a way of being. I use ‘way of being’, and not ‘moral outlook’, 
because the second would assume that the way that one treats people is the way in 
which one believes that they ought to treat someone. And these are so often distinct. 
Akrasia, anxiety, self-destructive tendencies, sickness, intoxication and numerous 
other issues can intervene between a person’s instinct and their reflective 
considerations of what we owe to each other. And it is the second which, I claim, are 
moral stretches of thought. Moral thought is the bringing to bear of moral concepts 
upon a situation, either prior, during or after it. It is not the characters doing everyday 
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tasks which have moral thoughts in Pride & Prejudice; rather, it is the characters 
judging them - either third personally or reflectively - and the reader.  
I started the section by claiming that two ideas would help us to deflect the worry 
about the indisputable fact that we disagree with each other all the time about 
specific moral judgments. The first was the Wittgensteinian point that for there to be 
disagreement there must be some agreement. The second was the understanding of 
the structure of moral thought between the deontic and the permissible. I think what 
Crary gives us with her analysis of practical reasons being viewed as open to moral 
assessment – the reminder, as it were, that morality is not merely about knowing 
what to do but the manner in which we ought to go about doing it - is a fantastic 
rendering of how we ought to conceive the permissible and the sorts of cues, 
examples, deliberation and reflection we use to conceive this moral domain. I have 
quibbled, rather than disagreed, with the manner in which she describes her 
account. But her main achievement is showing that for people who share a 
background moral literature can act as a guide to nuanced moral philosophy which 
distinguishes by ways of examples seen through full narratives the ways in which 
lives can be lead. This is the perfect expansion upon the clumsy thought 
experiments of the generalist, trying to get us to ascertain which principle to go by. In 
good literature, as in real lives, we have all the context we need to truly ascertain 
what the best courses of actions are.  
My main gripe with Crary has been over a conception of concepts being held 
hostage to certain interests which themselves seemed worryingly out of reach of 
deliberation. The idea that the cold hearted may see no wrong in the actions of Mr 
Darcy when he is first introduced, while those of us with a better grasp of the 
sensitivities which underscore a ‘better’ grasp of moral evaluation find ourselves 
perplexed and infuriated by his overlooking what he could share with Elizabeth. 
When Darcy learns this, it is presumably because he has within his motivational set 
the ability to see what is truly good; he sheds the set of concerns of status and 
privilege which then gives him direct access to what is truly important. The important 
point that Crary does not rule out, but which I believe she should explicitly rule in, is 
that the capacity which Mr Darcy clearly had to see these truths, despite his inability 
to recognise it at a certain time, marks the same distinction that should be the 
analysis of the psychological states of most people who seem to have a blind spot in 
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moral perception in some area. The capacity is constitutive of a set of interests which 
allow us to understand morality at all. This is an optimistic outlook but I believe the 
correct one. Those with whom we disagree, and ourselves when we are blinded to 
moral truths, may be unable to see some specific moral truth here and now, but in 
many cases we have the capacity to see them if we were to deliberate correctly – 
and, crucially, that this deliberation may be a matter of showing and not telling - such 
that only upon moral reflection could we have access to a conceptual repertoire so 
as to say discursively what it was that we were previously missing in our analysis of 
the situation. The shared perspectives give us the capacity (not the innate ability) for 
making correct moral descriptions but it does not guarantee them. Rather, there are 
then various ways of perceiving how these and other concerns are rightly ordered. 
But someone who does not share our quite particular perspective of a particular 
situation in this manner still shares the capacity to be able to be brought to do so. 
Again, most of the work here is being done in the permissible; someone (an outsider) 
who shared almost none of our more firmly held deontic ideals might not be able to 
be brought to do so. But this only proves that they, like the psychopaths from earlier, 
do not have the capacity. Like a colour-blind person, they simply lack the eyes to see 
the domain at all.         
If concept and interest are necessarily tied together then there is little hope of the 
cold-hearted moving past their original position. McDowell takes a similar position it 
seems. This in turn only adds to the idea of quietist retreat. There is nothing left to be 
said of those who grasp a set of concepts other than that their interests were so 
aligned as to be able to grasp them. For McDowell moral education ‘good upbringing’ 
and assort of conversion are the best chances one has of going from not getting 
morality to getting it. This, I believe, is a mistake and places far too much emphasis 
on the motivational set one starts with. This a very broad idea of internal realism 
which seems shared by Crary. Those who grasp the insidiousness of sexism have 
access to conclusions regarding the wrongs of various practices (which those who 
do not share that perspective simply do not).  The idea of a standard moves us 
beyond this. When we are saying with Wittgenstein ‘this is just what we do’ we have 
to make clear just who is included within this we. Is it us locally, here and now, or is it 
all people who could be seen as open to these reasons? Surely the former forces us 
to collide head on with an intuitive notion of objectivity? I believe that the latter is the 
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grounding for a defensible realism. It is a much larger project with more to explain 
than the internalism which invites quietism. It also satisfies more of our intuitions 
about what objectivity might insist of us, however.  
It is also a question which moves beyond the scope of this thesis. As a quick 
reminder, this thesis is looking to understand the form good ethical discussion should 
take, and see how this can be implemented into the medical ethicist literature. 
Defending against the twin pillars of generalist theories which abstract too much from 
our everyday moral lives, and non-cognitivist iterations, which makes us lose faith in 
the objectivity of the concepts we use, is the aim of the thesis. Evading the former 
required we allow there to be moral knowledge which is neither principled nor 
commensurate. From this we put so much weight on the utilisation of thick concepts. 
The latter requires that these thick concepts are not best analysed as a matter of 
description plus a non-cognitivist, appetitive extra. Whether the argument for 
objectivism can be made out without an appeal to quietism at some point shouldn’t 
affect the character of moral discourse which I am suggesting would give a more apt 
rendering of medical ethical discourse than we usually see today.  
I will now turn back to thick concepts and look at some of the more recent literature 
which has arisen from the McDowellian analysis of inseparability we countenanced 
earlier on. This will encompass various attempts to show that the non-reductive 
analysis of moral concepts fails, and to try to both rebuff these attempts and utilise 
them to indicate how we should best conceive of moral reasoning and moral 
concepts.                 
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Section 6:  A Return to Thick Concepts: 
 
The vast majority of what I have wanted to make out as a positive case for the 
metaphysical concerns about morality has been said. However, as we started this 
Wittgensteinian analysis with thick concepts and their important position in 
understanding morality, it makes sense to return to them for two reasons. Firstly, the 
McDowellian explanation of thick concepts I proffered ought to be able to be 
bolstered by what we have discussed since then. Secondly, the disentangling 
argument has returned as a focal point of discussion in the past decade. There are 
new challenges we have to meet before we can feel confident that we can move 
towards Medical Ethics with a non-reductive rendering of morality and see what sorts 
of corrections we can make there. The newer challenges will also be supplemented 
by older ones. I previously utilised the argument as an entry point into a conception 
of Wittgensteinian inspired cognitivism. Now we will see if it can rise to the challenge. 
The first thing that should be said is that the disentangling argument is the strongest 
attack that the cognitivist has against the non-cognitivist. The non-cognitivist who 
wishes to separate the two components (of description and evaluation) can look for 
times at which we do seem to utilise only the descriptive component as a way to 
challenge the account. But as cognitivists it is not enough to point to examples of 
when the two components seem to work together, as this too can be given the non-
cognitivist rendering of each component working independently. Much of what will 
come then will be reactive. There are some positive points to be made however. A 
further methodological point is whether such discussions give us the resources to 
determine the debate. After what will be said here I am highly sceptical of this. We 
have two different conceptions of the terrain, which are born of a disagreement about 
the direction of analysis, which in turn is born of different conceptions of objectivity 
and meaning. My own diagnosis is that this is a reflection of the fact that we have 
two modes of investigation with anything at all: first and third personal. The former 
represents normative reasons, and the latter represents explanatory reasons. Each 
has a claim to prioricity in various ways. I do not need to settle this debate however, I 
simply need to defend the idea that a non-reductive morality is the least distorting 
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way to represent morality and show it can sustain any immediate threats from 
subjectivists. 
It is important to state what will achieve this, before we move onto defending the 
position. It seems to me that McDowell’s disentangling argument is sometimes 
conceived as making much stronger claims than it actually is. What it does not claim 
is that an outsider can never grasp some thick concepts with ease. This is actually 
just assumed in the fact that thick concepts are world guided due to their specificity. 
It is the ‘world guidedness’ that makes them so interesting. From this it should be 
clear that there are indeed descriptive extensions to these terms which an outsider 
could grasp in many cases. What is claimed is that mastery of a thick concept would 
be impossible for an outsider without them sharing some of our evaluative interests; 
that some terms and how they are used in some specific instances (yet to be 
specified) would evade explanation, except for someone who has been inculcated in 
the right way. 
Secondly, I am defending my own account and not McDowell’s, despite agreement 
with his argument. Mastery of a concept is less tough to grasp from my point of view. 
It does not imply the Phronimos for instance. There is no perfect agent for whom all 
other reasons are silenced when thick concepts are present. While the lower 
demand on mastery may seem to be an advantage for the non-cognitivist, it will turn 
out that a more realistic view on morality and the defeasibility of the reasons therein 
are an important methodological point for denying their attacks.  
Thirdly, and most importantly, we must really decide what we have in mind when we 
say ‘thick concept’. As noted by Dancy, there is a tendency to demarcate them as 
two components stuck together in such a way that they cannot be prised apart. I 
would say that this is an unfair advantage for the non-cognitivist.; although I think in 
some cases this is a fair assessment. In certain cases it seems to me that the 
descriptive element is so intertwined with the evaluative interests caught up in a form 
of life that it cannot easily be separated out, and may in fact provide the very 
differences between those cultures. Such norms would sit as an arbiter, in the 
deontic position of eliciting necessity from those within the society. I have in mind 
such concepts as honour in an honour culture such as Japan pre-twentieth century, 
work ethic in protestant nations and (if one can take an outside perspective for a 
168 
 
moment on our own culture) personal freedom and autonomy in most modern day 
Western cultures. It is important to remember this does not rule out the idea that if 
we saw one of these cultures as flawed for holding these norms in such high regard 
that there would not be the conceptual resources available to allow them to 
deliberate to the conclusion it was indeed impeding their overall moral growth. 
The above also invites a second rendering which Matti Eklund (2011) has also made 
– that the idea of a unified account of thick concepts may be no more than a 
Chimera. This would stop the simple sort of three-level metaphysical analysis of the 
non-evaluative, the thick and the thin. The thick as we see it now would be an 
umbrella term for various concepts which could be variously analysed. There are 
further reasons for thinking this three part analysis is simply a mistake, and it will act 
as my first positive attack on the non-cognitivist rendering as a whole. 
Much of the thesis has attacked what might be thought as the descriptive side of the 
non-cognitivist ideal. We have seen various arguments about why it dangerous to 
characterise the non-evaluative in such a way as to make in non-perspectival, such 
that it follows the format ‘P because P’ because of how the world is and not because 
of how we are in some way - as though the ‘because’ does not hide an amalgam of 
pragmatically driven normative assumptions and so on. But the other side of the non-
cognitivist description of thick concepts also needs to be addressed. As Harcourt and 
Thomas (2013) have pointed out, if thick concepts exist at all, then their two 
components ought to be separated into two distinct concepts. But this precisely what 
the non-cognitivist says isn’t the case. The descriptive side can be, but the 
evaluative side is merely a psychological addition on the part of the agent. Rather, 
there is a weird shared tendency for us to attribute similar attitudes towards some 
descriptive concepts. When we consider what we have said in the thesis so far, this 
really shows the gap in the analysis of these concepts between the two parties.  
When we discussed the work of Judith Jarvis Thomson (1997) 3.4.2, the conclusion 
was that she made the externalist’s mistake of trying to make morality align with 
facts by claiming that the interests which were served by our having a certain 
morality could directly be brought to bear on the evaluation of the concepts which 
arose from those interests. The correction about motivation that we have made is 
recognising the importance of those interests, while simultaneously barring their 
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involvement from meddling within the morality that emerges from them. Rather, they 
are the basis for the presupposed subjectivity in our account. They are a necessary 
pillar for an independent explanatory basis for morality to emerge. The good point of 
Thomson’s was her analysis of the word good, where everything was seen as good 
in a particular way. There was then, no such property as just ‘the good’. This move 
can be utilised to close the door on Moorean analyses of goodness. But it brings with 
a secondary point crucial for any cognitivist rendering of thick concepts. They are not 
merely descriptions plus thin concepts. Rather, they tell us the way in which they are 
good by the position they hold in our moral lives. We needn’t ask why courage is 
good as though the goodness could be seen as an independent property, the 
conditions of which courage needs to satisfy. Being courageous just is one way of 
being good.  
This has implications for the demarcation point of the thick and thin. On Thomson’s 
account, thin judgments are world guided as well, it is just that it has been left 
unspecified by the speaker the way in which this is good (for making cheese cakes, 
for my psychological welfare or whatever). This means, however, that the thick/thin 
distinction is not so much a distinction as it is a spectrum of abstraction and 
specificity regarding how much world-guidedness is present within the descriptions 
given. This is at one with argument that Scheffler (1987) makes in his review of 
William’s work. I wish to make two points about this. 
The first is to do with an analysis that most non-cognitivists take up in the centrist 
debate (Hurley: 1989) namely, ‘thin-centrism’. This gives analytical prioricity to the 
category of the good and bad, which are then meant to be fleshed out with thick 
concepts which are relevant to the specific concerns we have. But again, if Scheffler 
and Thomson are right, thin centrism is in serious trouble. There is no good and bad 
without there also being something for the good and bad to attach to. This underpins 
a strong idea that there can conceptually be no such thing as a category without 
concepts that fall under it and no such thing as concepts which cannot be placed into 
a category (which provides them with meaning). If neither demands prioricity then it 
follows the two can be thought of as interdependent.  
The second point is much simpler. The spectrum implies thicker and thinner 
properties. Thicker properties, that is, the more specific properties that we have, will 
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be far more likely to take into account the more specific features of our form of life 
and may be the very thing which causes disagreements regarding ourselves with 
other cultures. Genealogical explanations of interest and concept often reveal that 
the most dramatic sorts of moral disagreements that we have with other cultures are 
born of traditions within the two cultures which do not mesh and which infect the 
moral standard with ideas that can be separated from it. Beliefs in certain sorts of 
deities and the sorts of narratives which get told within religions and the sorts of 
values that the religions highlights can be a prime example of this. If one sheds the 
religious beliefs (a decision that can be made on grounds quite separate from the 
moral sphere) one can shed the sorts of ideals which the religion inputs into the 
moral terrain. This aligns with the idea of an impartial standard quite nicely. What 
makes the standard impartial is that it brings to bear as little other concerns as 
possible. The concepts that we find again and again (despite the variance of how 
they are expressed) will be the ones which pay real heed to central human interests, 
rather than the interests of people entrenched in highly specific institutions which can 
interact with moral concerns in odd ways. 
 
6.1: Variability of Valence in Thick Concepts 
With all that said about the various ways to conceive the terrain, let us move now to 
some attacks upon the non-reductive cognitivist position. The two most common are 
those which threaten the disentangling argument by way of example. As Väyrynen 
(2011) rightly points out, one needn’t be a non-cognitivist to be a ‘separabilist’ but in 
most cases the trend holds. I will only address separabilists who are arguing against 
the cognitivism I have developed. Further, whatever the reasons for separabilism, it 
is not something that I can accept. I am committed to the thesis that - as far as 
concepts can be thought of as providing any semantic meaning when extracted from 
a wider form of life - the meaning of thick moral concepts provide us with a reason 
for action. This formulation seems to imply that thick moral concepts have an 
invariant direction. If I assess, correctly, that the concept barbaric applies here, then I 
am given, by my lights, a (defeasible) reason to in some way or another disarm or 
lessen that barbarism. This chimes with what Blackburn has made the case for 
(Blackburn:1992), namely, that if we both claim to see barbarism, but you see 
171 
 
nothing which gives you reason to act, then if we are not to be talking past each 
other in our use of this concept, the reason giving aspect of the concept cannot be 
doing the work. This is the non-cognitivist case. We can isolate the very content of 
barbaric minus the evaluative aspect which inspires the reason giving aspect. The 
cognitivist must show then how the concepts can both be evaluative in their very 
meaning and that despite this it is possible that recognition of the same concept 
seems to allow for different evaluations between cases (or agents).  
And indeed, there are examples aplenty of times when a thick concept seems rightly 
to apply, but in which either it is seen as giving us no reason at all, or even the 
opposite reason – that what we think of as the usual attitude changes valence, and 
negative thick concepts like barbaric seem to inspire a positive attitude towards 
them, or usually positive thick concepts seem to inspire a negative attitude. This 
seems to imply that in each instance, we can extract the world guided properties as 
supplying the meaning minus the attitude. So barbaric would stand for some 
descriptive property, say, ‘overt and unnecessary display of violence’. Where this is 
found in the world, one could apply the concept barbaric, and yet whether this would 
be good or bad would be open to evaluation post-recognition. Thus, barbaric does 
not imply ‘bad in a way’; it merely implies the presence of a property which is open 
for a non-cognitivist element to interact with it. Let us put this on record as a 
counterexample to inseparability: 
(1) it was barbaric what he did – and all the better for it 
This, however, seems to jar with our sensibilities in such a way as to require an 
explanation or context which would allow for this to be the case. Non-cognitivists 
would likely be accepting of this fact. Their claim is that between contexts the 
evaluative valence of the concept can change whilst still keeping its meaning. So, 
keeping in line with this: 
(2)  The boxing today was better than last week. Last week it just wasn’t 
barbaric. 
Now we have a context which seems to provide the exact sort of counterexamples a 
non-cognitivist would lay out. We have a thick moral concept which has seemingly 
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changed valence from how it is usually used. Barbarism then seems to be a concept 
that can shed its evaluation and keep the same meaning.  
Or can it? In (2) is the word barbaric picking out the same conceptual extensions as 
it does in its usual moral contexts? More specifically, does the use of barbaric in (2) 
indicate anything like a moral judgment? If it does not, does it pick out a moral 
concept at all or something (in this example) closer to an aesthetic concept? And if it 
is the second, can it really be said – given that each use is constitutive of separate 
domain of conceptual assessment - that the two uses of the term barbaric pick out 
one and the same concept? 
What is at play here, I posit, is a distinction between a term and concept. This is 
something we must be wary of because of the complex ways in which we can and do 
use words. As a (less) ethical example, let’s use a non-moral term: miraculous. I am 
an atheist and do not believe in any way in divine intervention. However, I make use 
of the word miracle. I use it to denote that something highly unlikely has happened 
which makes me happy, and in such a way that if I did not know better, it could be 
thought some deity or guardian angel was ‘looking out’ for me. This shares much of 
what is meant by the term when it is said by someone who is religious and truly 
believes that when, for example, they overcome a serious health complication that 
they were statistically expected to succumb to, that they were indeed being watched 
over by a deity who really did care about their livelihood and existence. Given the 
additional supernatural element, are my religious friend and I using the same 
concept? I would say we are clearly not. We literally mean various different things by 
using the same term. We may not hear it in each other’s talk. Perhaps when I tell the 
religious person I was subject to a miracle, they utter something like ‘hallelujah’ – 
taking me to mean precisely what they mean when they use the term. But our uses 
are not co-extensional. They pick out different items in the explanatory terrain. They 
indicate different terms for correct application, different sorts of assessment and 
different connections to other concepts and would give rise to different conclusions 
(such as their affirmation of that deity and their own blessedness). For example, their 
miracle and my miracle have distinct relations to ‘lucky’. My use is essentially co-
extensive with ‘lucky’, whereas they would have to decide whether they were subject 
to a miracle or ‘merely lucky’. As a final point, it is clear that my use of the term is not 
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incorrect as such, but parasitical on their use. Miracle couldn’t be used as a 
hyperbole of lucky if it weren’t for people who do or did believe in the fuller concept.  
I think this problem is underrepresented in the literature. And because of that, once 
we see it, we see how redundant so many of the supposed examples of valence 
change in the use of terms actually are. 
Another example is nicely adapted by Väyrynen (2011: 8) from an example given by 
from Blackburn (1992: 296)  
(3) The carnival was a lot of fun. But something was missing. It just wasn’t 
lewd. I hope it’ll be lewd next year 
This example falls to the very same explanation as (2). Lewd (if we are to allow it as 
an active thick concept) is supposed to act as an aesthetic complaint about the 
carnival and not as a moral assessment of it. One could of course use lewdness as a 
reason to not go to carnivals at all. But at least one part of the very essence of 
(many) carnivals is that they normatively offer a space in which one feels licenced to 
act in unconventional ways without suffering from moral judgment. Boxing matches 
do the very same for brutality. Strip away the moral aspect of the concept and one is 
no longer discussing the same conceptual terrain. I am not claiming that I want to be 
let off with being immoral in this instance. Rather, I wish to be titillated and believe 
that in this context that titillation is not of moral interest at all. My challenge to 
someone who made a moral argument against boxing for being too brutal would 
neither deny their use of the term, nor claim that boxing was morally better for it. The 
moral argument would likely be on the basis of the participants’ personal autonomy. 
The brutality present in boxing, I would claim, is a non-moral description of the 
events due to the context in which it is set.   
 
6.1.1: The Concept/Term Distinction and Dancy 
Sticking with the Scheffler and Thomson conception of the thick/thin ‘distinction’ 
then, ‘morally bad’ is a less specific way of saying (morally) brutal (and possibly 
(morally) lewd - but we will come to this later). If one worked from brutal towards 
goodness in the opposite direction, however, one would not arrive at ‘morally good’. 
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The ‘goodness’ here would be characterised as entertaining, therapeutic, aesthetic 
or what have you. This, it seems puts me at odds with what has been a hallmark of 
particularists in overcoming the valence issue in the past couple of decades. One 
form of particularism - but neither my own, nor I believe that of Wiggins or McDowell 
- is the one that has been advanced and defended by Jonathan Dancy (e.g. 2004). 
From the shapelessness criteria of the evaluative, which states that evaluative 
concepts can’t be given a non-evaluative shape, Dancy gleans the thesis known as 
the ‘holism in the theory of reasons’ (ibid: 7). This thesis states that a ‘feature which 
is a reason in one case, can be no reason at all, or even an opposite reason in 
another’. I want to explore how his idea about the holism of reasons works in terms 
of thick moral concepts.   
Dancy clearly thinks that thick moral concepts are reasons. They can be used to 
describe events or agents, but even in that description they are supposed to supply 
us with a reason for celebrating or condemning an action. They are more clearly 
reasons when they are given in a first-personal explanation for action: “I did it 
because it was fair”. Following his holistic thesis about things which are reasons, 
Dancy says that thick concepts, like features, will be able to work as reasons for, 
against, or not be reasons at all dependent upon the context. The changing of 
polarity is rare in thick concepts, says Dancy. In most cases they are invariant, but 
there is still room for variance. ‘Sometimes lewdness is just what is called for’ 
(2004:122). So his holism does stretch to thick concepts, even if in many cases there 
is ‘interesting invariance’ in thicker concepts. I believe that this possibility of 
invariance, if it is not only held in our thickest of concepts (‘dishonesty’) is dangerous 
in that it threatens the intelligibility which generality secures. 
I do think we can diagnose and remedy the flaw here, which is most evident in his 
account of conceiving non-evaluative features as reasons (i.e. ‘he kicked him’ or 
‘breaking a promise’). The flaw is that there is a distinction between ‘is a reason’ and 
‘can be cited as a reason’. Almost anything can be cited as a reason in a case where 
enough is known about the situation, such that one’s interlocutor needs no more 
information as to ascertain the full reason. In Ethics Without Principles (2004), Dancy 
comes up with a complex explanatory structure which is meant to mirror cases of 
deliberation such that things that would usually be counted as reasons against 
(‘kicking someone’) come out as reasons for – or not reasons at all. Usually 
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speaking, kicking people would be cited as a reason to hold someone to account, in 
some cases it could be cited as a reason for praise (the person who got kicked was 
about to do something truly heinous and the kick stopped that) and sometimes it is 
no reason for judgment at all (in an arranged kickboxing match between consenting 
adults kicking one’s opponent is just expected so is neither morally good nor bad). 
My claim is that it is the uncited part of the reason – the same background which 
allows the description, ‘he kicked him’ to act as enough explanatory information for a 
well-placed interlocutor - that is acting as the actual reason. As ex hypothesi there is 
not enough generality at the non-evaluative level for someone definitively to grasp 
the evaluative meaning behind the cited description, there must be, if moral reasons 
are to be communally explanatory, generality instead at the evaluative level. If there 
is not we are seriously in danger of losing grasp of the explanatory force of reasons. 
At some point there must be some shared sense of judgment which allows 
explanations to be intelligible to others, otherwise there would be no stopping point 
for explanations. ‘He kicked him’ and ‘he did so in a cruel way’ could both elicit the 
question – yes, but was the act morally bad? Only a verdictive judgment would 
therefore stop the chain of explanation, and at that point the chain seems to be a first 
personal interpretation, from non-evaluative feature to thick concept, and from thick 
concept to thin judgment. This only further opens the door to non-cognitivist 
interpretations.  
I agree completely with Dancy that we cannot have principles at the descriptive level 
of features. Shapelessness is part of my argument as well. The issue I have with 
Dancy is that his account threatens any generality at all, even between the 
application of thick moral concepts and verdictive judgments. Interesting invariance 
is not the same as something’s acting as a definitive reason without need for further 
interpretation. This leads to the problematic position that (variant) thick moral 
concepts are simultaneously evaluative (the position needed for non-reductive 
cognitivism) and yet can act as reasons for, against or be no reason at all when they 
are present (the argument needed for holism in the theory of reasons to apply to 
thick concepts). Dancy seems to be committed to an awkward situation of saying 
that thick moral concepts are evaluative alright, but the direction of evaluation, of 
how they act as reasons, is left undetermined. On this account someone could say 
that an act ought to be described as morally cruel and it could still be left open as to 
176 
 
whether it was morally okay overall. This seems highly counterintuitive, however. To 
correct Dancy’s account so as to remedy the intelligibility issue I could initially pose 
that a thick moral concept – not merely a property which shares the name - that is a 
reason for in one case can never be a reason against in another. 
When we give a thick moral assessment we are explaining how we see the make-up 
of the ontology of the moral terrain before us as moving us to action (or assessment 
or belief or utterance or whatever) in the hope that someone else grasps our 
explanation (if we are justifying our actions). Once we have the eyes to pick out the 
terrain (think here of Putnam and ‘seeing’ elation) we have internalised a mode of 
analysis which moves us to action and which we assume the other person shares at 
some level. They may conceptualise certain cases differently, but never be 
completely lost to our intentions. This is what thick moral concepts are; they are both 
action guiding and explanatory to others. They explain to others why we acted the 
way we did when a moral justification is available. The terrain that we conceptualise, 
however, is made up not of concepts, but of properties, and many of those properties 
are apt to be captured by thick terms. But only in the act of conceptualising those 
properties in various ways to provide the world with meaning (say aesthetically, 
humorously or morally) do they take on the form of fully fledged concepts. And if they 
are moral concepts, I claim, they come armed with an inherent evaluation tied to 
them by way of the conceptual network we share. Again, if I say a boxing match was 
brutal and bad for it, it is left open as to whether I am making a moral judgment or an 
aesthetic one. To meaningfully respond to this, it seems to me, one would have to 
share not just the some definition which stands for the property ‘brutal’ in some 
minimised descriptive sense, but both the aesthetic and moral conceptualisations of 
the word brutal and some context regarding my views and the object I was 
evaluating.    
Due to this inherent evaluative nature, when a property which is apt to be picked out 
by a thick term is present and doesn’t move us to action this calls for an explanation. 
And this explanation will be one, by my lights, which makes use of at least one other 
thick moral concept which is either explicit or implicit in the context.  This thick 
property will be what explains the non-motivational quality of the other thick 
properties present. It will alter the way we conceptualise the terrain in a way that is 
explanatorily clear to others. For instance, take the phrase all children hate to hear:  
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(4) Sometimes you have to be cruel to be kind 
No-one who utters this phrase presumably thinks that their action ought to be morally 
judged as cruel, even though they are openly admitting that cruelty is - in some way - 
present within the action. In what way will demarcate the crucial distinction between 
my own account and Dancy’s. Think of an innocent case which would induce this 
phrase being uttered. Does the cruelty act as a reason against what the person 
utilising this principle is doing? No. In a way it acts for it – it acts as a means towards 
correcting bad behaviour. But doesn’t this tie in with exactly what Dancy would claim 
– that cruelty can be a moral reason for in some cases and a moral reason against in 
others? Or that sometimes cruelty is ‘just what is called for’? 
 I think not - or at least only superficially - because in both instances Dancy must be 
taking the term ‘cruelty’ to refer to the same thing: cruelty conceptualised as a moral 
reason giving concept. If he is not saying this, perhaps by taking cruelty as meaning 
something like ‘’purposefully causing people to suffer’ is sometimes exactly what is 
called for’, then he is taking thick concepts to merely denote descriptive definitional 
properties. Thick concepts then would become an idle intervening step for Dancy, as 
we already know that combinations of descriptive features can interact so as to come 
out as reasons for, against or not at all. But Dancy clearly thinks that thick judgments 
do make a difference other than a mere definitional categorisation. He says, “That an 
action is obscene makes a difference to how we should act (although not always the 
same difference) beyond any made by the features that make the action obscene” 
(2004: 17) Thus, as no descriptive features could necessitate my use of the word 
cruel on pain of breaking the shapelessness thesis, Dancy seems stuck with the 
thesis that the moral concepts like lewd and (unless he has an argument against my 
example) cruel can change valence. But this threatens the very generality that we 
need for moral explanations to remain intelligible.  
In my mind, cruelty is not acting as a reason giving property at all in the ‘cruel to be 
kind’ case. My contention is that the descriptive feature, say, ‘depriving a child of 
something they want to their immediate distress’ is a specification of that which can 
be captured under some abstracted non-evaluative rendering of cruelty wherever we 
might see it: ‘purposefully acting so as to cause suffering in others’. That is enough 
for us to recognise some minimal notion of cruelty, but what is happening here is that 
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we are merely seeing something which is a caricature of cruelty and labelling it as 
such. Kindness is giving us a reason, not-so-much to overlook the features that 
denote the cruelty, but to not to see them as amounting to a full version of cruelty.  
These features we label as cruel speak for the reason only in this way: they are a 
structural means to attaining a positive moral result. We applaud the attempt at 
moral kindness in this case, but we do not condemn the cruelty because it is not a 
moral feature. Cruelty here fails to motivate at all. This works from the basic intuition 
that one cannot say that the same action is morally cruel and morally kind, because 
this is just a more specific way of saying it was simultaneously morally good and 
morally bad. If cruelty as a property is to be given any meaning at all in this case, it is 
as a practical (but non-moral) one of a means to an end (that of kindness). But it is 
tempered by the kindness. How much ‘cruelty’ is acceptable in various cases is 
demarcated by the complex notion of the sort of kindness a parent aims for with 
these sorts of actions. This would count against any idea to the effect that the moral 
concept of cruelty can be either good or bad dependent on context. Cruelty thought 
of as a vague set of descriptive features – features which act as a the most minimal 
description there can be of a property of cruelty - can be put to various ends which 
can only be ascertained once we know the reasons (this is Dancy’s shapelessness 
point) whereas cruelty as an end in itself is necessarily morally bad as part of the 
moral conception of it. There will be no example that someone can bring forward 
which will ever show someone being morally cruel and morally good simultaneously. 
If one’s mind leaps to find examples the examples will carry within them a moral 
value which trumps that of cruelty.  
It makes sense to discuss the relation that is left between moral properties and moral 
concepts. My account obviously claims that even though the descriptive features 
which underpin moral concepts can be present in a situation those concepts might 
well not track the relevance of these features into our reasoning due to the way they 
are arranged in our conceptual network. For example, if my friend has a much better 
job than me and then we both apply for the same role which is better paid, and he 
gets the job, I would not call him selfish, however small the pay rise for him. His right 
to self-betterment outweighs the notion. Although in some descriptive sense it could 
be said he has taken away goods which were far less valuable to him than they were 
to me. In cases like this, the moral concept does not track the property even though 
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the property can be seen to be there. But the separation of property and concept 
isn’t meant to be a full divorce. How could it be? Moral properties do instantiate 
moral concerns still. It is just that they can be offset by various other moral concerns 
and values which may be explicit (cruelty and kindness) or implicit (brutality and the 
moral freedom to box). Only another moral property will be able to be used to explain 
why a moral property that is present didn’t bring one to act upon it as a morally 
relevant concern. Accordingly, the presence of only a single moral property will 
necessarily motivate morally for anyone with access to the conceptual network. 
 
6.1.2 – The Position Applied to Non-Cognitivism    
At first this may seem like it is quite the coup for the non-cognitivist. After all, we 
have just admitted that there is a clear regularity between utilising the right 
evaluative term and the descriptive core of the property which instantiates the use of 
that term. I would answer - yes, the term; but not the concept. Someone who simply 
knows that kindness looks like ‘helping others’, and that cruelty is ‘taking something 
away from someone which they value’, will not ever be able to know their way 
around the various ‘cruel to be kind’ scenarios and master the complexities of those 
situations. In fact, given the long term nature of the kindness they would likely expect 
that we label the act as cruel, as at the level of properties the ‘cruelty’ is immediately 
present, whereas the kindness is both delayed and expresses a collection of 
concerns about raising people well. Such outsiders might have access to the vague 
descriptive forms of the terms but they will not and cannot have a grasp on the 
reasons for each move, because they are denied access to the reason giving part; 
the conceptual network in which those properties become reasons for action. It is 
access to this conceptual terrain, of what links what property and the results of this - 
of which properties in tandem can better each other and which worsen each other - 
which does all the explaining. Add courage to any set of distasteful views you wish 
and you have a worse situation than one with merely distasteful views alone. Add 
generosity to weakness of will and the same goes. How could a person with no 
access to the conceptual network explain these sorts of conglomerations? To put it 
another way, at what point does meaning enter into the picture at all for the non-
cognitivist?  
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This is crucial, because they were supposed to be answering the question of how 
thick moral concepts hold their meaning or their semantic content. The non-
cognitivist claim was that all of the meaning was in the world-guided aspect of the 
concepts, and that the reason giving part could be extracted, leaving only the 
definition equating to the meaning. But this leaves it unclear as to how they would 
ever know how to judge an ethical concept when it was spotted. Most moral 
situations are not constituted by one singular thick property (although at least one is 
needed) but several, each of which stands in potential evaluative reassessment on 
the basis of the others which were available. Furthermore, we have just seen 
situations where properties which can be conceptualised morally are present, but do 
not form the basis of a moral judgement but rather a broadly evaluative one which is 
given its status by way of its context – say brutality in boxing (or in a less ethically 
loaded case, brutality in a documentary made to inform people of the actual brutality 
of some political regime). In either of these cases brutality being present can clearly 
be a good thing, as it achieves the aesthetic expectation of the viewer or adds to the 
factual informative qualities respectively. With only the definitions to work from, how 
could the sort of person the non-cognitivist imagines as gathering the meaning minus 
the reason giving aspect even tell whether this was a moral use of the term brutality 
or not? If it is the case that a particular term can be present within various conceptual 
schemes in various ways, how can the person who pays no heed to such schemes 
in their applications of the terms ever get it right? It seems like access to a 
conceptual network is required for anyone to understand what the terms really mean 
in the various contexts these networks demarcate.   
I believe that these questions issue in problems for the non-cognitivist, although I will 
admit that these ideas are programmatic at best. It will need to be seen just how this 
concept/term-property division can be utilised in other areas. It seems that this will 
be a structural principle that should be universal. However, it makes sense that it 
demarcates the difference between noticing a property is present in each case and 
being able to place it in a contextual network. This would denote the difference 
between pointing and naming properties (describing) and actually explaining things 
and reasoning with concepts. All that seems to be left in the non-cognitivist account 
is recognition plus approbation or disapprobation. This seems to miss the point that 
by separating the two components of thick terms one will be left floundering around 
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those who get the point of the practice which those concepts govern. There is no 
room for conceptual mastery here.  To paraphrase a wonderful example from Alice 
Crary, when can one say that someone has mastered the concept ‘dog’? In young 
children it may be when all the things that are dogs come under the concept, 
although she may also include things from outside the category, like wolves and 
foxes. In older children, it may be when only the things which are actual dogs fall 
under that concept. In adults, though, it may include an understanding of why the 
phrase ‘Tony Blair was George Bush’s lapdog’ is apt precisely because it pays 
reference to dogs.  
This pushes us back towards the idea that there are huge pragmatic features of our 
linguistic capabilities. But there seems little reason why would we have thought this 
wasn’t going to be the case. The idea of ‘pure’ semantics unaffected by any 
pragmatic considerations seems like a chimera too. Properties may be vaguely 
definitional, but concepts seem to come in networks with various normative 
interactions available between those concepts. If we are trying to abstract from 
pragmatics to look only at cases of meaning, I challenge anyone to go back to (1) 
and read this claim without feeling jarred. That jarring can stand as some 
phenomenological evidence of just how strange it is to think of moral concepts as 
being untethered by an evaluative direction. And in all the examples I can find, of 
where evaluative direction changes due to some pragmatic feature that is in play, in 
the most convincing ones it is usually because the term is no longer denoting 
anything like an ethical concept.  
This analysis of course means that moral properties and moral concepts come apart. 
What underscores the moral and the aesthetic concepts of brutality are the same 
property, even though these aren’t identical concepts. Non-cognitivists needn’t worry 
about this analysis. To use this analysis as a stick to beat non-cognitivists with would 
beg the question. After-all, I have claimed that the meaning of a term is dependent 
upon whether that term is conceptualised in this way or that, which is precisely what 
they deny in their first premise. The battle with the non-cognitivist is best won at the 
level of epistemology and how meaning arises at all in the world that they conceive. 
However, the variability in concept use attack has been stymied. We have shown 
that for the cognitivist, moral concepts need not be thought of as changing evaluative 
direction, even if the properties underpinning them can be variously conceptualised 
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within our language. Further, we have given ourselves more reason not to claim that 
moral concepts are evaluative but underdetermined. This defends against an 
intuitive weakness whilst simultaneously giving us a better grasp on how we come to 
share our moral explanations. It explains how reason giving works and how we can 
extrapolate from loosely cited reasons to strong moral explanations with ease. All the 
above is at one with the idea of the impartial moral standard as well. One has to 
have grasped the conceptual network that constitutes a morality to understand how 
to get around the moral terrain. If one has different ideas about the morality of boxing 
than me, that argument can be made, but the disagreement will be umpired by the 
basic background of the conceptual network that we share.  
One final point might be this. Our point in Section 5 was the idea that our coming to 
reach a shared standard of non-reductive moral concepts was the very thing which 
allowed us to conceptualise the properties relevant to those concerns as pertaining 
in the world. The idea that we can still recognise those properties even when they 
are not relevant to how we are conceiving a specific case hardly seems like a 
surprise then. The interest which fosters the recognition comes far back in the 
genealogical story, so the properties are there to see, even when they are not being 
tracked by our concepts as being relevant here and now. If this is so then this gives 
a better explanation of the non-cognitivist contention. Without the interest the 
property could not be perceived. These concerns would fail to be saliently grouped 
together. The interest secures the property, it is not added on later. Much like my use 
of miracle then, anyone picking out these properties without a claim to the interest is 
doing so parasitically and in a diminished way which cannot capture the full meaning 
the concepts provide to those who utilise them meaningfully within a first order 
morality.        
 
6.2: Objectionable Thick Concepts  
With this in place it is worth quickly looking at the second major threat which 
separabilists claim should trouble non-reductive cognitivists: objectionable concepts. 
We saw in (3) above the use of the word lewd in a description of a carnival. Now, 
lewd is a special concept, claim the separabilists, because it has a historically 
understandable evaluative direction which most people now object to. It is not that it 
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has changed its direction of evaluation, but rather, claim many people (we will call 
them objectors), evaluating people as morally bad (or good) on the basis of their 
sexual exploits is itself an illegitimate move. If lewd shares an extension with some 
phrase like ‘overt display of sexual behaviour’ then objectors believe that this is not 
apt for moral judgment. However, claim the separabilists, objectors can still use 
‘lewd’ just fine. So the attitude which non-objectors attach to lewd becomes irrelevant 
to its meaning. This is not an evaluative concept which can change valence, this is 
an evaluative concept that seems to no longer evaluate at all.  
Pekka Väyrynen talks about this at length. The assumption he makes and does not 
question throughout his work, which I think is key to the whole thing, is that these two 
sets of people, when they utter the word, are really aiming at the same sense; or to 
put it another way, are objectors using lewd parasitically? I think there is strong 
reason to believe that this is begging the question against the inseparabilist if he is a 
Wittgensteinian non-cognitivist. For it is part of the background theory that if one is 
parroting a word then one is not really saying it at all. It is empty in their mouth. Lewd 
stands between generations though, and while it is a rarity these days I can still 
easily think of places it would be apt. Anything which overtly sexualises children 
would be one, like some child pageants and so on. Notice here how the claim to 
lewdness would have built into the idea of ‘overt sexual behaviour’ something like the 
term ‘inappropriate’. This stops being an acceptable term to utilise for adults in the 
right settings because we believe that adults have the right to express themselves 
sexually however they so wish. Other words do not have many modern day settings 
at all however, and pretty much belong to distinct societies. Perhaps a more ‘other-
timely’ term - and one which is a further example of Väyrynen’s - would be ‘chaste’. 
In some vague sense we all know what chaste stands for: it refers to refraining from 
sexual activity in a positive way, and that that way has with it some connection to 
moral goodness as derived from holiness. It is a withholding in a way which, to use 
an outdated phrase, makes one closer to God. This concept will have been used in a 
variety of ways at a certain time (Victorian Britain in higher society one might have 
thought). We can still use the word today, certainly. But it seems to me to be open to 
argument as to whether we would be expressing the same concept as the people 
who uttered it back then, which is what Väyrynen claims we can do. Are we not 
thrust into the position of the anthropologist, much like the anthropologist who is 
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trying to grasp the word taboo? Like her, we could surely grasp the most obvious 
extensions of the concept, the ones which shared some clear similarity pattern, but 
would also, if we were thrust into the society for whom the word still had full 
extensional meaning in an active network of first order moral concepts, be left asking 
just why certain actions or behaviours were seen as chaste when others were not?  
It seems like saying that we can still use the word as though it was a full concept just 
with the attitude dropped follows the reasoning, ‘I have so far used the word without 
error, therefore I have grasped its meaning, and therefore I have mastery of the 
word’. If one does not have the resources to use the concept in all the ways that 
someone who has mastered it can, then one also does not have the resources to 
know this is the case, unless one were corrected by someone who does have 
mastery. But in that case, in a world - as the first premise of the separabilist 
argument goes – where everyone thinks the concept is objectionable, we have lost 
the last resource for telling us that we have either gone wrong (or right) in our 
application, or missed what would be considered to be an apt application. One can 
only conclude that it begs the question that those people who object to a term simply 
can grasp the sense the term was supposed to convey and are thus employing an 
empty term well.  
Still, Väyrynen thinks this is a serious issue for us. And the seriousness comes from 
the fact that when we reject a statement of sort: 
(5) Isolde is chaste 
We are not denying it in a usual way. We are not saying this claim is false, rather we 
are saying that this statement is ‘lacking a truth value’.  It ‘doesn’t refer’ in a special 
way. It is not wrong; it is an inapt mode of assessment in the first place, like most 
people believe about astrology. ‘Paul is a classic Pisces’ might be another example 
of the same sort of phenomena. This, Väyrynen maintains, is important because it 
shows that the rejection of (5) is not truth-conditional negation, but rather ‘meta-
linguistic’.  
This, he argues, is enough to show that the evaluation the thick term carries is not a 
part of its semantic content, but a pragmatic feature of how we use the word. But this 
argument makes a very specific divide between pragmatics and semantics; one 
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which asks too much of any theorists who sides with a Wittgensteinian view of 
language acquisition. Words would have atomistic meanings, lexical meanings, or 
semantic meanings, which could be gathered as being utterly independent of the 
ways (and contexts) in which the word is used by the people who inhabit a form of 
life. As Väyrynen puts it, in his discussion of variability, there is a distinction at work 
between ‘speaker meaning’ and ‘semantic meaning’. And everything that falls under 
speaker meaning is pragmatically explained and thus does not belong to the 
semantic content of the term. But Väyrynen also freely admits that no non-evaluative 
predicate that can be swapped in for chaste can be “…anything like extensionally 
equivalent to ‘chaste’ or sufficient for it to apply, or even that it captures the full non-
evaluative meaning of ‘chaste’” (2009:243).  
But now we are left wondering what actually does provide the semantic content. 
Where is left in ‘chaste’ for the sense of the term to reside? When people use it 
evaluatively they are using their own ‘speaker meaning’ and thus this should be 
explained pragmatically – but use a non-evaluative predicate to capture it and you’ve 
failed to say something extensionally equivalent with the relevant semantic 
sufficiency conditions. This reminds me of the game example. Game is not an 
evaluative concept, but it too cannot be grasped by any other non-evaluative 
predicate other than game. Its semantic conditions are partly carried by being 
inculcated into a conceptual network. One would be required to be embedded in a 
form of life where ‘game’ was applied in variant ways as a ‘cluster-concept’. But this 
explanation is begging for one to say, with Wittgenstein, that there must be 
agreement in judgments of application that invite a diagnosis of practical concerns 
on the part of the speaker; of the speaker developing certain propensities and 
sensitivities. The sensitivity is one of the necessary conditions for using game 
correctly. And this gives the lie to the fact that there is such a thing as the semantic 
meaning/speaker meaning and semantic/pragmatic divide conceptualised in the way 
which Väyrynen wishes, so as to say that some uses of a word are just semantically 
guided and others are guided by pragmatic concerns. The picture requires that there 
are pragmatic conditions underpinning the semantics of (at least some) descriptions 
in order for anyone to mean anything with those words. Now, one can ask, why is 
this not also true of evaluative judgments? The appeal to pragmatics is gone. What 
one is concerned about is that the pragmatic underpinnings of the proper semantics 
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of the concept might include understanding it as having an evaluative direction. The 
intuition seems to be that evaluative concepts are open to be assessed on a first 
personal basis and thus pay homage to the attitudinative make-up of the speaker. 
But this simply ignores the Wiggins and Thomas argument that subjectivity can be 
conceived as entering into the equation as a pre-supposed set of first-nature 
concerns; concerns that are necessary for one to grasp the semantic output of the 
terms generated, and which are one part of the sufficiency conditions for correct 
application of the concept in the moral domain.  
I conclude that moral cognitivism can weather the storm here, and might even 
provide a mode of analysis which shows not just where the confusion comes from – 
in mistaking terms for full blown concepts constitutive of a particular domain – but 
can also from this analysis come to better define itself by ruling out the extreme sort 
of holism one finds in Dancy and show simultaneously what was right about that 
analysis and what was wrong about it.                         
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Section 7: Application to Medical Ethics: 
 
In the previous sections I have spent much time in developing a way of considering 
ethical reasoning, which eschewed the idea of relying upon general principles in 
such a way as seeing them as foundational to serious ethical thought. In so doing, 
via a detour through some more broadly epistemological concerns, I also made out a 
case that ethical reasoning that did not couch itself in such generalist terms - relying 
instead upon discernment of concept application, which I tried to show was a 
practical art rather than a theoretical exercise – could still be seen as reasoning 
towards knowledge. By making the case that all types of knowledge relied heavily 
upon a practical mastery of normative constructs of a particular practice or form of 
life, of both the content and system based varieties, I allowed for a different form of 
moral reasoning which I labelled as Particularist.  
This particularist position made various claims, which were quite at odds with the 
generalist picture and seemed to undermine many of the assumptions about moral 
theorising which is utilised in the application of morality to practical domains, such as 
medicine. The theses that emerged as a by-product of overturning the generalist 
picture to the particularist one, whilst also defending that picture from non-
cognitivism, were manifold. Before we start to look at how the acceptance of this 
picture would change the face of medical ethics, it may be wise to collect these 
theses together as a point of reference for this section, the purpose of which is to 
discredit some of the major underlying assumptions that bleed over from that 
generalist picture into the actual field of medical ethics and best clinical practice.  
Firstly, we have the non-definability of ethical and value laden, or thick, concepts in 
language that is understandable from outside of morality, by way of being grounded 
in naturalist or rationalist terms.  
Secondly, we have the idea of rational moral disagreement. By this we meant that 
two people might disagree about what the best course of action is without either 
being able to say that the other’s assessment can be traced back to a move that 
undermines a rational reasoning process. Such a position was bolstered by the ideas 
of incommensurability, bedrock, and the idea of how potentially various and varied 
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normative commitments are necessary for discourse in the all areas of thinking, and 
how they might be applied and interpreted differently by various agents and in 
various contexts. What was crucial here was a pre-suppositional account of 
subjectivity, whereby the sense of moral terms was given by way of inculcation, so 
we might disagree about specific instances and still be singing, as it were, from the 
same hymn book.   
Thirdly, there is an important point about proximity. There is no description of a 
situation in complete terms that will allow for a full and proper assessment of the 
ethical parameters of that situation by someone who was not involved within it. The 
uncodifiability thesis, pointed to in the first of these listed theses, combined with idea 
that perception is a conceptual exercise, means that when describing a situation, 
neither evaluative nor descriptive language will allow for someone who is removed 
from the situation to garner a full understanding of it. Either, one aims for a value 
neutral description - something I would claim is impossible to achieve, as any minor 
detail can radically alter how one would evaluate the whole - or one aims for a 
description which includes evaluative language, which would of course colour the 
description in such a way as to disallow for an appropriate evaluation which differs 
from the description given. This point raises a serious issue in regards to the 
relationship between theory and practice. Discussing moral theories as though one 
could find the one that best represents moral reasoning as it ought to be seen, and 
then assume one can arm people with this theory and expect uniform answers in 
specific situations, underestimates the gap that lies between any such theory and 
practical application; a gap that is necessitated by the fact of interpretation (beyond 
‘measuring rod’ applications) and the overlapping and multi-faceted list of concerns 
available if we accept language as rising up holistically, rather than being handed 
down legislatively. Both what counts as the best conception of maximised happiness, 
or what counts as a law one would will everyone to live by, requires one to look 
inwards towards one’s own conscience, as it were – not just in terms of acceptance, 
but also in terms of application.  
Fourthly, we made an important point about motivations, which showed that shared 
emotional reactions were inextricably linked to all evaluations but garnered their 
force at the presupposed level of interest. Rather than being an extraneous factor 
which hindered rational choices, emotional reactions are necessary for genuine, 
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rational, moral evaluations. This point is in accordance with the second idea, above, 
regarding the non-definability of terms, such that one cannot predefine what 
rationality looks like (‘cold and calculating’) and then reject modes of thinking that 
stand outside this given definition. The flexibility of the category of rational thought 
cannot, without circular reasoning, be predefined by an assessment of those types of 
reasoning that we mostly, by consensus, agree to be rational, and then utilised 
against those which do not fit this form.  What counts as rational is not handed down 
legislatively, as though it has some platonic form. To believe it should is itself a 
normative position. Opposed to this, I have argued that what counts as rational 
should rise up through the practices themselves and be argued for, or against, on 
the normative basis that necessarily underpins their usage. 
Fifthly, following the work of Alice Crary, I think we can say that the idea of soundbite 
examples in moral philosophy, of thought experiments which contain minute 
amounts of information and are supposed to disclose to us intuitions we might be 
susceptible to from which are meant to draw very large and significant conclusions, 
are damaging to understanding morality. Crary’s quite wonderful analysis of how 
literature can impart to us a full understanding of ways to live, and how many variant 
types of behaviours can be classified under the extension of a single concept like 
pride show just how important full pictures of background and character are for a full 
and valid moral assessment. We may have disagreed that certain mundane actions 
were moral actions from a first personal perspective, but I do not disagree that from 
a third personal perspective or a reflective perspective we can find ourselves or 
someone else to be severely morally deficient without them having undertaken a 
classically moral task. In all the talk of what we must and must not do, it seems we 
can lose sight of the importance of how we go about doing the things we already do.  
Sixth, finally, and as of yet not fully mentioned, we have to recognise an idea that is 
starting to emerge from this analysis. What our non-reductive account of morality 
points towards is precisely what is needed for us to be able to morally improve. The 
discussions of ‘objectionable’ concepts, when combined with the idea that 
recognition of a thick property needn’t motivate us unless it our conceptual network 
of explanation places it in a reason giving position, can go to show this. Our 
explanation of why we no longer use chaste is that there was no place for it left in 
our conceptual network once we had come to realise that the traditions which gave it 
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credence were a useful mode of analysis. The shedding of those religious traditions 
was inspired by the enlightenment, and one consequence of this was the idea of 
personal autonomy and freedoms were free to take a strong deliberative position in 
our evaluative conceptual network. This is the importance of seeing morals as strong 
reasons, and not silencing ones. Chastity was once a virtue and would thus have 
silenced other reasons. But morality conceived as a self-appraising conceptual 
network with various inputs (interests, cultures, traditions, personal outlooks etc.) 
must be vigilant against becoming too fixed. An independent conceptual network, 
such as that we are conceiving morality as being, must have some strong internal 
consistency. Traditions, whether they be beliefs in gods, or accepted hierarchies or 
what have you do input certain values, and these values have their positives in that 
they give us a shared sense of meaning. But they are also open to criticism when it 
becomes clear that they clash with other fundamental values in an unsustainable 
manner.  In the same way, one cannot both chastise on the basis of someone’s 
being unchaste and maintain that what consenting adults do with their bodies should 
be underscored by the value of personal freedom without internal inconsistency. A 
more recent version of this might well be the ‘#MeToo’ movement, which (in a quite 
innocuous but simple example) have questioned such traditions as ‘grid girls’ in 
motor-racing competitions. If we are to claim that women are to be valued for who 
they are and not their aesthetic and sexual qualities for men can we seriously justify 
such traditions which give the opposite idea and may influence the self-perception of 
young women. Morality, then, conceived in this manner, is a self-correcting 
conceptual network. This explains the possibility of moral improvement and 
betterment in a way that is far more edifying than can be made out by some fixed set 
of principles, or by  a position that equates being moral with being utterly aligned with 
the most commonly held moral outlooks within  that society. And it is this that I 
believe can be most effective for Medical Ethics. Let us find out what values are at 
stake within the various traditions of medicine and see which values and which 
traditions are the ones which we simply cannot do without.      
It is with these five major points in mind that I now wish to turn towards the field of 
medical ethics. There are three major ideas I want to turn this against. The first is the 
general notion of expertise in ethical concerns. This follows fairly simply from what 
has gone before but I wish to clarify a few things and address a relatively new move 
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by the ethicist to match the more particularist outlook of expertise. As we will see, lip 
service is paid, but in her actions she wishes to hold the same position as before.  
I will then move on to the idea of definitional theories; promoted by theorists who still 
look for a generalist underpinning to their claims. I will consider one case of this, in 
the form of a dispute between John Harris and Anne MaClean. 
I will then address a newer form of discussion in the medical ethics literature, which 
includes not just that judgements be passed on particular actions or processes. 
These theories try to give a characterisation of what the practice of health care is all 
about. As we will see there, any characterisation will fall into the trap of being 
platitudinous, or otherwise make distinctions which rely on defining everyday terms 
in restrictive ways to promote a particular characterisation at the cost of a basic 
understanding of morality or medicine. This is something I believe to be another form 
of the touchstone methodology. I will critique it thus.  
In order to not deflate those who still wish to say something meaningful about clinical 
practice and ethics, I will then move on to what I see as an example for future 
discussions in the field.; a paper which makes serious moral points without giving too 
much away to explanatory moral theorising.  
 
7.1: On Expertise in Medical Ethics.  
One of the most obvious conclusions that follows from what I have so far said 
in the previous sections, is that there is no independently ratified moral standard that 
would allow for someone to say that they have more authority in making a specific 
moral decision than anyone else, assuming that all the natural facts were known 
about the case by both parties in a dispute about what to do. Given the paucity of 
generalist theories in capturing relevant features in such a way as to determine how 
one should go on, the seeming necessity of virtue terms in helping guide our way 
through the moral terrain, and the uncodifiability thesis, there simply seems to be no 
way that we account for our making judgements about what is morally required of us 
by way of defining morality against touchstone definitions for verdictive terms, 
whereby theory creation can be uncontroversial, such that someone who spent more 
time attending to a theory (in the strict sense) could be said to have greater 
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knowledge of how to go on. All the way down to bedrock, moral definitions require 
substantive moves that, such as ordering of certain ends, virtues and values; rather 
than reveal the very nature of morality itself, can only go to reveal the implicit 
assumptions (be they moral, ontological, epistemological, methodological, religious 
or of any other overlapping category of thought) of the theorist who is utilising them. 
What we are each aiming for is to get things right. And despite difference (Variance 
in Judgements) we can still be content that we are talking about the same things, 
even if we see those values as applying differently from someone else here and 
now. 
For all its reliance on norms for one to know how to get around within an empirical 
practice such as science,  however, the practice still puts out a body of knowledge at 
the general level that certain things are true (upon this conception of science) which 
makes predictions that either will or will not be falsified. In so doing, we can 
eventually decide that we have something like a law, or theory which we can say is 
with some certainty correct. We are not forced to accept a result as absolute proof 
that a certain proposition can never be questioned. Nor would the laws we state with 
confidence, due to the results of various experiments, mean anything to someone 
who hadn’t been inculcated to see why the norms that govern scientific enquiry are 
apt to do so. But for those within the practice they have a strong epistemic appeal.  
This is what Wittgenstein means when he says:        
 It is as if we had hardened the empirical proposition into a rule. And now we 
have, not an hypothesis that gets tested by experience, but a paradigm with 
which experience is compared and judged... a new kind of judgement 
(Wittgenstein, 1978: VI-22)(my emphasis) 
If we buy into the ‘as if’ that I have emphasised here, as it seems to be meant, we 
need not worry about the idea of the possible interpretability of rules as they are 
meant to be seen by Wittgenstein’s lights. In fact, the ‘as if’ is meant to direct us 
between the idea of a hardened proposition and a rule in the Platonic sense. The 
‘rule’ is thus not ‘stretching out like rails’, but is a propositional end point of study on 
a particular conception that may or may not be discounted at a later date, based on 
further data gathering, furthering alterations and tweaks to our conceptions or 
metaphors which we see as forming the best possible explanation of the natural 
193 
 
world. It can be used to bring someone who shares the necessary forms of life 
against which the practice is meaningful up to speed. While morality mostly works 
regarding knowing how then, the practical side of things, science, by way of its 
empirical nature, allows for a highly specific knowledge that. But without being 
involved or acquainted with the human activity of scientific enterprise these 
propositions would be meaningless.   
‘Is’ propositions differ from ‘ought’ propositions in almost exactly the way that the 
consensus has it, then: one is open to proof, whereas the other is not. What is 
crucial about this analysis is that it makes the case that proof is not the whole of 
story for epistemological success. The proof only convinces those already accepting 
that these are the norms that should underpin our judgements about the natural 
world or this aspect of it (rather than some religion or other mysticism, say) and that 
these norms should be interpreted this way rather than that.  
Herein lays the difference between empirical propositions and moral ones; the 
difference which allows for expertise in the former and not the latter. An ethical 
expert cannot be like a scientific expert, a structural expert, or a medical expert. 
Expertise in these latter senses is always regarding empirical propositions that are 
testable. We can think back here to Judith Jarvis Thomson’s idea of ‘good’. Rather 
than being a type of thing in itself, yet to be defined (‘The Good’), it is in most cases 
used as a contextual evaluation that ‘X is good for Y’ or to show our approval of 
some ultimate or final end (some things are good without being good in relation to 
something else). If a medical, structural or scientific expert says that a particular 
course of action is good, they mean good for keeping a person healthy, making sure 
a building will not fall down on us, or any other scientific ends we might think of. 
Before testing, a theory is good because it coheres with the best knowledge we 
already have and have tested. When we say ‘X is good’, morally speaking, as we 
saw, we had no real way to naturalise that expression in an agreed upon set of 
norms that admit of success or failure, and in doing so become ‘hardened’ as if they 
were ‘rules’. We might have a measuring rod example, say, slavery, which we could 
then utilise if someone started to make a suggestion which seemed to make some 
people other people’s property in order to overcome some economical issue, say. 
But even then, there’s room to say it’s not precisely the same. In the same way if 
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someone says ‘taxation is theft at the threat of imprisonment’ we can make the case 
that there are suitable differences - for all the alarming similarities. 
With this in mind, there can be no expertise within ethics in the same sense as there 
is with scientific expertise. No guidance which does not have built into it, however 
implicitly, an already established substantive position. And as it is substantive ‘all the 
way down’ so to speak, there is also no measure on how one can interpret 
normative, substantive positions within it as interacting with each other. By this, I 
mean that, even if we see somebody espouse one particular view for one particular 
reason, this does not mean that we can pull them up on a contradiction for then 
assessing a seemingly similar case in, what seems to us, a seemingly distinct way. 
To believe it does is to buy into the idea that theories come as sets with touchstones 
that are interpreted in this way rather than that, or ought to be expressed in this way 
rather than that. One might express a right for a foetus to live in one case, and then 
cite the negative consequences of not aborting in the next. To believe this is 
necessarily a contradiction assumes that these ideas are the output of incompatible 
theories, rather than handy ways of expressing two concerns that could be linked by, 
say, a specific ideal of compassion to the particularities in each case.  I believe that 
this follows from our discussion of Dancy in 6. Generality occurs at the level of thick 
concepts, not specific actions which those thick concepts guide. And thick concepts 
can be spread rather wide and interact in interesting ways.  
Any sort of input by the ethicist does not show someone who has some greater 
insight. It shows a person who has a specific insight, one that is, itself, substantive all 
the way down.  The logical possibility that norms can be arranged in almost any way, 
be they the sort of norm that act as content or the sort of norm that suggests 
methodological presumptions, means that there is no map the philosopher - whose 
licence for authority is in the workings of reasoning itself (logical connections and so 
on) - has which the non-philosopher does not and thus the philosopher has no 
special authority here.  
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7.1.1 The New Claim to Expertise: 
This undermines also what I see as a lesser claim towards expertise than that 
a strict generalist might claim for herself. The strict generalist believes there are 
truths that can be discovered by explaining the naturalism of moral language, as self-
evident if suis generis truths, or by a priori reasoning. Enough study of these, will, by 
her lights, arm her with a solid conception of the nature of morality – a conception 
from which how to go on follows - which would allow for full expertise. We have, I 
believe, fully renounced this position; although it is fair to say that this was the dream 
for Medical Ethics when it began. 
The lesser claim, however, is often a claim that comes along with the explicit caveat 
that it does not imply expertise in such a way that one ought to defer to their decision 
at all times, as a layman would to someone with much more experience in a 
particular empirical matter. It is a claim that is nicely summed up in the following 
metaphor by Zoloth-Dorfman and Rubin: 
“…we suggest, it is the ethicist who is the navigator; knowing the map, being 
familiar with the terrain and it’s complexities, calling attention to how the 
desired…course might be changed by the immediacy, temporality and 
particularity of a given case, and above all guiding but not controlling the 
course.” Zoloth-Dorfman, (1997) 
Again: this account directly means to deny that the medical ethicist is an expert of 
the type that can give a definitive answer. But the same assumptions are involved 
with the metaphor of navigation as they would be if the ethicist was said to be the 
captain. To believe that because one makes a certain move one is therefore 
committed to various other moves, such that someone who is more in tune with 
ethics - namely the ‘ethicist’ with the her ‘unique perspective and tools of her 
profession’ might spot, so as to navigate you away or towards it - speaks of a 
conception of moral theory as if made out of various possible wholes (or following 
the metaphor, ‘courses’). If the doctor makes a call, what precisely can the ethicist 
add to this? Any suggestion of a particularity she may have missed will make the 
assumption that this particularity is salient. Perhaps the doctor’s not seeing it as such 
is actually because it is not. To say otherwise would imply general propositions can 
be made out which demand recognition. If the ethicist claims that she does this, she 
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seems committed to doing other things. But this too goes against the uncodifiability 
theory and the rejection of touchstone theories. One starts to wonder whether 
perhaps a better grasp of the actual ethico-legal process (something which does 
define rules and is as such rule-based in such a way as to allow expertise) might be 
what they are referring to. With this I hold no issue in attributing expertise, but it is 
not ethical expertise so much as administrative. In the drawing up of any code, there 
will of course be massive problems, if what one is aiming for is to draw a code which 
truly does pay homage to the idea that there can be right and wrong moral decisions.     
The mention of ‘particularity’ in the above quote only further confuses the issue. For 
if particulars are seen as an exercise in ‘seeing’, or perception - where that means 
the ability to discern minute differences in a way that cannot be placed under a 
generalised notion - then what the ethicist is claiming over the person she navigates 
for, is a sort of practical wisdom in concept use and having adopted the right sorts of 
concerns and learned to apply them and appeal to them in the right sorts of ways. 
This thesis maintains that that is precisely what it takes to get things right in ethical 
situations. In which case, mentioning her ‘tools’ and ‘training’ seems to imply an 
assumed method to train people towards practical wisdom. If one were to have such 
a thing as virtue and practical wisdom in order to open up an honest dialect in such a 
way as to heighten the perceptions in others of such things, as I have no doubt wise 
people do, then one can certainly claim to be an expert in the sense that they might 
be deferred to in hard cases. After all, this is expertise that does not speak of a body 
of knowledge; and this sort of wisdom is almost presupposed by virtue ethics under 
various guises.  
How one would truly be able to show they have such abilities though, what ‘tools’ 
would be necessary for it and what ‘training’ one might undergo so as to acquire 
them, seems to be beyond our grasp to say. Wisdom is yet another thick term, and 
the norms of success and failure that are available for empirical experts are not 
available for analysis of such terms, especially when hard cases appear. One cannot 
train to be wise in any strict manner. Wisdom, when contrasted with intelligence, is 
precisely beyond the scope of working out connections that are explicitly laid out. 
Rather, it refers to the sorts of understanding that the uncodifiability theory and 
universalizability-generality distinction tries to point us towards: a practical mastery of 
understanding when certain concepts apply and the discernment and understanding 
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of the salient concerns embedded with shared practices that goes along with that 
skill. This understanding is tied up with the Wittgensteinian account that our concepts 
gain their meaning in the range of cases in which they are already used seamlessly, 
their meaning acquired by way of its centrality to a form of life.   
One struggles to see what ‘tools’ and ‘training’ could really be being used here. 
These two phrases seem to be more suited to the previous conception of expert: an 
expert as it applies to a practice with a given suitable end that is amenable to 
hardened propositions. If, on the other hand, ‘particulars’ simply refers to how 
complex cases can be seen as altering the way that a case can be subsumed under 
some general rule, then what we have is the wrong sort of expertise, as the rule one 
chooses will reflects one’s own substantive idea of that case – making one merely an 
expert in one’s own view of the case. If the ethicist changes the mind of the 
professional making the judgement, it need not be because they have greater 
insight. They just have a different substantive conception of what doing the right 
thing means in this case. They may be able to give a more comprehensive sounding 
defence of their position, but this does not necessarily mean it is a better position 
over all. Here they might complain we are mixing up two categories of thinking: 
The clinical ethics consultant’s expertise is an expertise not in morals, but in 
ethics. In other words, hers is a discipline that functions not by offering 
declarative normative judgments, but rather by raising critical questions and 
focusing conversation and deliberation (ibid) 
This has the interesting effect of seeming to make the whole point of ethical 
discussion to be not about the outcome of a decision, but the process of making a 
decision. If it is not the results that matter, as this implies it is not, then it seems to be 
the actual act of raising critical questions. Critical questions are only of use if they 
push us towards something like the right answer, however. Being asked to justify the 
patently obvious is of no help to anybody. Indeed, with tough situations also, 
reflecting too much can result in both inaction and psychological tension. 
Furthermore, if the right answer isn’t something that the ethicist – as opposed to 
anyone else – can be shown to know, it seems academic that it be an ethicist who 
asks them. Again, I wish to make it clear - that there are people who can ask just the 
right question at just the right moment in order to help one perceive some salient 
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feature they have missed is not something I dispute. That these people can be 
professionalised and hired to do so in all situations that job entails very much is. The 
intuition is that to prove expertise one requires a body of factual or propositional 
knowledge and yet this conception of knowing lines up poorly with that which we 
have said characterises ethical knowledge: know how.  
On this basis I rule out the idea that expertise can be something which just anyone 
can see as existing in another agent without having seen them come to varied 
decisions, live their lives, deal with unexpected situations and reason in certain 
directions in certain ways that are impossible to generalise but attain our respect. 
These people are the ones we call wise, perceptive, measured and assured. They 
deal with situations calmly and with aplomb. They show discernment. One wonders 
then how these skills could be discerned in a person or trained into a person who 
wanted to become a ‘medical ethicist’ in the requisite sense. The lesser appeal 
seems to concede ground to the particularist idea only by an empty suggestion. In 
practice, however, the same idea that (somehow) the ethicist has a greater 
propositional knowledge seems to be in play. 
I will follow up this brief discussion by examining how these same generalist traits 
are still prevalent in more mainstream generalist Medical Ethics; the sort that 
considers big moral issues that deal with life and death, animal rights, moral status 
and so on. I first wish to look at an attempt in Medical Ethics which tries to resurrect 
a metaphysical scheme for the particular tasks thrown up by the de facto condition of 
limited resources as well as various issues surrounding abortion, unwanted 
pregnancy and euthanasia; valuing lives. This theory is definitional in that it proceeds 
by way of taking something that is a moral term and trying to illicitly find a way of 
making it appear, by way of definitional analysis, a technical one, which when 
applied to cases ushers in a particular moral standpoint.  
 
7.2 Harris vs MaClean: Metaphysics vs. Inculcation  
Harris (1984), our philosopher who utilises the method of definition – a 
method I aim to show as resting on a fundamental flaw within normative ethics – 
bases his account around the notion of which lives we might find valuable. There is 
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no doubting the idea that his position is made out in order to alleviate some concerns 
we might have about treating some beings with moral respect, while not doing so 
with others. This giving of respect, he says, can be seen as being given due to 
something the beings or objects that we ought to treat well possess, which others do 
not: moral status. Having moral status, he aims to show, implies that a being has a 
valuable life as such; not merely because it is valued by someone but because it is 
valuable in and of itself. 
The question thus hinges on him giving us reasons as to why some beings ought to 
be seen as having moral status, while others simply do not. Harris believes that he 
can, and furthermore, that such a theoretical position is needed. Those beings which 
he will show to have moral status, such that their lives are valuable, will be termed 
persons. And as he puts it, we all ‘need’ some ‘justification’. It ought to be the case 
that ‘people are not people because they are accepted, but rather they are accepted 
because they are people’ (Harris, 1985: 14). One can certainly see the purpose of 
this position, especially as it relates to the idea that if we simply rely upon our 
practices as they are - if we only look - we may not make progress or see similarities 
quick enough to stop tragedies such as those of slavery or the holocaust - where 
persons were grouped as not worthy of moral status precisely because the 
communities in which those injustices happened took them as slaves, as 
undesirables, and as such overlooked features which we now see as making them 
worthy of being moral equals.  
And indeed, this is precisely the direction of Harris’s argument. In deciding what 
does have moral status he takes something ‘we all agree with’ – the idea that a fully 
functioning adult human being has moral status and is thus a person.  
If we look at creatures we are sure are persons if any are –normal human beings 
– and can find features of their lives or capacities which, unlike differences of the 
‘featherless biped’ type, incline us to judge their lives of more significance and 
value than lives which lack such features, we might come closer to the concept 
of the person. (ibid) 
His analysis follows that of Locke - who he recommends to us in trying to distinguish 
why persons are morally special - in that it takes as morally pertinent those features 
which are special to the group that we almost agree about – features such as: 
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consciousness, language, reason and the ability to ‘consider [oneself] the same 
thinking thing, in different times and places’. (ibid p.15) 
So, we have isolated a feature, self-consciousness, that seems to belong to those 
sorts of beings who we all agree have this thing, moral status. But this does not 
really take us any closer to an account of what makes a person, or a being with 
moral status, unless we also decide that it is the only feature which is relevant in that 
equation. This is one of MaClean’s reservations regarding Harris’s account. He 
appears to move from the claim that self-consciousness is valuable in all beings that 
have it, enough for us to afford them the status of persons, to the claim that only 
those beings with self-consciousness  count as persons. As such, MaClean claims, 
he has begged the question about all those beings of which there is dispute. There is 
contention between the two theorists as to whether this begging the question 
pertains to Harris’s argument. Harris claims it does not (Harris, 1995: 221). His 
reason for saying this is that there is an argument placed between the assumption 
(his words) that full grown adults are persons and his conclusion that foetuses and 
babies are not. (It is fair to say that both Harris’s account and MaClean’s concerns 
about it are based largely around the moral status of certain beings, but mostly 
around children and foetuses. While these arguments pertain to all beings that lack 
self-consciousness, I will refer to foetuses and babies). 
Harris does indeed place an argument between the initial assumption and the 
conclusion but I cannot see it as a sound one.  As he puts it in his reply to MaClean, 
I have treated normal adults as a paradigm… [and] produced an account which 
justifies their paradigm status. If for example the only feature of alleged moral 
relevance that distinguished humans and chickens had been that the former are 
featherless bipeds, the moral relevance of feathers would have required 
demonstration or the paradigm extended to embrace chickens” (1995: 221 
leading onto note 6) 
Whether or not his argument meets the criteria that Harris sets himself, that the 
feature of moral relevance (self-consciousness) is demonstrated as being relevant, 
remains to be seen. I would claim that it does not. Harris has two points to make on 
it. The first, as we have seen, is that we do seem to hold it self-consciousness in 
moral regard. This is merely a consensus point about our actual reactions to things. 
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It acts as no proof, especially on Harris’s account, which is precisely meant to lead 
us to conclusions that are true regardless of our sentiments upon such issues (‘we 
value them because they are people’). Here, however, all we learn is that there is 
general (although not necessary) agreement in human moral life that fully grown 
human beings have moral status – one I can agree with -  coupled with a less 
obvious one: they have it because they are self-conscious, and only because they 
are self-conscious. What Harris requires, then, is an argument which equates moral 
status (being valuable in oneself) to having self-consciousness. 
So what is the argument which settles that self-consciousness itself is the marker of 
a life having value? It comes from an assessment that is developed in ‘Strategy 2’ 
(1985: 15) - which is meant to move us beyond the simple observation that we value 
beings that have self-consciousness and in many cases this seems to be a good 
reason as to why we do so value them - that we cannot say that any particular sort of 
self-conscious life is more valuable than the next. Here, there is an interesting move 
from trying to see what makes for a valuable life (something Harris claims is a 
relative matter of the values of the individual being asked – no ends we give for life 
could ever be said to be definitively better or absolutely appropriate for all conscious 
beings) to what makes a living being valuable (not relative to anyone, but absolutely 
set). Here we see the intuition that crops up from his early assumptions: 
1) If there is to be a reason as to why we treat certain beings as absolutely 
valuable (in that they have a special moral status), this implies there is such a 
thing as an absolute value - that stands outside of our particular or relative 
evaluations. 
2) All of our valuing is otherwise relative (‘X is valuable plus adjunct’) 
3) Without an absolute sense of value, our evaluations of what is valuable in 
every sense would be relative, including which sorts of lives. X’s life would 
only be valuable if it is valued by X or others.  
4) As there is disagreement on what sorts of beings have value there would be 
no way of determining what the right thing to do is with each life, and each life 
would only be as valuable as it is relatively valued (as lettuces are) 
5) Without a theory which gives us an example of absolute value therefore, no 
life is valuable except in relation to the preferences of that group or individual 
at that time, with each reason being as relative to that position as the next 
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6) Therefore, we need a theory of what makes something absolutely valuable 
which makes no reference to ways of life. 
 
Here we can see a similarity to Wright’s concerns 4.3, to the extent that we need a 
way to ratify independently of our own actual judgements that something is valuable 
as such. With the relative/absolute distinction, Harris seems committed to the idea of 
trying to find a way beyond our actual judgements. Otherwise he would assumedly 
agree with Wright that the whole thing is matter of cultural artifice – but unlike Wright, 
take that to be the end of meaningful normative declarations on value.  
One can see also, perhaps, the similarity to the Kantian construction of the 
Categorical Imperative that was shown by Schopenhauer to be an ‘ingenious trick’. 
In lieu of being able to give an account of what makes any particular lives 
themselves valuable, but in need of an absolute universal of what makes a life 
valuable, Harris is left only with the capacity of valuing itself (thus shorn of any pre-
decided notions of what is relatively valuable) in order to fill in the absoluteness of 
value he needs. This mirrors Kant’s attempt to garner content for moral law from only 
the form of the law. Both stripped away our anthropological senses of good, and are 
left the concept under analysis to carry the whole weight of the account. In Kant’s 
case it is the law. In Harris’s it is value.  
Thus, what is valuable absolutely is the capacity to value, as every other thing that is 
valued (albeit relatively) is dependent upon the capacity to value. Everything else 
you value makes your life more or less valuable to you, relatively speaking. What 
makes life valuable as such is that you do value (something, it doesn’t matter what). 
If we accept this argument then we can say that the only beings that have absolute 
value are those who can value things. Very early on, Harris makes the point that 
‘valuing is a conscious process…to [both] know what we value and to be conscious 
of our attitude towards it.’ (1985: 15) 
But the reminder of Kant should make us wary here, as should the notion of absolute 
value - of something that is beyond our scope of assessment. We have already seen 
how appeals to metaphysics seem to beg the question when answering moral 
issues. Whichever metaphysical position one takes, one runs into the danger of 
begging the question. The attempted definition of ‘person’ as, ‘possessor of the 
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capacity of self-consciousness’ does precisely this. The magic trick happens in the 
disguising of a moral term as a technical one. If we feel that we ought to agree with 
Harris’s account, but that we do not agree with the conclusions – that babies might 
be killed without any moral residue if they are not relatively valuable to an already 
functioning person – it might be that one has made the mistake of not seeing the 
evaluative elements that run through the supposedly technical definitions of Harris’s 
account.  
The majority of the evaluations that permeate that account are not to be found in the 
parts that he would claim are the moral equation. Rather, they are hidden away in 
the various assumptions within the three parts of his account: Firstly the selection 
and analysis of a paradigm feature; secondly, the account of valuing relatively and 
absolutely; and thirdly the assumptions in the idea of requiring a theory to distinguish 
between the two types of valuing.  
To accept Harris’s theory, we need to accept the three steps. I will now show that the 
whole process lies on a fallacy about theory and moral judgements. 
The first pillar is the one that states that we just do value some beings as persons. 
These beings therefore have something that we see as valuable, if our evaluation is 
to be rational. That value can be attributed to a characteristic that they have, namely, 
that they are self-conscious. While we can agree with Harris that we do find fully 
functioning humans as having valuable lives, we need not assume that it is merely 
because they have the proposed characteristic - self-consciousness - in such a way 
for this to be the only reason we find them valuable. It may be a reason to say they 
have value, but it need not be the only one.  
Furthermore, the value that attaches need not be because of some characteristic 
that they have, or even many characteristics that they have; it may not be, that is, a 
natural characteristic of theirs. It may be in how they are related to us in various roles 
that they perform, in the sorts of lives that they live, or in what they represent. 
Indeed, there are various ways to see that looking at the natural features of what 
makes grown human beings, taken as a species of object that are being considered 
as apt for moral concern misses how we do treat ‘human being’ as a thick term, one 
which carries with it certain assumptions. For one, as Cora Diamond has pointed out 
(Diamond: 1978), once we detract from the self-consciousness, we still seem to give 
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a special status to things that are human. We do not eat human meat that is 
available even without our harming in order to get it, we give human beings funerals, 
we respect their wishes post death, and so on.  
Harris would say that these final points are all irrelevant. We needn’t do any of these 
things, they are mere contingencies, or traditions, that we merely happen to find 
valuable (relatively so on his account). But this is where our attack on the third point 
comes in to play. Harris would say that we cannot defend these ideas rationally 
because we have no theory which tells us why these are the sorts of things that we 
ought to value. Our observations do not add anything to our arguments, for we lack 
any explanation that the observations of how we do act have anything to say about 
how we ought to act. Without a theory we cannot be sure we are acting rationally.  
This is the point MaClean takes up. She makes the point that ‘Harris…argues 
backwards’ (MaClean, 1993: 21) in creating a theory. In order for a theory to have 
greater explanatory power than ‘what [bioethicists] like to call our intuitions’ (ibid) – 
what Harris would call ‘a relative value’ – that theory would need to precede our 
particular judgements. The truth there would need to be antecedent of all human 
judgements. Otherwise we might simply all be mistaken. But his theory does not do 
this. The first premise makes this clear. Harris starts with something we all do find 
valuable (an intuition common to our community) and then makes the further claim 
that this is due not to the other reasons that people within that community would cite 
when giving a description of the value of their lives, but because they have this 
shared characteristic: self-consciousness. This move from ‘we value them and they 
all share this characteristic’, to ‘we value them because of this characteristic’ is 
unwarranted. The further move ‘we can only absolutely value lives with that 
characteristic’ relies on the same unwarranted inference. And getting there depends 
on the second point: that there is a distinction that can be made out theoretically 
between what is valuable as such and what is valuable only relatively. 
MaClean seems to believe Harris fallaciously but accidentally conflates the two types 
of value, relative and absolute. I believe that this move is certainly supposed to be a 
move to the metaphysical. Harris is looking not for what is valuable to some group at 
some time, but what is valuable from any position (Harris, 1985: 16) and such a 
position requires that there be at least one fixed absolute value. MaClean’s refusal to 
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accept this is likely because of her Wittgensteinian epistemology, one I share, which 
counts out the move to the metaphysical. But in not taking seriously the intuition that 
guides Harris to look for a metaphysical position, she fails to connect with the 
ordinary reader why ‘relative value’ – or values that do not necessarily enforce 
consensus from the point of view of a shared rationality - being all there is to discuss 
does not necessarily make the whole enterprise of discussing morality a merely 
culturally-relativistic phenomenon.  
Harris, in his reply to her, does not mention her attribution to him of this contentious 
conflation of the two sorts of value, except in passing, in the quote above about his 
methods of demonstrating why self-consciousness is indeed a morally relevant 
feature. It is clear from his reply that he has not left behind the idea at all. In fact, he 
builds a defence of his position from it (Harris, 1995: 220-222) by attacking the 
‘positive account’ that MaClean has; claiming that from her position we cannot say 
anything meaningful about what we ought to do that is not tied up in what we already 
happen to do, and can thus make no progress, or give solid (to be read unassailable) 
reasons as to why people should change their minds.  
This he believes will be due to the fact she eschews any theoretical position. But her 
so eschewing it is precisely because any theoretical position she takes, much like 
Harris’s, would itself have so many evaluative assumptions attached to it that it 
would hold no greater explanatory power than any which does not appeal to a 
theoretical position but to the values we do have. 
Here are some excerpts of Harris’s reply to MaClean which show that he still firmly 
believes that a theory is needed and has thus without argument simply rejected her 
most important point: 
…her book is not a thesis on bioethics but an antithesis (1995: 220) 
Maclean has two main objections to my theory of personhood. The first is that it 
is false and the second that it is a theory…. such an objection from a philosopher 
might be described (to borrow an analogy from pugilism) as leading with your 
chin (ibid) 
[MaClean states] ’no-one who sets aside all his particular judgment concerning 
life and death can have anything at all to say about what makes for a valuable 
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life'... This is true; what is false is that I (or any other ethicist, so far as I am 
aware) claimed the contrary (1995: 221) 
I am puzzled by Maclean's complaint that: 'bioethicists present the theory they 
put forward as showing that their judgements and theirs alone are correct'. 
Anyone who puts forward a theory puts it forward as correct. (ibid) 
That Harris remains puzzled means that he fails to grasp that MaClean’s point, that 
the sort of explanatory theory he posits becomes an idle step which ought to give us 
no extra sense of security about our judgements. He still seems to believe that his 
giving a theory at all is something that an ethical philosopher ought to do to give us 
clearer insight into the problems at hand. The desire of Harris, to make a theory 
which explains our judgements as being either rational or irrational, is made manifest 
in his reply to MaClean’s anti-theoretical position. She states that we can defend the 
value of children by simply saying that they are the sorts of beings whose lives are 
valuable and listing why we do find them valuable. She puts it like this. ‘That they are 
babies is all the reason in the world [to think of them as valuable]’. This, she says, is 
an attitude that we know – from being involved in a full moral life – is apt for babies. 
She here borrows Wittgenstein’s aphorism, “My attitude towards him is an attitude to 
a soul; I am not of the opinion that he has a soul” (Wittgenstein, 1953: II iv 22). 
In reply, Harris gives an argument by making these comparisons, followed by a 
statement: 
My attitude towards him is an attitude to a slave 
My attitude towards her is an attitude to a woman 
All of the classes of objects of these attitudes are vulnerable to the prejudices of 
the attitude-holder, and all, if Maclean's suggestions are to be accepted, are not 
only beyond the reach of the bioethicist, but beyond any and all rational criticism. 
(1995: 222) 
Harris, then, takes her suggestions as being beyond all rational criticism because 
she fails to give a reason as to why we ought to hold them that makes reference to a 
theory of understanding morality which somehow bypasses the actual intuitions of 
morality that we have. And there is a great precedent in medical ethics literature of 
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the need to overtly theorise about things in order to move us past intuitions and into 
the supposedly rational. We have already shown that this cannot be done. Any 
supposedly metaphysical truth about value from which we can deduce particular 
truths will actually stand as a moral sentiment that has been taken from the values 
we all have and share, and disguised as somehow being more sacred than all the 
others; more pertinent; more central. But this is not because it really reveals some 
great truth of value itself; it is because we do indeed happen to value this thing (in 
this case self-consciousness) very highly. Indeed, we do value beings which have 
the ability to value in a special way. That we need to subordinate all other values 
beneath that, or claim that it is the only thing we can value absolutely, takes the 
philosophical trick we have just exposed, and leads to the touchstone type of 
theorising with which we are well accustomed: tell me if it has feature X and I will tell 
you if it is valuable.    
At this point it is worth noting that just because there is no metaphysical position to 
say that X or Y are absolutely valuable, there is absolutely nothing wrong with saying 
that the wholesale killing of babies is ‘absolutely wrong’. It cannot be proven from 
outside our concerns. But it seems like a position that we can hold from inside the 
practice. When we left behind the idea of Kantianism as a ground for deontological 
claims, we need not have left behind the intuition that makes his arguments so 
attractive: that some things we just should not do, no matter how valuable the 
consequences. Surely the claim that, for there to be certain things no one ought ever 
to do, there need to be some theoretical device we can’t possibly deny, is one that 
needs further argument. What we were right to leave behind with Kant was the 
insane premise that there must be a way to prove that I ought to care about the 
things I care about, and that listing our actual connected concerns by way of 
accessing our actual moral conceptual repertoire was merely marching on the spot. 
It is the hidden premise that we can rationally prove to any and everyone, even those 
who have no care about our values, that they ought to think what we think, which 
Harris takes up in Kant’s stead. In so doing he asks too much both of himself, us, 
and the limits of rationality and theory building in general.  
If Harris claims, as he does about puppies, that this is ‘soggy sentimentality’ (p.13), 
that we are not seeing things aright, he can do so. His defence for his position 
however cannot be given a metaphysical angle without begging the question and 
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simply ignoring the epistemology that MaClean wishes to impart to us. If he dislikes 
the idea that ‘their being babies is a reason, all the reason in the world’ (221) he 
better get used to the fact that his own position is nothing but a laying out of the 
reasons that already exist in the moral realm for an opposing claim, ‘their being 
consciousness is the reason, all the reason in the world’. If he believes his position 
has more sway because it appeals to a theory, then he has been misled by a poor 
idea of the explanatory power of justification of a moral theory. If he feels any of that 
soggy sentimentality for babies, he might well want to consider changing his position 
to be in accord with the source of those feelings or else find a reason as to why this 
portion of the moral everyday life we live in can so easily be rejected while another 
part, that consciousness is valuable in all beings who exhibit it, is not so disposable. 
Furthermore he must do so in a way that does not make an illicit appeal to a Platonic 
picture.  
For anyone worried regarding the point about slavery, we have already given good 
reason to doubt it. It seems now that had we access to theories of equality back 
when slavery was around then we wouldn’t have had slavery. Surely then, a theory 
which denies people can be treated fairly, rather than a conglomeration of mere 
attitudes, is what would stop such things happening again. But no theory can 
legitimately stop such injustices happening again. Principles such as ‘treat all men as 
equals’ were around before the end of slavery. We just chose to not call such people 
‘people’ then. It is the broader concerns we share that allow such principles to find 
their mark. Rather than precluding slavery, it was events like the end of slavery – not 
due to any theoretical postulations, one might add – that made such theories seem 
so necessary. Attitudes feed the acceptance of theories; theories cannot change 
attitudes for those who do not believe in their premises. And such a mention of 
attitude needs to be addressed. My attitude that you are not a slave, nor ever could 
be one, is not the same as my mere attitude that I ought to run tomorrow or they 
should stop making Marvel films. My attitude is really an attitudinative-belief that 
gains its force from being situated in a balanced web of different ends that support 
and delineate each other.      
I will leave this argument here. I do not want to get into the debate itself, but merely 
make the point about the forms of the two positions. In Harris’s argument we saw a 
209 
 
perfect example of the generalist tendency to miss the six points this final section 
started with: 
Firstly, the uncodifiability theory was disregarded in his identification of moral status 
with a single feature: self-consciousness. In so doing he overlooked the varied uses 
of such terms as ‘value’, ‘human being’ and ‘potential’ that we utilise in everyday 
lives within context against a set of shared concerns.  
Secondly, he derided the idea of rational disagreement. There must, he believed, be 
a rational way to answer all moral questions, even hard questions, and this would be 
done by bringing the right theory to bear on the situation. Thus, MaClean’s position 
was represented as irrational, or holding notions that were beyond rational criticism, 
as opposed to expressing the moral realm in which these ideas find their meaning in 
a more full and textured manner. 
Thirdly, by making ‘person’ a technical term and thus beyond the scope of moral 
argument, he put into service the idea that one could tell another the bare facts of 
the case and have that person describe what could morally be done. One didn’t need 
to see the nuances of the case, as most of these were seen as relative values or 
soggy sentimentality. As far as absolute valuing goes context doesn’t enter into the 
equation. One is rationally required to value self-consciousness.  
Fourthly, the idea that we needed a theory to cut through the ‘intuitions’ and 
‘sentimentality’ to be rational (as considered ‘cold and calculating’) meant that Harris 
promotes the idea that our emotional responses towards things are more of a 
hindrance to moral knowledge than a helping factor in finding nuanced reasons and 
in properly instilling an appropriate moral education in people. This would cause his 
position, when fully developed, problems regarding why people would be motivated 
towards making the sorts of decisions his theory would see as morally vindicated. 
One can only assume such motivations would come from the belief that his theory 
adds explanatory power, and thus make his pronouncements more rational. This I 
have shown to be false. 
Fifthly, in his appeal to basic intuitions about persons who do have consciousness he 
missed the vital points that those like Cora Diamond and Alice Crary bring to the 
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table, by showing that in a deeper analysis we value things in ways which manifest 
not in simple theories but in entire ways of being.  
Finally he misses the point about the possibility for moral growth that comes from a 
nuanced view of a conceptual network. Harris wants moral advancements to come 
as proofs entailed by universal moral theories. But this is a mischaracterisation of 
how we come to know morality in general. And in general, Harris just misses the 
point.  
Harris’s account makes the mistakes that are common in the more abstract 
theoretical side of Medical Ethics where sweeping discussions regarding complex 
ideas like personhood, cloning, animal rights and so on take centre stage. What is 
clear in this area, in British and American Medical Ethics particularly, is that the sort 
of rationality that this thesis has set out to reject as misguided, the one that puts 
touchstone definitions as a central pillar of coming to rational conclusions, still has 
extreme sway. Indeed, the most famous Medical Ethicists take this sort of line: 
Harris, Tooley, Rachels, Ruben and Singer being among those that do.  
I would argue that a good way to address this sort of suggestion is not to focus on 
the conclusions as such, but directly find a meeting point of consensus, namely that 
the intuition that each is striving for (in Harris’s case, that self-consciousness does 
indeed seems like a morally relevant property in various ways) has serious merit, 
along with the point that Harris makes in one of the passages I quoted above: that to 
begin thinking at all we must always borrow at least some intuitions from the 
common forms of life, thought of in those non-technical terms. If we edge out the 
generalist tendency of an appeal to a metaphysic, Harris’s argument can actual get a 
better grounding for itself and be embellished with further intuitive notions from inside 
the practice of moral reasoning as it actually stands – that is, fully imbued with our 
actual way of life.   
There is one final point to make. There is a constant threat from those who do seem 
to persist in these doomed theoretical exercises that those of us do not share their 
optimism for rationality to show us a guiding path in complex cases cannot say 
nearly enough about what we actually need to do in these situations. But, it may be 
worth remembering there is nothing wrong with not saying anything definitive if one 
is not sure. On our picture, if someone does have a point to make it will not be 
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backed by some overarching generalist theory, but this does not mean it cannot be 
meaningful and effective. Positivity of the sort the generalist is looking for is based 
on an illusion. Let us stick to the truth and make the head way that allows. 
 
7.3: Organising and Characterising the Practice: 
One way of analysing the mistakes that Harris makes then, is by recognising 
that he tries to smuggle a highly contestable term, ‘person’, through as something 
that can be decided on by way of definitional and technical markers only. Once he 
does this, other parts of his arguments follow more easily, and we end up with 
dramatic moral conclusions because there was, hidden away in changing the term 
from an everyday usage to a philosophically loaded one, something at once both 
reductive and substantive. The same move is employed often in writings on clinical 
practice. The way Williams (Williams, A. 2012) makes a seemingly plain truth of 
substantive ideas of value regarding quality and quantity of life and then quickly 
moves towards a system in which it is applied has the same effect in his much 
discussed QALY system. 
The notion of what factors make up such broad a term as ‘quality of life’ cannot be 
sectioned off and then marshalled for some systematic theory in a way where the 
output of that theory will seem meaningful and correct without us sharing the 
assumptions which narrowed the scope of the issue to allow for a systematic 
rendering in the first instance. If only we could know what we really ought to mean 
when we use these sorts of terms, the thought goes, we could really say something 
meaningful. The same thing can be said for assumedly technical attempts at 
deciding when life starts. While physical features can certainly be a major factor 
here, using them as general markers or rules for applying a term like ‘morally 
valuable human’ will have further substantive commitments one may not wish to 
defend but will feel like, on pain of inconsistency, they have to. Let us admit these 
are moral issues, with multi-faceted and complex interactions between the values in 
play that cannot be so easily systematised, as opposed to evaluations that follow 
directly from the recognition of general features obtaining.     
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The same battle has also been fought against broader concerns in health care 
recently, with arguments about what constitutes the best characterisation of the 
practice of health care. Again, what we have said seems to have serious issues to 
face in arriving at anything like a resolution. Contenders include Evidence-Based 
Medicine (EBM), Values Based Practice (VBP) and Person Centred Medicine 
(PCM).  
At first blush it is hard to understand why these conceptions cannot be reconciled. I 
would like any medical practice I attend to use evidence, place me at the centre of 
their practice, and utilise values. There is also no immediately obvious reason as to 
why I ought to have to choose between these options. The problem, of course, is 
that these terms (evidence, values and persons) have more specialised and action 
guiding meanings to them in this context than our usual uses of them seem to 
require. In wanting to say something meaningful, each characterisation of practice 
places theoretical constructs about what medicine is ‘really’ all about in such a way 
as to encroach on other intuitive ideas regarding the other concepts. The 
assumptions we use to make evidence (specialised to mean the output of our best 
empirical techniques at data collection in EBM) centre stage seems to substantively 
go on of its own accord to lessen the trust between doctor and patient and reduce 
the doctor’s role to that of (empirical) evidence collector and patient informer, and the 
patient’s role to being a mechanical object with varying faults to be remedied. 
Theoretical arguments which fuel what counts as evidence (again, a normal term 
specified into a technical one in the name of being action-guiding) rule the roost 
here. I will use this space to try to show that there are certain theoretical 
assumptions that both EBM and VBP – which arises as a reaction to EBM so as to 
compliment it (Fulford, 2012) – hold which stops their seemingly sensible and 
respective suggestions that evidence and values ought to hold prime place in 
medical contexts. 
Then again, are these ‘sensible’ suggestions? Doesn’t that imply some thought has 
gone into it? The whole point of theorising in a definitional and reductive way, one 
might think, is precisely to not merely parrot platitudes. Terms like value, evidence, 
quality and best practice litter the clinical literature. But we all want these things; we 
are just not sure what they amount to. But this is down to the fact that these terms 
rise above practicality. They are ideals which we say something has for having 
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various other features. Once we realise that these features can be inchoate and 
express various, overlapping and inchoate concerns, we ought not to start with them 
and work backwards, but start instead at the bottom and work up towards them by 
addressing those same various, overlapping and inchoate concerns. A strict and 
principled system will not appear from this, but at least we will be interacting with the 
subject matter face to face, in the only way we can.  
The intuitive idea that EBM seems to pick out is that which we have come to 
recognise in our thesis as grounding the ‘unfavourable comparison’ between matters 
of fact (empirically identified) and matters of value (as that which floats contingently 
upon these factual matters). Unsurprisingly, this technical application of ‘evidence’ 
will carry with it substantive baggage that makes seemingly innocuous modifications 
have wildly specific and controversial effects further down the line.  If what we have 
said so far is true, that all judgements must have some grounding in shared 
commitments – to motivate us towards their acceptance – then this view can only be 
seen as radically mistaken. When a patient and doctor judge something to be a 
medical issue the idea of health is central. But unless we are to concede ground to 
the empiricist thinker and undermine what we have already said, we must view 
health as a concept that cannot be cashed out without evaluative notions informing 
our judgements.  
Bad health is judged to be so not on some purely diagnostic empirical ruling that only 
utilises physical traits, then. It likewise takes judgements of contrasts against normal 
physical workings, the ability to interact with the world in a way that doesn’t have a 
negative effect upon one’s lifestyle and various other possible markers of what it is to 
be negatively impacted by the workings of one’s own body. What is healthy and 
unhealthy, on our picture, will necessarily be a judgement that is contrasted with a 
set of shared judgements that allow discussions of these concepts in action guiding 
ways. By EBM’s lights all evidence is made out at the physical level, with clinical 
epidemiology no longer being a central pillar for medicine, but the very ‘basis’ (EBM 
Working Group, 1992). The very idea that health had an evaluative aspect to it was 
simply not taken seriously by defenders of this position. Thus it was without irony 
that the EBM working group wrote that: 
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The proof of the pudding of evidence based medicine lies in whether patients 
cared for in this fashion enjoy better health. This proof is no more achievable for 
the new paradigm than it is for the old, for no long-term randomized trials of 
traditional and evidence-based medical education are likely to be carried out 
(ibid) (my emphasis) 
The very notion that suggesting that ‘better health’ could be proven by randomised 
trials - the very thing the other paradigms would resist, and that which was under 
discussion – would be begging the question was seemingly beyond their imagining. 
That I ought to reject such a position on the basis of the epistemological account I 
have proposed is obvious. Evidence of any sort makes sense only against a shared 
background of values and commitments. That meta-analysis of empirical data is 
important is not even in dispute. But why we ought to run those trials, what sorts of 
illnesses we run them on, the design features of such trials and why they have such 
epistemic pull cannot be made out without the sorts of values that EBM rejects as 
satisfactory evidence. By the lights of my own position, for those with the eyes to see 
them, such values can be read off as descriptions of properties that are actually 
there, and so evidence stretches far beyond empirical data.    
The particularism I have developed thus matches up with that which appears to be 
espoused by Thornton. While his papers (Thornton 2005 and 2011) do not allow the 
sort of thorough analysis of precisely how it is that we overturn the empiricist and 
generalist pictures, it does utilise the general conclusions we have come to here, 
regarding the idea that facts are laden with values even in seemingly empirical 
contexts – diagnosing illnesses say – and thus we needn’t shy away from the idea 
that when we are postulating about more obvious evaluative matters that we 
suddenly need to take on the idea that these are somehow ‘just our opinions’ or 
tastes on the matter. It is the particulars which decide the judgement, how the facts 
of the matter are actually laid out, because, as he puts it, we ‘are actually responding 
to real features of the world’. (Thornton, 2011: 991)  
Underlying agreement in the factual are a whole host of evaluative assumptions; we 
see them as being accurate descriptions of things on evaluation. That a ‘malignant 
tumour is bad for us’ seems like a description of a state of affairs. But it certainly 
cannot be made out in purely empirical terms. It is the shared values of privation 
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from pain, enjoying physical privacy, not having a life disrupted by dramatic 
treatments, feeling generally fine, longevity of life (and so on) which make the 
statement ‘cancer is bad’ make sense in such a way as to feel like a descriptive one. 
Likewise, if a doctor says he has a good treatment for us, the ‘goodness’ will be 
predicated on the qualities the treatment has been shown to have weighed up 
against risks. These risks will be measured against evaluative notions of what a 
good outcome is and this will be made against an overarching conception of a good 
life. Chopping a leg off can be a very effective way to get rid of a possibly dangerous 
mole situated there, but the life altering effects of the treatment will just not be worth 
the effort given the other treatments available. These are not mere evaluations as 
opposed to empirical facts; they are real features of the world; real descriptions of 
the real properties of the case. If these are the only salient variables and someone 
disagrees, choosing amputation over having the mole frozen off, say, one does not 
merely hold a different opinion; they are actually wrong or crazy.  
Thornton (2011) uses this sort of particularist analysis (however briefly stated) to 
assess the merits of one of EBM’s rival accounts: Values Based Practice (VBP). 
Fulford’s arguments lead him, at first, to seemingly particularist conclusions about 
how all judgements are imbued with values: ‘all decisions stand on two feet’ (Fulford, 
2012: 131). His work on showing the centrality of value to decision making deserves 
praise. But he leaves particularism behind in his methods when, as Thornton points 
out, he moves away from a codified ethics; not - as the particularist would demand – 
towards the idea that value properties are there to be assessed in the world (being a 
part of the same tapestry as empirical claims) but towards a type of ‘process’ for 
assessing values, where ‘the process [not the decision that results from that 
processing that] is the end itself’ (Thornton, 2011: 991).  
We have already seen the oddity of this sort of suggestion above. (7.1.1) Fulford’s 
unwillingness to posit values as actually being there in the world to be considered - 
grounding agreement in judgements and allowing for understanding people’s 
reasons for disagreement as well - becomes a major issue for his account. Value 
becomes both central to it and yet meaningless. Again, I believe his failure is 
predicated upon a sense of truth that is somehow ‘out there anyway’ and I will aim to 
show this.  
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If we get cancer we agree it is bad (‘bad’ standing as a veridical judgement on top of 
the multitude of shared judgements listed above) and if there is a quick and generally 
painless treatment available, over one which is longer or more risky, it is shared 
judgements based on shared commitments which allow us to reach a quick 
consensus about which treatment to go for. This is the picture I share with Fulford. I 
have argued at length that this places values within the fabric of the world above the 
bedrock level - that it is this picture that demands epistemological primacy - backed 
up with the claim that meaning and normativity are impossible to explain if perception 
is seen as evaluatively innocent. But when values clash in dramatic ways, there then 
seems to be a serious problem for particularism; for who do we listen to, who do we 
give the authority to in order to say that this should be the way to go? By the lights of 
the unfavourable comparison this places us in a predicament that doesn’t (usually) 
exist for empirical claims. There we turn to an expert, for clarification, say. The 
comparison pushes up against particularism in a seemingly vicious way. Without the 
possibility of proof, how can we say to another that, against their seemingly sincere 
declaration to the contrary – they are simply wrong in their judgements?  
Fulford seems to think we simply cannot. He shirks the idea that we ought to try and 
actually get things right, all thing told; to look for, in his own words: ‘pre-set right 
outcomes’ (Fulford, 2012: 24) Cassidy (2013) has argued that Fulford’s position 
dissolves into a form of subjectivism. I agree, if for slightly different reasons. I will 
now aim to show this, using Thornton’s article as a guide but hopefully filling it out as 
I go. 
The way that Fulford sees the picture we seem to share is quite different. Yes we 
reach a consensus that cancer is bad and this is the best treatment. But the values 
are not there like the tumour is there. We just happen to share them.  
This is still a case of our casting something onto the world. Where I would say we 
share the values surrounding cancer because we have good reason to be against it, 
Fulford would seemingly say that the reasons we think we have are predicated upon 
a local or contingent consensus of values, none of which have no further court of 
appeal for claiming primacy. Thus, if someone loves their tumour dearly and names 
it, and thinks all the pain is well worth it to have it around, that person’s values 
merely differ to ours.    
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Fulford thus pushes his position towards ‘answering’ ethical questions by way of a 
process. And the process does not make reference to its conclusion being the right 
one, decided, as Thornton puts it, by way of ‘antecedently real moral properties’ 
(Thornton, 2011: 991). Here is Fulford: 
Values-based practice aims to support balanced decision-making within a 
framework of shared values, based on a premise of mutual respect and relying 
for its practical effectiveness on good process rather than pre-set right 
outcomes. (Fulford, 2012: 24)      
Fulford, then, gets caught up on the point of proof. It is an epistemological concern 
which is causing the worry. ‘We cannot prove what we ought to do’ is thus run 
together with this claim: ‘so we cannot say that our judgement is better than anyone 
else’s’. Fulford does not see this as incorrect, nor any sort of loss. He merely sees it 
as the fact of disagreement, given that values ‘are complex in the sense that they are 
capable of very different interpretations by different people and in different 
situations’. (Fulford, 2012: 41) While values are complex and we indeed cannot 
prove to someone they ought to change their values this does not preclude the idea 
that one party is not more correct.  In our picture this is guided by the normative 
constraints of the sorts of values in play. Whereas Fulford says: 
…that many values, even though shared, are complex in the sense that they are 
capable of very different interpretations by different people and in different 
situations (Fulford, 2012: 41) 
The mention of many interpretations brings to mind theorists like Wright; and this 
idea of the endless interpretation of the evaluative will bring similar problems for 
Fulford. For if values are infinitely interpretable, such that no one should be accorded 
with being more right, however diverse their interpretation is, then the same goes, by 
way of our Wittgensteinian account, for empirical judgements as well. Fulford seems 
to separate the empirical and the evaluative, with only the former being properly true. 
In fact, this thesis makes part of his account for being able to say that mental health 
and physical health diagnoses are not so different. Following Hare he makes the 
claim that all values supervene upon the empirical; that which is really there anyway. 
It is just the values we share that seem to be intrinsic goods. Whereas the ones we 
do not wear their contingency of our personal inclinations upon their face. The 
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uncontroversial health issues of physical ailments are thus so because they are 
predicated on heavily shared evaluations that supervene upon the empirical world, 
whereas mental health ones are complex and thus open to vast interpretation.  
But this interpretative position falls precisely into the same complaints we posited 
against Wright. And it is dangerous for Fulford. It again splits into the two levels, 
things we can say are right and wrong at the empirical level ‘the tumour is there or is 
not’, and the level of evaluation which supervenes upon this by way of shared 
judgements: ‘and the tumour being there is bad - and only now with the added 
evaluation is it a health issue’. 
But as we have seen, minus shared commitments, empirical judgements are open to 
an equal amount of interpretation as the evaluative; because empirical claims are not 
self-evident without shared commitments guiding our evaluations of how their 
extensions are to be made out; if they were self-evident we would require the 
suspect psychological mechanism (4.2.3) to explain them. This realisation, one 
hopes, might go some way to relieving Fulford’s fear that the lack of proof for holding 
one value over another means that neither party is, in fact, right or wrong.  
Thus, it would seem that Fulford’s commitment to Hare, when analysed in the 
Wittgensteinian manner, collapses into something like Wright’s analysis. If we can 
interpret evaluative claims infinitely and there is no way for accounting for shared 
empirical judgements accept against a background of shared evaluative 
commitments then empirical judgements also are infinitely interpretable. 
On the particularist picture I am endorsing both positions fail. Hare’s position illicitly 
makes the claim that empirical judgements can be made out without shared 
commitments - which requires the idea of the suspect psychic mechanism - while 
Wright’s ends all hope for actual normativity and the intuition of objective choices 
even in the empirical claim. But Hare’s position fails because it collapses into 
Wright’s. Thus the idea that there can be no antecedent evaluative truths becomes 
the claim that there can be no truths, just a conglomeration of perspectives. Thornton 
points out that some theorists who wish to make mental health more normalised 
have tried to square it off with physical ailments by showing that both can be 
analysed in purely empirical terms. Fulford instead shows that both are necessarily 
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imbued with value. With this I agree. What I disagree with is then going on to make 
the claim that those evaluations are not up for analysis as better or worse.  
What I would claim is that the shared commitments we develop to become active 
members in a form of life – the only background against which we can have 
normativity at all -  normatively commit us (if we have things right) to using these 
concepts in a way that goes beyond how people happen to use them at any 
particular time. The community and the form of life can have a wedge driven 
between them. This is why, for example, Americans can list values they hold dearly – 
freedom of expression, justice as fairness, diverse political and societal values, 
innocence before being proven guilty, and freedom of speech – and then act against 
all of these when a politico-religious state they are unfamiliar with, half the world 
away, expresses an interest in nuclear armament. Most Americans would not say all 
these values listed above are trumped by distant concerns for safety, even though 
this is how many of them happen to act here and now. The universality of the values, 
inherent in the normative contract picture, extends beyond how they are used by a 
society. The concepts in play rise above how they function in particular instances 
and instead demarcate an ideal version of what we believe. Whether we follow them, 
or give in to weakness of will, is quite another matter.  
On my thesis then, we have direct access to the moral properties that are present in 
a situation. We can say that there are in fact some answers that are better than 
others, precisely because the people proposing these answers have picked out 
values which are more readily present and pertinent there. This needn’t work against 
Cavell’s point, that there can be a rational disagreement. All I need to show is that 
there can, in principle, be some cases where rationality requires that one specific 
path of action is followed, despite the sincere protests of the many. This I have done, 
by showing that the alternatives to this picture, community ratification and 
empiricism, fail to give workable epistemological accounts of meaning. The only 
other possibility is that we are, with McDowell, contractually bound to speak against 
the majority if there are normative reasons to.  Our analysis of VBP has extended 
Thornton’s analysis by showing just why it is that particularism, and not an account 
of proceduralism, ought to be seen as the main alternative to generalism.  
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Proceduralism, then, seems to be based on a serious rejection of the idea that we 
cannot make generalist claims which allow for set rules. In so doing though it drives 
us towards an account of irrationalism when we bring it to its logical conclusion and 
show the unfavourable comparison for what it is. This seems like a pattern of 
assessment that is being quickly established in clinical evaluative practice. That 
there are no right answers seems to devolve quickly into the claim that all we can do 
is let everyone be heard in a way that respects their (however wildly) variant opinion. 
But proof and objectivity come apart. From the fact we cannot prove definitively 
which opinion is better, it does not follow that all opinions ought to be given equal 
weight.   
 
7.4: Particularism and Practical Ethical Guidance: 
As a further point, it is also fair to say that the real driving force behind 
Fulford’s account is Liberalism. On the basis that we cannot prove any value to be 
right, we develop a new value: that all values are equal. While this value can make 
sense in certain contexts – say respecting someone’s religious rights to deny 
treatment, even when we have strong reason to believe their god does not exist, so 
whatever judgement that a person believes will be cast upon them by this 
supernatural entity does not exist – it cannot be the default between all judgements; 
remember our patient wishing to amputate his leg to rid himself of a mole. Whereas 
Fulford would say this value’s being shared is what makes it not need to be 
questioned, we can say it is not questioned because it actually is a powerful 
evaluative reason.  
Liberalism made out of the case of lack of definitive appeal for values is surely self-
defeating. It remains unclear why I ought to respect other’s values if they clash with 
my own. If no value can be made out to definitively trump any other it does not follow 
that I ought to value all values equally or not speak against ones that I find heinous, 
ignorant or dangerous (if only for the person who holds the value). If someone 
makes the case that indeed I ought not to speak out, and I ask why, their answer will 
necessarily involve an evaluative position: that I am offending the liberalist value of 
self-legislation. In which case the liberalist value itself stops being equal to my own, it 
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necessarily demarcates the ways in which I can act upon my own values: but this 
would be in direct contradiction of itself. 
It is crucial to point out, however, that it is a central pillar of my own thesis that, 
although there are evaluative truths, these truths cannot be formalised into a system 
which can guide actions before we know the context of the situation they are meant 
to guide. Even though I disagree with Fulford about the metaphysics of moral 
reasons, one might ask how particularists can say something meaningful and true 
about how medical practices ought to be organised and characterised. What 
principles could we build such a case around? 
There is a positive and a negative point here. The positive point is that we can free 
ourselves from the theoretical ideas that have bewitched philosophers, such that if 
we are to say why evidence is important we must define evidence just so, or if we 
are to say autonomy is important, we must define autonomy just so. As such we can 
hold a whole plethora of values to be available to us without coming to theoretical 
implausible conclusions. When and what type of evidence ought to be used in 
certain situations will not be pre-decided upon by theories. We have already seen 
that such a move works backwards. Those theories will specialise the term in such a 
way for it to become a new philosophical entity by starting with an intuitive notion and 
generalise it in such a way as to make certain uses of it - which in everyday 
language seem perfectly acceptable - seem fallacious. What they call intuitions, the 
particularist just see as shared, if inchoate universal concerns, which can be 
specified in various ways depending on context, with no way to abstract from each 
case to find some general feature.  
In each case better or worse specifying from the universal seems possible. And this 
itself seems to make saying something meaningfully action guiding close to 
impossible. This picture places us back with the issue of expertise. The requisite 
sense of expertise for moral, clinical and politicised decision making seems to defy at 
every turn the use of generality. Being inchoate in this way makes it a practical skill; 
an art, not a science; know-how, not knowledge-that.  
From the back of this comes the negative point. We cannot design a characteristic 
form for clinical practice or for the imposition of ethical concerns into practice which 
will give us the right outcome. To say otherwise would be to shirk the commitments 
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of my own arguments. To be fully aware of which of the universal, inchoate, 
overlapping and sometimes incommensurable concerns apply here and now I really 
need to be present and vigilant within the situation that demands it. This does not 
mean we cannot list appropriate concerns. But if start to systematise them from 
outside a position where they might actually apply, without the contextual perception 
of all the salient issues, we will soon be back to fallacious generalising. 
Thus, with this picture in place, we can start to see that moral education needs to be 
practical. Particularism has to be taken seriously if we are to pay due respect to the 
way the moral terrain actually encroaches upon our reasoning. We can look for 
universals and see how and where they apply in certain situations. As Thornton’s 
own work has made clear, however, such a picture, based on particularism looks 
more descriptive than prescriptive. His analysis of the Four Principles account, 
proffered by Beauchamps (2003) makes this point. Beauchamps pays heed to the 
idea of incommensurability and also gives, when read properly and supplied with a 
particularist metaphysic of morality (Thornton, 2005), a theory that gives a full role to 
judgement. Either specifying or balancing the universal principle they supply there 
cannot really give us a mechanical answer to problems. Both balancing and 
specifying are open to judgement. Thornton (2005) seems to give the impression 
that balancing has a more substantive slant to it, but specification allows the exact 
same issue to arise. Universal principles do not unpack themselves. Each one has 
various possible specifications depending on the contextual features that are there. 
As there is no general feature that can be abstracted from them and in this sense 
judgement or practical wisdom is called for. 
It likewise means that the person who comes to do the specifying or balancing sees 
the principles. This is a crucial point that cannot be missed. Just because some rules 
are not open to interpretation, it does not mean that others are not. We have no 
further place to look for certainty except to our own judgements that have been built 
up, via inculcation into moral life, and those who we see as wise for advice on such 
issues. This prompts the question, how do we know we were inculcated correctly 
and have seen the light in a way that, say, those whose attitudes to some persons 
was ‘an attitude towards a slave’? 
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Such a fear is warranted upon this account. Here is Onora O’Neill (1996) on the 
issue:  
Particularist strategies…to discern who has ethical standing by inspecting the 
scope of our community or nation or relationships are often decently clad in the 
vocabulary of commitment, care, and attachment, but…those who fix the scope 
of ethical consideration by reference to [these] limits… must exclude from ethical 
consideration those for whom ‘we’ care not a whit or… see as outside ‘our’ 
community… 
Such a fear lingers, but as I have already said before, how we read the sorts of rules 
that O’Neill is implying can put an end to what she sees as cultural subjectivity in fact 
depend upon our attitudes to attain any motivity. To believe that rules defeat 
attitudes is to misread this entire thesis. The rule is made clear to perception as 
meaningful by way of the attitudes we have. That the rule ‘treat all rational people as 
equals’ has such an effect now shows our attitudes are going in the right direction. 
Again, this is not to say that the attitudes that people had towards slavery then were 
right by fiat, just by them having that attitude. They were wrong. There were enough 
conceptual tools present for the moral reality of what they were doing to strike them 
as being wrong. The same goes for Nazi Germany. If we can learn anything from 
such examples it is that we have to be careful about honouring our normative 
commitments to all our virtuous concepts in the full.  
As Aurel Kolnai (1938) emphasised so long ago, those who were present at the 
beginning of the Nazi party did not see themselves as being pure evil. They saw 
themselves as upholding a very specific set of values. The issue is that these could 
only be made out at the expense of all others. The sorts of dispositions we all know 
lead to disaster – stubbornness, pride, unquestioning duty, courage stripped of 
mercy, obedience, greed – were all present there. This is why moral education is so 
important. Rules only get us so far if we are not raised with the right eyes to see why 
they are important. It is this which makes the intuitive claims of each of the 
touchstone theories so appealing. Autonomy, self-legislation, happiness, flourishing, 
the continuation of our species, freedom and so on; the list goes on. But it is a 
mistake to specialise these terms in order for them to be generalised into general 
principles for action. We feel without the principles we have nothing to appeal to. 
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This is simply a mistake. The list of concerns goes on; it is simply that none are 
utterly definitive to the man who is wilfully ignorant. But it is only philosophers who 
are wilfully ignorant. Such a position is precisely one we put ourselves into to look for 
some certainty. Having failed to do this with morality, however, can we really turn 
around and claim that the whole project is therefore dispensable? Are these still not 
still our reasons and are they not the right reasons? Other than the wilfully ignorant, 
we have to deal with the actually ignorant if we do not learn the lessons of 
particularism and educate people in the right way, to see morality not as a theoretical 
exercise, but as an exercise of practical reason, of nurturing the right sorts of 
dispositions and perceptive states to be able to see such properties as and when 
they obtain.  
 
7.5: Getting Moral Discourse Right – Concluding Remarks 
I would like to finish this thesis with an analysis of a paper that I believe to 
really combine all of the concerns that I have outlaid here. It is a paper that pleads, 
without appeal to any one overarching theoretical position backing up its central 
claims: that doctors ought not to be those to whom the burden of refusing treatments 
falls to. The author is Vegard Bruun Wyller (2015)   
His concerns are that of a physician who has first-hand experience of bedside 
rationing. His points are lucid and well considered. The bulk of the argument points 
out that there is a theoretical clash between, firstly, the everyday ideas and concerns 
that make up the ethos of the doctor looking after his particular patients and the 
psychological, societal and practical elements which allow for trust to foster between 
the two, and the rationalistic and principled sort of theorising that underscores such 
ideas as distributive justice and health economics. The latter, if taken as something 
that needs to be done, belongs, claims Wyller, without appealing to any rationalistic 
grounding about societal identities, to the realm of political decision making. This is 
because here, a first order evaluation shows us that the trust is not predicated on the 
belief that the politician to whom it falls has specifically my best interest at heart. 
Instead, we assume that the politician has precisely every member of his state or 
constituency to look after and cannot be so personalised. The societal roles of doctor 
and politician, which allowed for this division of labour in such a way as to allow each 
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role to exhibit the correct sort of concern for the individual – in the case of the doctor 
as an actual individual with a name a history and a character, and in the case of the 
politician as one of his herd – has thus been subverted. This subversion brings with it 
a diminishing of trust in terms of the patient and the doctor, and a diminishing of 
meaning between the politician and his electorate.      
While Wyller takes resources from various philosophical positions including Aristotle 
and Levinas, this seems to be largely to add some academic clout to his position 
which is just fine as an argument without it. At no point does Wyller attempt to define 
any of the key terms that are pertinent to his positive arguments. The concepts of 
politics, medicine, trust, care and commitment are not defined to suit his purposes, 
but are left as ideas we can all understand without their identity and 
comprehensibility being cleaned up to suit rationalist purposes. The way his paper 
makes use of the idea of ‘by the bedside’ to get across a picture of the actual state of 
affairs we are discussing, placing us in the position of someone being treated, rather 
than taking some disinterested stance on the matter. Indeed it is the human element 
of medicine which shines through in his critique of health economics, of turning 
people to mere numerical values, which strikes at the heart of the matter there as 
well.  
This celebration of this piece of work – which does not stand alone, various authors 
write with equal compassion and lack of regard for overt-rationalisations (see: 
Diamond, 1978) – is not overtly academic. The point that stands is how well we can 
in fact marshal our actual many and distinct concerns into very real, very meaningful 
expositions of what it is that really matters in ethics without illicitly breaching the 
parameters in which those ideas can be sensibly discussed and looking for 
definitions from outside the domain to gain a false sense of clarity or certainty. The 
inchoate concerns Wyller brings out are not generalised into specific arguments that 
aim at abstracted principles. Indeed, he sees right through the attempts to aim for 
such principles when they are applied at the bedside, readily admitting that at the 
political level, where the trust relationship is precisely set up to not take into account 
individualistic credentials, generalised principles will be a necessary factor in 
decision making. He does not take on the voice of someone who is bewitched by the 
idea of finding the right answer when that is taken as being conceived as a 
generalised principle. He is an appropriately concerned member of the medical 
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profession that can see that values that elude the sort of quantification that is so 
commonplace in the usual discourse are being eroded in such a way as to genuinely 
distort the sort of relationship that is necessary for clinical care, as abstracted from 
the multiple specifications that might take given by context.  
That this argument was instantly met by an overtly rationalist retort by Magelsson 
(2016) is testament to what we, as particularists are up against. But it is contributions 
to the debate such as this one which are crucial to the ongoing battle to 
depersonalise that which is most personal. His argument gives not only a complaint, 
that health economics by way of trying to make things ‘fairer’ (in a theoretically 
specialised way) is eroding trust; with proof of that erosion and its negative effects 
being based on first-hand experience and a claim to ‘intrinsic, primary value’. Wyller 
also diagnoses with incredible clarity the reason for this – a movement of power from 
the political to the bureaucratic which in turn suggests a programmatic remedy: 
reverse the power transfer and we will regain the trust. In this article, then, we find 
the embodiment of the particularist position. 
It is a piece which exhibits perfectly the five points that I listed at the start of this 
section as being hallmarks of a particularist argument. Firstly he makes no attempt to 
define in a way that carries loaded meaning any of the key terms his argument is 
based around. The notions of trust, care, compassion, power, the division of the 
political and the medical – each concept is used as we do use them without a 
specialised definition. The doctor-patient relationship is given an ‘ethos’ rather than a 
substantive or loaded definition.  
Secondly, Wyller keeps open the possibility for rational disagreement to specific 
cases being rationed. He does not make, as Magelssen (2016) claims, some 
overarching claim that rationing as such is immoral. His argument could not be used 
as some sort of definitive proof we ought not to ration here and now. It allows for its 
concerns to be set aside as and when judgement demands, such as difficult triage 
situations.  
Thirdly, we come to proximity. Wyller’s argument is as good as it is, I maintain, 
precisely because he is a physician. As such he has a more nuanced and discerning 
grasp of the sorts of values that are crucial to his role. Rather than being observed 
and analysed into general principles by an outsider such as an ethicist, his day to 
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day interaction with patients gives him the sort of insight which is indispensable to 
understanding values in a medical setting.  
Fourthly, his arguments for keeping certain values are motivational, in the sense that 
they make us look at the situation as it is: imbued with the sorts of values we expect 
within a medical context. The concerns he has are specific to its cause, not 
abstracted from rational analysis and just applied to a new context. To abstract is to 
take out the very details that are essential to the appropriate values forming.  
Fifthly, his argument is not a philosophical explanatory theory, which we have 
already made a significant case against. As previously noted, Wyller utilises insights 
from Aristotle and Levinas, amongst others. But using the insights of philosophers is 
not enough to warrant the label ‘philosophical explanatory theory’. His argument is 
distinctively moral and cast in moral language and expresses clear moral concerns. 
He uses these philosophers precisely because their own work eschews the same 
notion of over-rationalisations. He does not build a theory, as much as he makes a 
case from first order moral concerns that are our own; concerns that he knows that 
we can all relate to because we live against a backdrop of shared practices and 
concerns. These are the sorts of arguments that particularists should not just accept, 
but the sort they ought to promote. It says something meaningful and true; it directs 
our attention to a distinct problem and highlights particular areas of concern (trust 
and doctor/patient relationships) as areas which could meaningfully fix the faults it 
finds there. In so doing, he shows how a tradition in one set of norms (the desire for 
algorithmic ethical answers) is causing issues with our most firmly held moral 
convictions.  
If someone disagrees with Wyller, they can do. To do so and be convincing one does 
not need to step outside of the first-order concerns we share. The point of a non-
reductive morality is that we can always make contact with someone else’s position. 
As long as we are not talking past each other – which is simply not possible if we 
think properly about translatability – then there will always be some point of 
agreement. If we add to this the idea that we can start with any shared norms and 
work towards changing an outlook, such that we do not need to share first premises 
or principles in order to change someone’s mind, it seems like this position, properly 
conducted within a first order moral account, properly defended, could well have 
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greater positive and effective impact on the moral discourse than any overarching 
generalist theory could wish to hope.    
In this manner it is fair to say that if these sorts of arguments are the way to go then 
the threat that is posed by generalism is not merely a theoretical one, it is itself a 
distinctively moral threat. Particularist theorists seem to spend most of their time 
undoing the issues caused by rash and unthoughtful generalism. We are trading in 
real human concerns for rough approximations and quantifications and doing so in 
the name of a serious and distinctive claim to reason, not a caricature of rationality. 
This generalist academic fashion needs to end if moral discourse is to find its feet 
once again. Particularist contributors, like Wyller, will hopefully put an end to it.  
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